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CHAPTER 1 : INTRODUCTION 
The clothing sector is fundamental to the world economy. International trade in the 
combined sector has increased 60-fold during the past 40 years, a period characterised 
by major increases in the globalisation of business, deregulation and the gradual 
removal of quotas. The clothing industry is also one of the most mobile industries in 
the world. Over the last two decades complex global supply networks have emerged to 
supply clothing to world markets. The nature of these global networks poses significant 
challenges for quick and accurate response in the clothing sector. Ensuring the right 
product volume and mix within retail stores from a globally dispersed supply network 
requires innovative operational strategies and practices. 
The purpose of this project is to use supply management as a tool in analysing the 
global sourcing processes and activities within two successful leading textile 
companies: Zara and Benetton; to describe their logistics and supply chain processes in 
order to understand how these two companies can add a good value to its customers, 
to its stakeholders and to its suppliers. Pressure for companies to create and deliver 
value to customers manifests itself in every stage of the business today. Therefore, it is 
significant to compare and to contrast these two companies' activities and processes 
which lead them to success.  
After a brief introduction about vertical integration, are described these two 
companies: the business model, the strategy, the strengths, the weaknesses,  the 
information solutions adopted, some financial data and the biggest competitors. An 
important point of comparison is the solution of the need of this market of a quick 
response (QR).  Finally are described a solution that is adopted in the grocery industry 
and that can be adopted as well in the clothing industry (ECR). 
The interest in this subject born from my Italian study in management engineering; as 
well an interest in informatics solutions  grow from my Spanish study at FIB. Because of 
my permanence in Spain I choose to compare an Italian company with a Spanish one. 
This project is realised as a Final Project both in Italy and Spain with the supervision of 
a Spanish professor, Jose M. Cabré Garcia, and an Italian professor, Massimo Visconti, 
too.   
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Project description 
This project would analyse two big companies in the clothing industry : Zara and 
Benetton. The objective is to compare the two model above all in the view of vertical 
integration, that is how the vertical integration is supported by the information 
technology. 
The idea is to study the strengths and the weaknesses of these two model in order to 
suggest a possible informatics solution that allow to improve the efficiency and the 
satisfaction with the consumer. 
Motivation 
I choose to develop this project because of : 
- My interest in clothing industry 
- Application of my knowledge acquired during my study in management 
engineering 
- My interest in a Spanish company, taking advantage of my permanence in 
Spain 
- My interest in IT, due to my study en la FIB 
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CHAPTER 2 : VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
2.1: VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
In microeconomics and management, the term vertical integration describes a style of 
management control. It is grounded on the acquisition by a company operating in one 
market of another company which is complementary to its existing business (as a 
supplier or user of product) but which operates in another market. That is that the 
vertical integration is the degree to which a firm owns its upstream suppliers and its 
downstream buyers. Contrary to horizontal integration, which is a consolidation of 
many firms that handle the same part of the production process, vertical integration is 
typified by one firm engaged in different parts of production. Expansion of activities 
downstream is referred to as forward integration and expansion upstream is referred 
to as backward integration. Both expansions upstream and downstream are referred 
as balanced integration. 
 A company exhibits backward vertical integration when it controls subsidiaries 
that produce some of the inputs used in the production of its products. For 
example, automobile company may own a tire company, a glass company, and 
a metal company. Control of these three subsidiaries is intended to create a 
stable supply of inputs and ensure a consistent quality in their final product 
 A company trends toward forward vertical integration when it controls 
distribution centers and retailers where its products are sold. Type of vertical 
integration where a manufacturer acquires the channel of distribution of its 
outputs to achieve greater economies of scale or higher market share (It was 
the main business approach of Ford and other car companies in the 1920s, who 
sought to minimize costs by centralizing the production of cars and car parts) 
 Balanced vertical integration means a firm controls all of these components, 
from raw materials to final delivery. 
The three varieties noted are only abstractions; actual firms employ a wide variety of 
subtle variations. Suppliers are often contractors, not legally owned subsidiaries. Still, a 
client may effectively control a supplier if their contract solely assures the supplier’s 
profitability. Distribution and retail partnerships exhibit similarly wide ranges of 
complexity and interdependence. In relatively open capitalist contexts, pure vertical 
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integration by explicit ownership is uncommon and distributing ownership is 
commonly a strategy for distributing risk. 
Two issue that should be considered when deciding whether to vertical integrate are 
cost and control. The cost aspect depends on the cost of market transaction between 
firms versus the cost of administering the same activities internally within a single firm. 
The second issue is the impact of asset control, which can impact barriers to entry and 
which can assure cooperation of key value-adding players. 
 
Benefits of vertical integration 
Vertical integration potentially offers the following advantages: 
 Reduce transportation costs if common ownership results in closer geographic 
proximity 
 Improve supply chain coordination 
 Provide more opportunities to differentiate by means of increased control over 
inputs 
 Capture upstream or downstream profit margins 
 Increase entry barriers to potential competitors, for example if the firm can 
gain access to a scarce resource 
 Gain access to downstream distribution channels that otherwise would be 
inaccessible 
 Facilitate investment in highly specialized assets in which upstream or 
downstream players may be reluctant to invest 
 Lead to expansion of core competencies 
 Economies of scale 
 Economies of scope 
 Cost reduction 
 Competitiveness 
 Reduce threat from powerful supplier and/or customers 
 Higher degree of control over the entire value chain 
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Drawbacks of vertical integration 
While some of the benefits of vertical integration can be quite attractive to the firm, 
the drawbacks may negate any potential gains. Vertical integration potentially has the 
following disadvantages: 
 Capacity balancing issues. For example, the firm may need to build excess 
upstream capacity to ensure that its own downstream operations have 
sufficient supply under all demand conditions 
 Potentially higher costs due to low efficiencies resulting from lack of suppliers 
competition 
 Decreased flexibility due to previous upstream or downstream investments 
 Decreased ability to increase product variety if significant in-house 
development is required 
 Developing new core competencies may compromise existing competencies 
 Increase bureaucratic costs 
 
Factor favoring vertical integration 
The following situational factors tend to favor vertical integration: 
 Taxes and regulations on market transactions 
 Obstacles to the formulation and monitoring of contracts 
 Strategic similarity between the vertically-related activities 
 Sufficiently large production quantities so that the firm can benefit from 
economies of scale 
 Reluctance of other firms to make investments specific to the transaction 
 
Factor against vertical integration 
The following situational factors tend to make vertical integration less attractive: 
 The quantity required from a supplier is much less the minimum efficient scale 
for producing the product  
 The product is a widely available commodity and its production decreases 
significantly as cumulative quantity increases 
 The core competencies between the activities are very different 
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 The vertically adjacent activities are in very different types of industries. For 
example manufacturing is very different from retailing. 
 The addiction of the new activity places the firm in competition with another 
player with which it needs to cooperate. The firm then may be viewed as a 
competitor rather than a partner 
 
Alternatives to vertical integration 
There are alternatives to vertical integration that may provide some of the same 
benefits with fewer drawbacks. The following are few of these alternatives for 
relationships between vertically-related organizations: 
 Long-term explicit contracts 
 Franchise agreements 
 Joint ventures 
 Co-location of facilities 
 Implicit contracts (relying on firms’ reputation) 
 
Origin of vertical integration: history 
The strategic reasons for opting for a vertical integration strategy have changed over 
the years. During the 19th century, firms used vertical integration to achieve economies 
of scale. During the middle of the 20th century, vertical integration was used to assure 
a steady supply of vital inputs. In some cases, the theory of transaction cost economics 
was applied to backward integration or forward integration, as a means to total cost 
reduction. That is, it was cheaper for a firm to perform the role of suppliers and 
distributors than to spend time and money to interact with such parties. Subsequently, 
in the late 20th century, competition intensified in most industries. Corporate 
restructuring resulted in vertical disintegration by reducing the levels of vertical 
integration in large corporations. 
Vertical disintegration is facilitated by the widespread use of information and 
telecommunications technologies, which support lower transaction costs between 
market participants. As lower transaction costs can be achieved using information and 
communication technologies, rather than by vertically integrating, firms start to 
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vertically disintegrate. This effect is commonly known as ”Coase’s Law “or the “Law of 
Diminishing Firms”. This law states that when the transaction costs are decreasing, the 
size of the firm will also decrease. 
 
Usage of vertical integration: applications 
Decisions on vertical integration are usually made in the following contexts: 
 In the strategy development process, vertical integration may be considered as a 
strategic choice. For example if suppliers are very powerful, a solution to that threat is 
to buy a number of them up 
 When you are analyzing industry dynamics, using Porter’s Five Forces model, vertical 
integration is an action to decrease the bargaining power of suppliers and customers 
 Vertical integration may be a path for reducing transaction costs 
 
2.2: THE THREE A’S OF A SUPPLY CHAIN EXCELLENCE 
During the 1990s, companies across varied sectors of the economy rolled out bold 
initiatives to improve their supply chains and stay competitive. Apparel makers called 
their program Quick Response, the grocery sector came up with Efficient Consumer 
Response and the food service industry dubbed its system the Efficient Food Service 
Response. All focused on efficiency and speed. But supply chains that focus solely on 
cost efficiency or material speed cannot sustain long-term success. Companies may 
gain some ground over their competitors in the short run but may not be able to hold 
it.  
 
The three A's 
Companies today face a multitude of supply chain challenges that did not exist a 
decade ago. Increasing supply-and-demand uncertainties, the accelerating pace of 
product and technology changes and the electronics industry's continuing 
"disintegration" all add complexity. A successful supply chain strategy requires distinct 
capabilities to meet these challenges. First, as OEMs increase their product variety and 
customization and penetrate new markets, they need to improve their forecasting, 
production scheduling and inventory planning. Indeed, the day-to-day uncertainties in 
demand and supply are much more challenging when you have high product variety. In 
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addition, businesses are subject to more shocks today than in the past. The terrorist 
attacks of September 2001, the Longshoremen's strike in California in 2002 and the 
SARS outbreak in Asia in 2003 are three high-profile examples. Such events cause huge 
disruptions to supply chains, and companies must learn to respond swiftly. The 
dynamics of ultrafast product and technology life cycles mean that the "clock speed" of 
virtually all industries is increasing. The competitive landscape is constantly changing, 
and risks and opportunities present themselves rapidly. The right supply chain strategy 
of yesterday may not be correct today, nor will it be right for tomorrow. And the 
supply chain that works at the beginning of the product's life cycle most likely will be 
different from the supply chain at product maturity, and different again at end of life. 
Likewise, the pace of the industry's disintegration — the outsourcing of everything, 
from design to manufacturing to services — is unprecedented. The result is a rapidly 
maturing outsourced manufacturing and logistics services sector and a burgeoning 
ODM sector. We live in a world where supply chains, not companies, compete for 
market dominance. But companies often have diverging incentives and interests from 
their supply chain partners, so when they independently strive to optimize their 
individual objectives, the expected result can be compromised. The best efforts of one 
company could be wasted if its supply chain partners don't synchronize their efforts 
accordingly. To respond to the high degree of uncertainty associated with product 
variety proliferation and disruptions due to unexpected crises, supply chains need to 
be agile and flexible to match demand with supply. And companies need to develop 
supply chains that are adaptable, that respond to the systematic changes of the 
market and the customer. In addition, companies must be ready to adjust their supply 
chain structures and strategies when change occurs. Given the potentially diverse 
interests of the many players in the value chain, companies need to align their 
incentives so each acts in the best interests of the whole and the total supply chain is 
optimized. That's where the three A's — agility, adaptability and alignment — come in. 
Beyond just efficiency and speed, the three A's form the basis on which superior value 
can be created within the supply chain and delivered to the market. 
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2.2.1: AGILITY 
Agile supply chains respond to uncertainties in a rapid, flexible, cost-effective and 
reliable manner. Building agility requires strong supplier relationships, the right buffer 
inventory, appropriate capacity levels, product and process design with 
postponement, parts commonality, efficient logistics systems, backup plans for supply 
and logistics, and an information system that enables fast and accurate information on 
demand and supply conditions. These capabilities require tight integration of such 
functions as design and manufacturing, merchandising and operations, and 
procurement and logistics. Consider two agile companies: Seven-Eleven Japan and 
Nokia. Seven-Eleven Japan is the most profitable retailer in that country. Its annual 
inventory turn rate of 55 is the envy of competitors worldwide. The company makes 
use of up-to-the-minute demand information — point of sales, customer profiles, local 
events and weather data — to drive its replenishment and product development 
process. And it reorganizes its retail shelf three times a day to meet the changing 
needs of consumers.  Its logistics system is also agile, utilizing multiple modes of 
transportation, smart consolidation at distribution centers and flexible but reliable 
delivery processes. Nokia's agility is evident in its responsiveness to unexpected supply 
chain disruptions. In 2000, a Philips Semiconductors RF chip factory in New Mexico 
went up in flames when it was struck by lightning. Nokia, a Philips customer, had 
contingency plans in place and a team of executives ready and trained to deal with just 
such a crisis. The company promptly evaluated the seriousness of the problem, made 
quick design changes and tapped backup sources. Contrast this with Ericsson, also a 
Philips customer. Ericsson's supply chain couldn't cope with the disruption, so the 
company had to scale back production, which affected handset supply for months. As a 
result, Nokia was able to grab valuable market share from Ericsson.  
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2.2.2: ADAPTABILITY 
For any given product family, OEMs try to design the most efficient supply chain to 
serve their customers. That includes optimizing the location of suppliers, 
manufacturing contractors, distribution, logistics systems and retail channels. When 
demand or supply conditions change, OEMs must reexamine the supply chain strategy 
to ensure it's still appropriate. Options include adapting the supply base, relocating 
manufacturing, using different means of distribution or outsourcing services, offering 
new sales channels and modifying product designs. Some companies excel at 
adaptability. EMS provider Flextronics International Inc. started as a pure contract 
manufacturer but over time evolved a business model of building industrial parks to 
accommodate its extensive supply base. More recently, Flextronics' services have 
expanded to include product design. Flextronics used its extensive supply network to 
help Microsoft Corp. launch and ramp production of the Xbox. Microsoft used 
Flextronics' industrial parks in Mexico and Hungary for the product introduction, since 
speed and market proximity were critical to a successful launch. But as the product 
matured, and when faced with strong price cuts from Sony, Flextronics migrated the 
production of Xbox to China to boost cost efficiency. Adaptive supply chains are one 
reason that Flextronics has moved from the 22nd-ranked EMS Company in 1993 to No. 
1 in the world today.  
                
                                           Figure 2.1: Foundations of adaptive supply chains 
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2.2.3: ALIGNMENT 
The weakest link in any supply chain defines the chain's ultimate performance. If one 
member of the supply chain focuses only on maximizing its own interests, and if those 
interests are not aligned with the objectives of the entire supply chain, then the overall 
chain's performance will be less than optimal. Smart companies have therefore 
devised relationships and contracts that align their partners' incentives with their own 
interests to maximize the chain's overall performance. It starts with sharing 
information and knowledge to form the foundation for a deep supply chain 
relationship. The second dimension is the alignment of identity — that is, the roles and 
responsibilities of the partners. Here, such issues as responsibility for replenishment, 
forecasting, order fulfillment and customer service need to be well-defined and, if 
need be, realigned. We find examples of clearly defined roles in vendor-managed 
inventory, which shifts the responsibility of managing replenishment from the buyer to 
the seller. Another example is collaborative planning, forecasting and replenishment, 
where the responsibilities for those tasks are shared. Collaborative design is yet 
another example. The third dimension is the alignment of incentives. This requires the 
creation of risk-, cost- and reward-sharing schemes so partners’ supply chain works in 
unison to maximize the overall performance of the supply chain, while each gets a fair 
and equitable return. One example of a successful supply chain incentive alignment is 
Saturn's service operation. The service supply chain works well because the interests 
of Saturn, its suppliers and its dealerships are aligned. J.D. Power's consumer 
satisfaction index has consistently ranked Saturn among the top three automobile 
companies in customer service. Inventory turnover at Saturn dealerships averages 
more than seven times a year, compared with between one and five for its major 
competitors. The Saturn system fully integrates service operations with the parts 
supply process. Integration here involves shared material flow systems, positioning of 
parts people within the production facility, use of direct supplier performance metrics, 
and inventory sharing among production and after-sales logistics to cover emergency 
shortage situations for either plant production or service delivery. Demand data is also 
linked with external parts suppliers' data to support production planning. Saturn has 
relieved its dealerships of the burden of managing their inventory directly — 
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something few did well — by creating a retailer inventory system known as Jointly 
Managed Inventory (JMI). The dealers bought the hardware, but Saturn provided all 
software implementation, system installation, maintenance and support. All demand 
transactions at the dealer are transmitted daily to Saturn via satellite. Saturn then 
generates stocking decisions and replenishment quantities for each dealership 
location. Successful implementation of JMI requires proper alignment of performance 
management and the sharing of risk. Saturn does not simply monitor its service 
performance in delivering parts to dealers, but the service operation personnel and 
dealerships are held jointly accountable for the service performance experienced by 
the vehicle owners. In addition, the Saturn service parts group is measured on the 
parts profitability of the dealers as well as the frequency of emergency orders needed 
to support those retailers. The Saturn system also lets retailers pool inventory. Saturn 
can transfer inventory from one dealer to another to address a stock-out situation. If 
demand for a stocked part has not occurred for nine months, Saturn will buy back the 
part. Flextronics has also succeeded at supply chain alignment. The EMS provider has 
low-cost manufacturing sites in several countries, but final-assembly labor cost is 
actually a small percentage of the total cost of many technology products. A high-
quality supply base is essential too. Thus Flextronics uses the "industrial park" 
approach at low-cost locations in Hungary, Mexico, China and Brazil. In addition to 
housing final assembly in the parks, Flextronics invested in developing subassembly 
and processing facilities, utilities, transportation networks, labor education, logistics 
support, customs clearance and employee recreation facilities. These investments are 
a powerful inducement for Flextronics' suppliers to co-locate manufacturing in its 
industrial parks. The suppliers benefit from Flextronics' investments, and Flextronics 
ensures the reliable supply base that its customers expect. Creating capabilities in all 
three A's involves proper training and the right performance measurement system, 
business process design, product design, and incentive schemes and contracts with 
supply chain partners. Companies that work on all three simultaneously will achieve 
superior supply chain performance. 
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                                                    Figure 2.2: foundation of aligned supply chains 
 
CHAPTER 2.3: PORTER’S ANALYSIS 
According to Porter, companies must look for having a superior comparable 
performance regarding competitors in the same industry, and described that the 
competitive advantage is to have a profitability level greater than those in the industry 
on the long run. He also described the cost leadership and the differentiation as the 
two types of competitive advantage a company can have, depending on the sources on 
which it is based on. In 1985, Professor Porter defined competitive advantage as the 
ability of adding value in the eyes of consumers, meaning the value perceived might be 
superior than the sum of the amount of costs related to the production processes. 
Subsequently, Porter’s conception of strategy is that it is a matter of competitive 
position, that a company creates by differentiating themselves in the eyes of its 
valuable customers, including a process of adding value along a structure of different 
activities interrelated in a way imperceptible for competitors, and so that this complex 
mix differs from those created or used by competitors. By 1980, Porter defined the 
competitive strategy as all the offensive or defensive actions a company does in order 
to create a favorable and sustainable position within an industry with the objective of 
having a superior performance which at the end will be convert as a considerable ROI 
(return over investment). Additionally, he explained that these actions were the 
response to the competitive five forces that according to him were the ones that 
determined the business environment and competition level around a company. The 
sources of competitive advantage are described as a necessary issue for a company to 
superior the competitors, over which the strategy must be created, as those leverage 
the main activities of a business. On the literature found regarding the sources of 
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competitive advantage, it is possible to identify four approaches to describe those, the 
approaches are: 
A) The industrial organization hypothesis comes from the microeconomic analysis of 
the relationship between a market structure and its profitability. 
B) The Resource-based hypothesis affirms that the competitive advantage comes from 
a firm’s strategic resources. 
C) The Capability-based hypothesis affirms that a company’s capabilities and 
competencies involved on coordinating the strategic resources are the sources of a 
firm’s competitive advantage. 
D) The Knowledge-based hypothesis affirms that a company’s competitive advantage is 
founded on its explicit and tacit knowledge that might be turned into tangible and 
exchangeable assets, for them to last and so the competitive advantage. 
 
Michael Porter’s hypothesis to develop the generic strategies was the industrial 
organization analysis but he modified it in the sense of its focus form nothing can be 
done by companies, neither the industry nor the company’s performance, by 
companies have some influence on its microeconomic area. This new subapproach 
affirm that even if for grouped products regarding characteristics and technology 
requirements, the industry frames them with specific parameters, within these 
parameters an industry evolutes through different paths along time, which is related 
beside others, to the strategic choices firms actually make (Porter, 1981, p.616). After 
all, these participant firms can influence its industry by creating its own competitive 
advantage. The result of this approach is a stated vision that encourages companies to 
first analyze their environment and the structural parameters of its industry, followed 
by a consideration on the potential level of profitability of this specific industry and 
concluding with the selection of a strategy that can effectively align the firm to the 
industry and simultaneously generate superior performance (Porter, 1980, pp. 4-5). 
According to Porter, the sources of competitive advantage for a company are either 
cost efficiency or differentiation. The Cost efficiency can be considered as a source of 
competitive advantage if a company can maintain lower costs than its competitors. On 
the other hand, the differentiation can be a source of competitive advantage if a 
company creates tradeoffs for competitors while its customers recognize these 
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differences as an added value. To define weather a firm has a higher potential on cost 
efficiency or differentiation with the actual resources, a company must look at the 
strengths at the drivers of both of them. The drivers are: “economies or diseconomies 
of scale, learning, synergies, including linkages between activities and relationships 
with other business units; integration effects, capacity of utilization, timing, location, 
discretionary policies independent of other drivers like quality and sales policies, and 
finally institutional factors like government regulation.” Though, the sources of 
competitive advantage are given by the analysis of the activities of a company. 
According to Porter, those should be either a different set than those of a competitor 
or must be performed differently, providing a unique value creation. In fact, Porter 
developed a tool to analyze what kind of competitive advantage a company has, also 
to identify what are the sources of a company’s competitive advantage. The tool, 
that’s shown below, is the so-called value-chain, it disaggregates a firm into primary 
activities and support strategically relevant activities ‘in order to understand the 
behavior of a firm's costs and its potential for differentiation.  
 
                  
                                                                     Figure 2.3 : Porter’s value chain 
 
Finally, for a company to decide where to base its competitive advantage on, it must 
have into account some additional considerations on both the cost and differentiation 
sources. The cost sourced advantage might be sustainable only if it is maintained as 
the lowest one, and that besides the drivers that sometimes leads to different levels 
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on competitive advantage depending on the driver a company is strong in, it has to 
have several activities aligned with the lower cost performance, if not, that would run 
it easy to imitate by competitors. “Cost leaders usually accumulate cost advantages 
gained from numerous sources in the value chain that interact and reinforce each 
other. This makes it difficult and expensive for competitors to imitate their cost 
position In contrast, the differentiation sourced advantage given by added features, 
supportive differential services, better designs, increasing reliability, brand tradition, 
among others; might be sustainable not only if this higher value is recognized as such, 
to allow the company to charge prices higher than the average, but also if “the sources 
of differentiation involve barriers, if the sources of differentiation are multiple, if a firm 
creates switching costs at the same time it differentiates, and if a firm has a cost 
advantage in differentiating. To start to aboard the Porter’s proposal, we might frame 
its limits on the business strategy one, understanding it as a strategy within an 
individual business, managed as a business unit, with a portfolio of a series of related 
products, that are involved into a bigger and wider portfolio but those are 
independent to the one on a business unit. The fact is that a business strategy will 
bring differences in all the areas of a business, creating though the necessity of a 
whole independent configuration between market needs and a company’s resources, 
as so an independent strategic proposition, clarifying that it doesn’t impact 
dramatically the performance of neither other business units nor the whole company. 
Additionally, the specification on Porter’s model of generic strategies to be as for a 
business strategy allows us to predict that the main focus on this proposition will be to 
answer to competitive advantages search and synergy creation more than to bother 
with resources allocation. A business strategy involves goals associated with products 
and markets of a specific business unit, as well as it leads the path to further activities 
that will be done for a company in the mentioned specific sector. There were proposed 
several classifications for types of business strategies but the most recognized ones 
are: The portfolio based strategies, the ones based on the product life-cycle, and finally 
the classification on Porter’s proposal, the generic strategies. In Porter’s opinion, the 
essence of a business strategy is the selection of a manner that will always lead the 
company to acquire competitive advantages. The way he designed the model has been 
retold by different authors including a framework of Porter’s backgrounds on strategy 
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but also on economics. Porter proposed two dimensions: the strategic goal and the 
strategic advantage, the first one refers to the scope in which a company wants to 
develop its activities being one segment or the broad market. The second one, refers 
to the manner the company will perform the best results in the market either by highly 
differentiated products or by low costs. According to other authors, he explained that 
these common strategies used by companies within an industry, were based on the 
market economic analysis matching supply and demand to capture from the demand 
side the size of the market a company seeks for, defining weather it is an industry-wide 
strategic target or a particular segment to target. From the supply side, it captures the 
strategic advantages, stating two general most important advantages according to 
him, which are product differentiation and product low costs (cost efficiency). 
Accordingly, by matching these two dimensions (supply and demand), companies have 
3 alternatives as strategy as shown in figure1 and that will be explained in detail 
below. According to Porter and in order to decide which of the three generic strategies 
to chose, a company must consider if it has the capability, the competencies, the 
resources required, and the organizational requirements also . A competitive 
advantage is possible just for a specific given market context, so to model a 
competitive advantage is necessary to analyze the forces and issues that influence the 
business environment. In his new vision on strategy, showed in the book The 
Competitive Advantage of Nations (1990) Porter recognizes that because of new 
circumstances and challenges that the process of globalization brought to markets, the 
companies development got influenced, and that this three generic strategies are 
unstable, and that is needed to create new more dynamic models to describe the 
competitive advantage. Though, Porter affirms that there are different ways for a 
company to reach the desired position and obtain the superior expected return over 
investments, the main fact for him is that a company’s strategy must illustrate the level 
at which it comprehended its situation related to its environment circumstances and 
the way it get going into that specific context. The context in which the generic 
strategies were developed implies reasonings in which: Those are to be used 
independently (but also combined in the case of differentiation and focus strategy by 
broadening the market scope, and anyway this can hardly be possible), to build in a 
long term the desired position, that was aimed to bring the company better results 
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than its competitors and so a sustainable competitive advantage. Miller, criticized 
Porter’s generic strategies in the fact that they can not used mixed strategies, as porter 
said that companies that mix strategies would end either getting heavy in costs or 
structure to behave and compete with cost leadership focused companies, or 
confusing its targeted customers. He affirmed that by mixing two of the generic 
strategies, entering with a niche strategy and then increasing its market as their 
internal strengths allowed it they go for a differentiation one, expanding their market 
going to a broader scope. Entered a market as a niche player and gradually expanded. 
Porter’s Generic Strategies are: 
1. Cost Leadership 
2. Differentiation 
3. Focus 
 
                  
Figure 2.4: Porter’s strategies 
 
Cost Leadership 
The cost leadership corresponds to a strategy used by companies when they have 
abilities to produce at lower costs than the competitors, and so to get more profit 
when selling the products in high quantities. This strategy calls for cost efficiencies, 
close control of costs, advantage or preferential access to raw materials, to 
components, to labor, and some other important inputs; because as long at it gets 
lower costs to produce, it can provide lower prices to its customers getting the 
valuable profit from a high level of sales, supported with a production process 
reinforced by economies of scale and experience curve effects; though it might be 
directed to a broad market scope. Companies that implement this strategy expect to 
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take advantage of economies of scale and the experience curve, by producing large 
amount of a product, to allow the company to compete with other companies in the 
same sector and that has decided to go for the same way of cost leadership. Examples 
of this include retailers such as Wal-Mart but also IT firms such as IBM, Dell, and 
Lenovo. According to Porter, “Low costs will enable a firm to sell relatively 
standardized products that offer features acceptable to many customers at the lowest 
competitive price and such low prices will gain competitive advantage and increase 
market share. Additionally he stated that if the low cost support can be sustained for a 
company during long periods of time, this will guarantee that they will increase market 
recognition and so market share, increasing sales and profits and thus superior 
performance will be reached by this company in its specific industry or market. Yet, as 
soon as the model starts to be developed, the critics start to match Porter’s ideas to 
say in this part that the sustainability of a cost based company’s competitive 
advantage last until a competitor develop a model allowing it to provide lower costs to 
the customer, and so critics argues that it is not in hands of a company but that its 
strategy will always be dependent to the competitors and that it doesn’t allow a 
company to react freely and follow its own path, because if this situation continues, 
this company will end by copying and minimize the competitor’s strategy in a cyclic 
process that finally will stop when all competitors in an industry have the same 
strategy, eroding the market profits in hands of the consumers. Some disadvantages 
on the cost leadership strategy pointed out by authors like Vokurka are that it would 
represent for the company a decreasing customer loyalty16, that the author sees as 
the killer of the same strategy in the long run, because as the company educates the 
customer to get the value from the lower price, any other competitor that would be 
able to reach the same or an improved cost based performance and so would offer 
lower prices to the customer, this last one will have no doubt on getting the “best-
value” (from their position) from whatever company offering the lowest price for a 
generic product. Priem also remarked that in terms of prices, there is a logic reasoning 
among consumers worldwide that those are related negatively to the quality. He 
described that customers perceive a tradeoff on quality and satisfaction when buying 
by prices means. This approach aim to expose the long term devasting consequences 
of this strategy in terms of how its customers perceive what they are buying and the 
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difficulty of make them come back again, because sometimes mind conceptions lead 
customers to change preferences in case for example of few more money to take buy 
decisions, under this approach they will go for another company that would offer 
higher quality for few more money. And finally, this might lead a customer to go at any 
given moment willing to pay more for a more distinguished article, being quality or 
different features. One of the most contradictory publications towards Michael 
Porter’s proposal, Kim and Al with the Blue Ocean Strategy book, explained that this 
strategy can be possible only for one company per industry, and so that it is quite 
optimistic. According to Kim et Al, only “if firms costs are low enough it may be 
profitable even in a highly competitive scenario hence it becomes a defensive 
mechanism against competitors. Low cost leadership becomes thus a viable strategy 
only for larger firms. Market leaders may strengthen their positioning by advantages 
attained through scale and experience in a low cost leadership strategy. In fact, 
maintaining this strategy requires a continuous search for cost reductions in all aspects 
of the business. Emphasized on efficiency, this strategic option is not an acceptable 
approach of difference or advantage right now, because technology nowadays are 
getting accessible for lower costs and improved constantly so it turns a production 
process cheaper and allow companies to low prices, so the possibility for all the 
industries to have access to it, makes it an easy to copy approach. The solution that 
Porter gave to this easy imitable issue was that it is not necessary to produce at less 
cost but also when doing that, companies must create tradeoffs that lead competitors 
to desist to get into these new technologies. Finally, this strategy besides requiring 
huge companies running huge markets, it is necessary to have price-sensitive 
customers as a big part of this market. Weather a company has decided to chose this 
strategy, there are three basic methods of cost management, it can use: the traditional 
product costing (TPC), the process based costing (PBC) and the activity based costing 
(ABC). There exists also the value added/non-value added method that minimizes costs 
and tries to reduce activities that don’t provide the company too much value added, to 
better use those resources. Additionally, the target costing method model a company’s 
costs regarding a target that represents being better that competitors. Anyway there 
are several methods for companies to control and reduce its costs and manage to run 
their business as efficient as possible. For the cost leadership strategy to be accurately 
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implemented, and to have more chances for it to be successful there are some 
situational issues that can help and that have been pointed out by Buble. Those are: 
“prices are the dominant mean of competition, products are highly standardized, 
customers are not especially bounded to a specific product brand, products have 
ordinary usage characteristics, customers change product preferences easily due to 
lower prices, or customers possess extensive bargaining power. This approach is 
criticized for been considering operational efficiency, which according to Porter in a 
latter work is necessary but not sufficient. The cost leadership brings a big problem for 
companies and is that once the company has reduced costs from several processes, if a 
competitor achieve to improve its performance with lower costs, the chances are that 
the company can’t react to this situation, loosing not only the competitive advantage 
and the market leadership but also inducing costs and devasted revenues and 
profitability.  
 
Differentiation Strategy 
The differentiation strategy, also directed at a broad market involves the creation of a 
product or service that is perceived throughout its industry as unique and that is 
valued for a customer meaning that he/she is able to pay more for this uniqueness. 
This uniqueness usually is reflected in design, brand image, technology, features, 
network, or customers’ service. In this strategy, the sustained competitive advantage is 
given by customers loyalty reflected on low price sensitivity what allows companies to 
cover extra costs to provide customers high value by charging them in a differentiated 
product, this happens without affecting the demand. Some examples of companies 
runned with this strategy are Nike in the clothing sector, Apple in the IT sector, but 
also in the automobile sector with Mercedes- Benz and BMW or big designers on 
clothing worldwide like Dolce & Gabbana. This vision of differentiation is easy diluted 
in globalization as customers get the same differentiated product from a huge number 
of companies, even if the service is so specialized, there is a global supply that makes a 
fierce competition, due to the conception of see the market as structured like 
everyone thinks it is structured. This strategy is not accurate by the current business 
environment as customers are each time more aware of the suppliers and are more 
exigent when doing a purchase, wanting to cover all their most little desires on any 
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product. As there are wide forms of differentiation and customer with very specific 
needs, companies and competitors “differentiated” for a wide scope, maybe do not 
satisfied the very specific needs of its customers, and so this is how the competitive 
advantage on this strategy as customer loyalty are lost, giving entrance to new comers 
that can supply widely a customer specific needs. In this approach we must consider 
increasingly higher competition reinforced by lowered boundaries on design, 
production, and distribution that brings differentiated portfolios constantly to the 
market in the same worldwide market. For a company to be able to develop a 
differentiation strategy it is necessary that it has remarkable strengths and advantages 
in research and development, design, marketing, and quality control, but also an 
innovative orientation, a technological level superior to the average of it industry, 
beside others. This internal requirements cause also increased costs especially under 
the means of product development and marketing campaigns to inform about the 
products specifications and to promote product tasting. What can sustain this strategy 
is the continuing development of differentiated products that match customer’s needs 
and preferences along trends, and in order to reach that, a company must monitor 
constantly its customers trying to identify their preferences and understand their 
behavior, until the point of predicting how they can react to certain product changes. 
As well, this strategy implies some requirements that must be seen on the industry, 
such as the existence of numerous market segments, as well as specific customer’s 
needs and wants, which are not satisfied by products in the current market.  
 
Focus Strategy 
The focus strategy is aimed to attend specific small niches that require special features 
or prices to be provided and so for the company to get the market. Porter proposed 
this way of competing as to get involved into specific market segments either by focus 
on differentiation on products or by focus on costs. An example of this strategy in firms 
is Southwest Airlines, which provides shorthaul point-to-point flights in contrast to the 
hub-and-spoke model of mainstream. To run a focus strategy a company must have a 
selective offering provided to selective markets, every process must be focus oriented, 
in both meeting the market segment needs and doing it with lower costs than the 
average of its competitors. Afterwhat a company will direct its efforts headed for a 
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specific group whose specific needs were not satisfied for companies with the broader 
scope of differentiation. According to Porter, for a successful implementation of a 
focus strategy the market must be a big one and expect to growth dramatically. And 
have for a company too much different segments in which it can focuses on or 
represent the impossibility to go to the broader perspective, because this are facts 
creating tradeoffs, and so barriers to imitation. These specific needs usually generates 
specific demands, that includes specific inputs to be provided and so higher prices to 
cover this costs and that are reasonable for the customers demanding such products. 
In the long run, the company will not only maintain these customers but also will 
integrate more customers by continuing improvements on technologies and research 
and development processes. The risks implied in this approach are the volatility in the 
customer’s preferences and trends on its consumption patterns that would implies a 
change on supplier of the product and so to give a try to competitor’s products. 
Another risk is the fact that new comers would easily saturate the market that would 
bring about all the already known consequences. 
 
Stuck in the middle 
Michael Porter explains that companies that don’t fit in any position are about to be 
“stuck in the middle” meaning that its customers will find more value on competitors 
with strong defined position as those are offering them more value either in 
characteristics or in price, by using its resources more accurately to what their market 
is asking for. Porter was also criticized for its co-existence of two strategy types, 
related to this concept of “stuck in the middle”, Luis Eduardo Ayala Ruiz described that 
there is an incoherent reasoning between the cost leadership and the differentiation 
strategy relationship; because in some industries, there were companies able to have a 
cost leadership and would choose to compete at prices comparables to the industry. 
This situation, according to Porter would be classified as stuck in the middle, meaning 
that this company will not have superior performance compared to its industry, but 
actually the financial situation of those companies were superior to the average, 
showing that even if a company can lower the prices there is no reason to do it when a 
customer will buy at a price of the industry, not entering a price war, and keeping 
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profits in the hands of the company whose revenues will be higher, rather than in the 
hands of customers that were able to pay more for the same. 
 
Other Critics 
Another point of criticism is the missing variables that affirm that as a model is 
supposed to reflect reality in a simplified way. The objective of the model determines 
the level of simplification, which is represented by the number of variables included in 
the model. Porter’s model contains variables like economies of scale which are 
supposed to lead to a certain choice of strategy. However, nowadays, where we find 
“pull”- markets rather than “push”-markets (a “pull” market being a market in which 
the demand, the costumers, determine what is produced) other variables might be 
necessary to describe a company’s strategy in a way that reflects reality. A missing 
variable might be the abilities of the internal management. For example, if the CEO of 
a company is an engineer he might have the ability to foresee future trends and to 
follow specific R&D projects. Even if the company had a competitive advantage with 
respect to its production (for example economies of scale) it might be possible that it 
will rather follow a differentiation strategy – because of its internal management 
capabilities. If you’d try to describe this company’s strategy using Porter’s model of 
generic strategies you would not get a satisfying result. 
 
2.4: EXAMPLES: WAL-MART AND DELL 
 
Wal-mart 
Companies like Wal-Mart, now the first world leader retailer, had followed his advices 
about strategy, going for a cost leadership strategy, developing a huge experience 
curve, high negotiation power due to the enormous volumes of distribution, 
developing economies of scale on distribution and marketing, and a commitment to 
continuously search for cost reductions in all aspects of the business. The starting point 
was a relentless focus on satisfying customer needs.  The key was to make the way the 
company replenished inventory the centerpiece of its competitive strategy. This 
strategic vision reached its fullest expression in a largely invisible logistics technique 
known as “cross docking”. In this system, goods are continuously delivered to Wal-
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Mart warehouses, where they are selected, repacked, and then dispatched to stores, 
often without ever sitting in inventory. Instead of spending valuable time in the 
warehouse, goods just cross from one loading dock to another in 48 hours or less. 
Cross-docking enables Wal-Mart to achieve the economies that come with purchasing 
full truck-loads of goods while avoiding the usual inventory and handling costs.  Low 
prices in turn mean that Wal-Mart can save even more by eliminating the expense of 
frequent promotions: Stable prices also make sales more predictable, thus reducing 
stock-outs and excess inventory. Finally, everyday low prices bring in the customer, 
which translates into higher sales per retail square foot. These advantages in basic 
economics make the greeters and the profit sharing easy to afford. Another key 
component of Wal-Mart logistics infrastructure is the company’s fast and responsive 
transportation system. To gain the full benefits of cross-docking, Wal-Mart has also 
had to make fundamental changes in its approach to managerial control. Instead of the 
retailer pushing products into the system, customers “pull” products when and where 
they need them. This approach places a premium  on frequent, informal cooperation 
among stores, distribution centers, and suppliers, with far less centralized control. The 
company information systems provide store management with detailed information 
about customer behavior. As the company has growth and its stores have multiplied, 
even Wal-Mart’s own private air force hasn’t been enough to maintain the necessary 
contacts among store managers. So Wal-Mart has installed a video link connecting all 
its stores to corporate headquarters and to each other. The final piece of this 
capabilities mosaic is Wal-Mart’s human resources system . The company realized that 
its frontline employees play a significant role in satisfying customer needs. So it set out 
to enhance its organizational capability with programs like stock ownership and profit 
sharing geared toward making its personnel more responsive to customers. Even the 
way Wal-Mart stores are organized contributes to this goal, where training can be 
more focused and more effective, and employees can be more attuned to customers. 
Wal-Mart emphasizes behavior like the organizational practices and business 
processes in which capabilities are rooted, as the primary object of strategy and 
therefore focuses its managerial attention on the infrastructure that supports 
capabilities. The cornerstone of Wal-Mart’s success control point was based upon 
opening stores that would satisfy all the retailing needs of a rural area within a 15-20 
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mile radius. Sam Walton discovered (or created) a less than obvious bottleneck in 
distribution to rural communities, and filled it so completely with large-scale, low-cost 
channel that existing competitors could not afford to compete and potential new 
entrants were preempted. Wal-Mart created a de facto monopoly for each rural 
location. To some extent this advantage was absent as Wal-Mart began to grow into 
larger metropolitan areas where the bottlenecks could not be created. Not 
surprisingly, their performance began to fall off.  
 
DISCOUNT’ MARKET 
CARACTERISTICS IN 1962 
WAL-MART’S APPROACH SUCCES FACTOR 
 Small town presence “cross-docking” 
Low margins Lowest price Partnership with logostic companies 
Small growth No product promotion Partnership with suppliers 
Poor offer Customer “pull” products Information sarin 
 Company culture identity Fast & responsive transportation 
Figure 2.5: Wal-Mart approach 
 
Dell 
In 1984, with $1000 in startup capital and an unprecedented idea- bypass the 
middleman and sell custom-built PCs directly to customers-Michael Dell registers Dell 
Computer Corporation. Doing business as PC’s Limited, the company is the first in the 
industry t sell custom-built computers directly to customers. In 1985, by offering risk-
free returns and next-day, at-home product assistance, Dell establishes the customer 
experience as a company cornerstone. Dell is one of the first computer companies to 
send a technician to homes to service personal computers. Since the first Dell PC was 
introduced in 1986, Dell has continued to shape the industry, breaking new ground 
and pioneering critical developments in home, small business and enterprise 
computing. Dell's R&D efforts now span the globe, driven by some of the industry's 
foremost product designers and engineers. At the core of Dell's innovation approach, 
however, remains an unwavering commitment to delivering new and better solutions 
that directly address customer needs. 
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Requirements are gathered directly through tens of thousands of customer 
interactions daily, organized events, social media venues, and customer panels. 
Partnerships with a wide variety of key industry software, hardware and component 
suppliers give us a uniquely broad perspective on the computing landscape. 
 
Many innovations begin in-house, led by a global team of top engineers, product 
designers and technical experts. Others begin as a team effort with Dell's strategic 
partners. The mission is to deliver innovative and cost-effective solutions that meet 
today's real-life customer challenges and work seamlessly in existing environments and 
with other products. 
 
Dell is uniquely positioned to impact industry trends. It maintains strong internal 
development capabilities. It partners, rather than compete, with top industry 
technology suppliers and original development manufacturers. It steers enabling 
industry standards and technologies through industry groups and strategic partners. In 
this way, Dell spurs innovation and delivers value to customers. To deliver effective 
solutions that meet customer challenges, Dell focuses on pivotal standards that drive 
future technology innovation. Dell's industry leadership places it in a unique position to 
help establish the core building blocks for the future innovation - in the home, the office 
and the enterprise. With a long track record of pioneering work and wide network of 
strong industry alliances, Dell can drive adoption of open standards that give customers 
more choices, lower costs and complexity, and interoperability. In the 1980s, Dell 
became a pioneer in the "configure to order" approach to manufacturing — delivering 
individual PCs configured to customer specifications. In contrast, most PC 
manufacturers in those times delivered large orders to intermediaries on a quarterly 
basis. To minimize the delay between purchase and delivery, Dell has a general policy 
of manufacturing its products close to its customers. This also allows for implementing 
a just-in-time (JIT) manufacturing approach, which minimizes inventory costs. Low 
inventory is another signature of the Dell business model — a critical consideration in 
an industry where components depreciate very rapidly.  Dell's manufacturing process 
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covers assembly, software installation, functional testing (including "burn-in"), and 
quality control. Throughout most of the company's history, Dell manufactured desktop 
machines in-house and contracted out manufacturing of base notebooks for 
configuration in-house. However, the company's approach has changed. The 2006 
Annual Report states "we are continuing to expand our use of original design 
manufacturing partnerships and manufacturing outsourcing relationships." The Wall 
Street Journal reported in September, 2008 that "Dell has approached contract computer 
manufacturers with offers to sell" their plants.  Assembly of desktop computers for the 
North American market formerly took place at Dell plants in Austin, Texas (original 
location) and Lebanon, Tennessee (opened in 1999). The plant in Winston-Salem, North 
Carolina (opened in 2005) is scheduled to cease operations in 2010, while the Miami, 
Florida facility of its Alien ware subsidiary remains in operation. Dell servers come 
from Austin, Texas. Instead of building computers according to a sales forecast and 
letting other companies sell those Dell sells directly from its own website and call-
centers and then builds to order. That way, it not only cuts distributors and retailers out 
of its supply chain but also gets paid up front. Dell Inc. pioneered the Direct Model of 
selling PCs directly to the consumers. How it enabled Dell to manage its supply chain 
efficiently is discussed in this case study. Dell Computer Corporation a leading direct 
computer systems company was founded in 1984. Dell sells its computer systems 
directly to end customers, bypassing distributors and retailers (resellers). Dell's supply 
chain consists of only three stages— the suppliers, the manufacturer (Dell), and end 
users. 
 
Dell’s direct contact with customers allows it to: 
 properly identify market segments, 
 analyze the requirements and profitability of each segment, and 
 develop more accurate demand forecasts. 
Dell matches supply and demand because its customers order computer configurations 
over the phone or online (Internet). These computer configurations are built up from 
components that are available. Dell’s strategy is to provide customised, low cost, and 
quality computers that are delivered on time. Dell successfully implemented this 
strategy through its efficient manufacturing operations, better supply chain 
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management and direct sales model. Dell takes orders directly from its customers; 
either on phone or online. Thus, Dell reduces the cost of intermediaries that would 
otherwise add up to the total cost of PC for the customer. Dell also saves time on 
processing orders that other companies normally incur in their sales and distribution 
system. Moreover, by directly dealing with the customer Dell gets a clearer indication 
of market trends. This helps Dell to plan for future besides better managing its supply 
chain. Another advantage Dell gets by directly dealing with the customer is that it is 
able to get the customer’s requirements regarding software to be loaded. Dell loads 
the ordered software in its plant itself before dispatching it. By eliminating the need of 
a PC support engineer to load software, the customers gain both in time and cost. They 
can use the PC’s the moment they arrive.  
PC’S MARKET IN 90’s DELL’S APPROACH SUCCESS FACTORS 
 Direct customerorder Partnership with suppliers 
Limited market growth Tailored on customer’s needs Just in time supplì chain 
Margin erosion High flexible cost structure Efficient assembly 
Risk of commodity Internal efficiency Very quick delivery 
 Supply chain focus  
Figure 2.6: Dell’s approach 
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CHAPTER 3: THE SYSTEM LOCK-IN 
3.1: THE DELTA MODEL 
The Delta model encompasses a set of frameworks and methodologies to help 
managers articulate and implement effective corporate and business strategies. It 
grew from the conviction that the world of business has been experiencing 
transformations of such magnitude that the existing managerial frameworks have 
become either invalid or incomplete. A fundamental force in these transformations has 
been the emergence of the networked economy. Networks have enabled a degree of 
bonding between customers, complementors, and suppliers that has changed the 
drivers of profitability and, consequently, the landscape of strategy. The foremost 
thing in defining the strategy of a firm or business is to decide on the relevant strategic 
positioning. This should capture the essence of how the firm compete and serves 
customers in its relevant marketplace. There are three distinct strategic options, which 
offer very different approaches to achieve customer bonding. They are depicted 
graphically trough a triangle. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.1: The Delta model 
 
                                                                                    System Lock-In 
 System Economics 
 Market Dominance 
 Achieving Complementor share 
                Best Product 
 Product economics 
 Rivalry 
 Achieving product share 
          Total Customer Solution 
 Customer Economics 
 Cooperation 
 Achieving customer share 
Enabled 
through 
effective use of 
technology 
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The best product 
The best product positioning builds upon the classical form of competition. The 
customer is attracted by the inherent characteristics of the product itself, either due to 
its Low Cost, which provides a price advantage to the customer, or due to its 
Differentiation, which introduces unique features that the customers value and for 
which they are willing to pay a premium. The products tend to be standardized and 
unbundled. The customers are generic, numerous, and faceless. The central focus of 
attention is the competitor, who we are trying to equal or to surpass. Competitive 
advantage rests upon product economics and the internal supply chain, which provide 
the engine for efficient product  production. Innovation is centered on the internal 
development process. The liability of this approach is that it generates a minimal 
amount of customer bonding, hence making the incumbent firms most vulnerable to 
new entrants. Its obsessive concern with competitors often leads to imitation and 
price war, resulting in rivalry and convergence; the worst of all situations. In spite of 
widely adopted, and the default position for those businesses that do not deliberately 
consider other strategic options. 
 
The total customer solutions 
The total customer solutions strategy is a complete reversal from the Best product 
approach. Instead of commoditizing the customer, seeks a deep customer 
understanding and relationship that allows to develop value propositions that bond to 
each individual customer. Instead of developing and marketing standardized and 
isolated products, seeks to provide a coherent composition of products and services 
aimed at enhancing the customer’s ability to create their own economic value. Instead 
of concentrating inwardly on proper supply chain, seeks to develop an integrated 
supply chain that links the company with key suppliers and customers. Instead of 
focusing on competitors and imitating them, redefines the ways to capture and serve 
the customer by putting together an overall set of corporate capabilities, also sourcing 
from proper external parties, that enhance one’s product offering. It means that the 
company is outwardly driven; customer economics is the guide. Strategy is not war 
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with the competitors; is it love with the customers. The innovation is not oriented 
toward the design of standardized products; it is aimed at initiatives with the key 
customers for the joint development of distinctive products. 
 
The System Lock-In 
The System Lock-In strategic option has the widest scope; it includes the extended 
enterprise- the firm, the customers, the suppliers, and most importantly the 
complementors. A complementor is a firm engaged in the delivery of products and 
services which enhance the firm product and service portfolio. The key to this strategic 
option is to identify, attract, and nurture the complementors. They are typically 
external, but may also be internal to the corporation, particularly in large and 
diversified organizations. These complementors are rarely detected and exploited 
effectively. This is why a System Lock-In has to start with the full corporate scope- not 
just for one product or business- and has to continue with the identification and 
incorporation of all the key external players that can become complementors. The 
customer continues to be the central focus, but now we extended the enterprise to 
the fullest. This strategy looks at the overall system supply chain, not just the supply 
chain for the product, and harnesses the innovation percolating throughout the system 
as a whole. The richness and depth of complementors supporting the product or 
service lock the product into the system and lock-out the competition.  De facto 
Proprietary Standard are one way to achieve System Lock-In. Distribution channels are 
often a key consideration for a System Lock-In positioning, particularly for old 
economy companies. By owning or restricting access to distribution channels, 
competitor can be locked out. There are several routes to System Lock-In. A company 
that achieves this position exercises an enormous amount of power. However, a 
System Lock-In position is not always possible; there are necessary conditions. 
Foremost among these is that the value of the product to a customer should 
significantly increase as the product is used by others. After attaining it, there are 
additional challenges to a System Lock-In position: how to sustain it and exercise this 
power in an ethical way that does not create excesses of monopolistic behavior. 
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In a Best Product position the value proposition to the customer is the product and its 
attributes are independent of the customer. In a Total Customer Solutions position, 
the value proposition to the customer is enhance by the interaction between the 
customer and the product, which leads to bonding with existing customers. In a 
System Lock-In position, the value proposition to the customer is enhance by 
interaction with other customers, which leads to bonding with existing and new 
customers. Bonding reflects externalities beyond the product itself. 
 
3.2: THE SYSTEM LOCK-IN 
The System Lock-In represents the strongest for of bonding and demands  that the 
business addresses the overall architecture of the system. Instead of focusing solely on 
the product or the customer, we are now concerned with all the important players in 
the system that contribute to the creation of economic value for a particular customer. 
Besides the normal industry participants – buyers, suppliers, channels, and potential 
new entrants- we are now especially concerned with nurturing, attracting, and 
retaining “complementors”. A complementor is not a competitor, or necessarily a 
supplier; it is a provider of products and services that enhanced, directly or indirectly, 
our own offering. Examples of complementors pairings include computer 
manufacturers and software producers, high fidelity equipment manufacturers and CD 
retailers, and video cassette recorders and movie studios. System Lock-In further 
expands the scope of the business relative to the previous strategic options. System 
Lock-In players attract, satisfy, and retain customers by attracting, satisfying, and 
retaining complementos. The value of the system grows with increasing returns with 
growth. This defies conventional economic reasoning which has it roots in the behavior 
of the agricultural industry. As the agricultural activity expands, less fertile lands enter 
into production. The more you produce the lower incremental margins you enjoy. 
Network effects put an end to the universal validity of this principle. At eBay, the 
Internet-based auction house, the value of their service goes up with each additional 
buyer and seller that uses their service. While networks enable and accelerate these 
effects, System Lock-In has always existed. Sotheby’s and Christie’s are physically-
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based auction house that sustained themselves for years because they were the 
dominant exchange point for buyers and sellers to congregate. As with all aspects of 
bonding there are two necessary conditions to create System Lock-In : 
1. The existence of increasing marginal returns  
2. External network effects 
Increasing marginal returns reflect how the value of the product or service increases 
with increased users and usage. Network externalities reflect the fact that 
attractiveness of the product is not embodied in the characteristics if the product, but 
is external and often the function of investments by others, particularly the 
complementors and customers. When these conditions exist, the more a product is 
adopted and used the greater the benefit it confers to the customer. This translates 
into a virtuous cycle, where more  is better, leading to even more, and so forth. This 
sets the stage for achieving a System Lock-In position. This increased reach and 
connectivity that the Internet provides has expanded the stage of opportunities. 
Moreover, this technology has disaggregated industries creating a network of complex 
interactions among fragmented and specialized participants that almost mandates the 
use of common standards to ensure effective exchanges. 
There are three ways to achieve System Lock-In: 
1. Proprietary Standard 
2. Dominant Exchange 
3. Restricted Access 
A business successfully positioned as a Proprietary Standard draws customers because 
of the extensive network of complementors that are designed to work with its 
product. If you want to use the complementors you are compelled to use th 
Proprietary Standard. Microsoft, Intel, Real Networks, Palm and Cisco are superb 
examples. A business positioned as a Dominant Exchange provides an interface 
between buyers and sellers, or between parties that wish to exchange information or 
goods. Once this sort of business achieves a critical mass it is very hard to displace. 
With eBay, sellers want to go to the site with the most buyers and buyers want to go 
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to the site with the most sellers. Other companies with this position include the Yellow 
Pages, Visa/MasterCard, and AOL Instant Messaging. In the case of Restricted Access, 
the competitors are deprived of access to the customer because the channel has 
limited capacity to handle multiple vendors. This is the situation for the Walls ice 
cream cabinets, free of charge, and keep them fully stocked with Walls ice cream. Due 
to space constraints in small shops there is no room for competitive distribution. 
 
3.3: EXAMPLE: FORD MOTOR CO 
Ford Motor Co is an automotive company that supplies vehicles to customers and 
companies. Henry Ford built his first car, the Quadricycle Runabout, over a hundred 
years ago in the summer of 1896. It had a four-horsepower engine and could reach 
speeds of up to 20 miles per hour, an astonishing feat for the late 19th century. He 
sold that car for $200 to finance his second car, which was completed in early 1898. On 
June 16, 1903, he incorporated Ford Motor Company, which was capitalized for 
$100,000 with twelve stockholders. The company produced 1,708 cars that first year. 
Today, Ford Motor Company is a US$160 billion corporation with some 350,000 
employees in 200 countries around the world. In 1999, just over one hundred years 
after Henry Ford built the Runabout, Ford Motor Company manufactured 7.2 million 
vehicles worldwide.  
 
The Challenge 
Ford’s uses a complex supply chain that spans their entire business dealing with 
manufacturing, sales, after sales and marketing. Ford’s roots are grounded in 
harnessing the latest technology and innovative production techniques. In fact, 
Fortune Magazine recently named Henry Ford the “Businessman of the Century” and 
Ford’s Model T “Car of the Century.” However, as a 100-year-old company, Ford had 
developed some of the unfortunate characteristics of large-scale growth. With 
customers becoming more demanding and cost pressures mounting, the company 
wanted to transform from a very linear, top-down, bureaucratic business model to a 
Net Ready, nimble organization that involves and integrates customers, suppliers, and 
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employees. Ford needed to integrate more closely with their many and diverse 
suppliers, to make information available to the entire supply chain simultaneously. In 
the current cascade process, this can take days, weeks, and sometimes even months. 
Another key initiative close to the executive team’s heart is Ford’s OTD (Order to 
delivery) process. OTD is the supply chain process that comprises product engineering 
through vehicle manufacturing and distribution. The goal of being more consumer 
oriented requires Ford to shorten the delivery cycle from the time a customer places 
an order to the time the vehicle is actually delivered to a dealer and the owner takes 
possession. Ford also wanted to improve communication to and among employees, to 
encourage a more open, collaborative working environment. From providing unfiltered 
top-down communication to providing low-cost access to the Internet, Ford wanted to 
expose employees to the eBusiness transformation every step of the way. In addition, 
online e-learning and other cost-saving employee benefits would be far more effective 
with a well-connected workforce.  
 
 
3.3.1: FORD MOTOR CO LOCK-IN 
Repeat transactions can be encouraged by situations that cause lock-in. In the case of 
Ford, lock-in can be created from the following: 
 
Personalized vehicles 
Ford customizes vehicles for companies such as RAC;AA and Royal Mail, they supply 
vehicles such as breakdown trucks, tipper trucks and chassis cabs. These companies all 
get priority service meaning that once they place order they “jump the queue”, and all 
the regular orders get moved back. This creates trust and a good business relationship 
between the two companies. 
 
Loyalty programs 
Ford gives their large customers extra discounts known as their “privilege purchase” 
scheme. They also offer a discount to staff. This helps to compete against ther 
manufacturers trying to under-cut them on price in order to win the order. 
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Servicing 
During the first three or four years a vehicle has been sold by Ford dealership most 
vehicles are brought back to the dealership for services and maintenance. Many 
people do this as they feel it necessary to have a main dealership service history 
otherwise they feel that vehicle will be worth less when they come to sell it. 
 
Reputation 
This alone is a very good lock-in as they have built very good relationships and 
reputations with customers. This gives customers a good reason to stay with them. 
 
Building upon transaction history.  
Ford has lock-in other companies that supply components due to their buying power. 
They buy in extremely large quantities and their orders are higly valued among 
suppliers, the suppliers compete themselves to win the orders by cutting the prices as 
much as possible. 
 
Brand name and trust (RBV -Resource based view- theory) resources are defined as 
stocks of firm-specific assets; they cannot be easily duplicated and cannot be easily 
acquired in well-functioning markets. 
Examples: 
 Patents and trademarks 
 Brand name 
 Installed base 
 Organizational culture 
 Workers with specific expertise or knowledge 
The combined effects of this lock-in create the potential value of the business. 
Lock-in helps reduce the amount of customers that take business elsewhere to 
competitors. In the case of Ford’s lock-in causes repeat orders, guaranteed future 
orders and forced orders. This could happen because when switching costs from one 
brand to another are substantial, customers face lock-in. For this reason an existing 
customer base with high switching costs is a significant and valuable asset. 
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The factory layout is very efficient as the production line doesn’t need to stop for a 
part to be transported to another part of the factory and all the space is being used. 
The y have set places where parts travel behind cages and through walk ways. Certain 
parts of vehicles aren’t required until the end of the production line. For example 
adding wheels, they are sent along a conveyer belt before they are needed and they 
arrive at the requires place just in time (JIT). 
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CHAPTER 4: ZARA 
4.1 ZARA’S HISTORY 
Zara is the flagship chain store of Inditex Group owned by Spanish tycoon 
Amancio Ortega, who also owns brands such as Massimo Dutti, Pull and Bear, 
Oysho, Uterqüe, Stradivarius and Bershka. Amancio Ortega Gaona is a famous 
Galician fashion designer and entrepreneur, ranked by Forbes as Spain's richest 
man and the 10th richest man in the World in 2009. Amancio Ortega was born 
on March 28, 1936 in Leon, Spain. At the age of 13, Ortega began working for a 
shirtmaker as a delivery boy in La Coruña, Galicia, the centre of the Iberian 
textile industry. He worked for a variety of stores and tailors and studied how 
products and costs changed as they travelled from the manufacturer to the 
consumer. As a result, he became focused on the importance of getting 
products directly to the consumer without a middle man. Ortega never 
attended higher education and continued to work in the textile field into the 
early 1960s. After becoming manager of a local clothing shop, he discovered 
that only wealthy individuals could afford to purchase fine clothing and became 
even more determined to make quality clothes accessible to everyone. As a 
result, Ortega started making his own products, purchasing cheaper fabric from 
Barcelona and selling good quality, cheaper products to local stores. In 1963, at 
the age of 27, Amancio Ortega founded his own company called Confecciones 
Goa that made and sold fine bathrobes.  
Ortega continued to build his company and in 1975 he opened his first retail 
store called Zara. It was located across the street from one of La Coruna's most 
well known department stores and Zara became famous for selling high quality 
designer products at reasonable prices. As a result of this success, Ortega 
continued to open stores and was credited with choosing perfect locations for 
each one. The Zara fashion concept was well received by the public later in 
1976, allowing it to expand its network of stores to the other main Spanish 
cities. During 1981-1988 with the growing popularity Zara started new ventures 
by multiplying in number not just in Spain but around the world. In fact, in 1988, 
there were 82 Zara stores in Spain and the company started its international 
46 
 
expansion through Porto, Portugal. In 1989 they entered the United States and 
in 1990 France. This international expansion was increased in the 1990s, with 
Mexico (1992), Greece (1993), Belgium and Sweden (1994), home of its closest 
competitor, H&M, until the current presence in over 73 countries, with a 
network of more than 1,540 stores, ideally located in major cities. Its 
international presence clearly shows that national frontiers are no impediment 
to sharing a single fashion culture. With the Zara's increasing popularity and 
overwhelming success, in 1985, Amancio Ortega integrated Zara in a new 
holding company, Industria de Diseño Textil, INDITEX S.A. Inditex became one of 
the largest textile companies in the world. . He joins the business Jos Mar a 
Castilian, professor of business school and a lover of technology, such as 
Amancio Ortega's right hand, making the company as a logistics model.  Inditex 
made an initial public offering of stock in May 2001. In 2003 enjoying being the 
eye candy among the fashion followers Zara entered the home furnishing 
market by opening the first Zara home store. In 2005, Pablo Isla replaces CEO 
Jose Maria Castilian and begins a restructuring of logistics, in search of 
efficiency. Its first store featured low-priced lookalike products of popular, 
higher-end clothing fashions. The store proved to be a success, and Ortega 
started opening more Zara stores in Spain. During the 1980s, Ortega started 
changing the design, manufacturing and distribution process to reduce lead 
times and react to new trends in a quicker way, in what he called "instant 
fashions". The company based its improvements in the use of information 
technologies and using groups of designers instead of individuals. Zara stores 
are company-owned, except where local legislation forbids foreigner-owned 
businesses. In those cases, Zara franchises the stores. 
1975 Zara opens its first store in A Coruña (Spain) 
1985 The creation of Inditex as head of the corporate group 
1988 The opening of the first Zara store outside Spain in Oporto (Portugal) 
1989-1990 The United State and France are the next markets in which the group 
begins its activity with the opening of outlets in New York and Paris 
2000 The opening of stores in four countries: Austria, Denmark Qatar and 
Andorra. Inditex installs its head quarters in a new building located in 
Arteixo ( A coruña,Spain) 
2001 On 23rd May 2001 Inditex goes public and listed on the Spanish Stock 
Market 
Figure 4.1: Zara’s timeline 
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4.2 BUSINESS MODEL 
Zara is a vertically integrated retailer. Unlike similar apparel retailers, Zara controls 
most of the steps on the supply-chain: it designs, produces, and distributes itself. The 
business system that had resulted was particularly distinctive in that Zara 
manufactured its most fashion-sensitive products internally. Zara did not produce 
"classics", clothes that would always be in style. In fact, the company intended its 
clothes to have fairly short life spans, both within stores and in customers' closets. 
 
4.2.1: PORTER’S ANALYSIS ON ZARA 
To better understand how Zara developed its strategic proposition and how is it 
related to the Porter’s proposal; it is shown how the market behaved at the very 
beginning of the company according to the Porter’s 5 forces analysis. 
 
                    
Figure 4.2: Porter’s five forces model 
Competitors: 
 Elevated number of competitors 
 The growth rate is low, it is a mature industry 
 The barriers to get out of the industry are low in distribution and high in 
manufacture 
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 The storage costs are low as clothes have a long life time before getting 
damaged. 
 There is no a diversification level in terms of quality of products, reason why 
the customer’s choice is based on price and brand recognition. 
 There might be diseconomies of scale for the possibility of quick changes in the 
consumer’s habits and trends. 
 High manufacture costs and raw material in the local market. 
 
New Entrants: 
  The local market (Spain) is not saturated 
  No distribution barriers to entrance because it only consists on low costs of 
renting a shop, no administrative restrictions, low initial capital to start. 
  Reduced reaction possibilities in front of new entrants. 
 In production, there are barriers for the existence of economies of scale. The 
initial capital is high. 
 
Substitutes: 
 No substitutes, it is considered a basic necessity to be dressed. 
 
Customer’s Bargaining Power: 
 Numerous customers, not well organized to defend their interests. 
 Low purchase volume per customer. 
 When it is about distribution, the customer is the final consumer, though there 
is no risk of back integration. The other way down to production. 
 In distribution, there is no risk of not paying because they are paid off at very 
moment of the purchase. 
 Because of changes on the lifestyle, demographic changes, cultural changes or 
technological changes, the demand can easily vary. 
 
Supplier’s Negotiation Power: 
 There are too much suppliers, no negotiation power 
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 The nature of the products allow to storage them long time, unless the trends 
conditions. 
 Big stores and supermarkets are relevant customers to Suppliers, because of 
the amount of purchases in each order. 
 
4.2.2 ZARA’S PRODUCT LIFE CYCLE CURVE 
Generally, a typical Product Life Cycle Curve looks like the one given in the diagram 
where Sales decreases as the product moves over the time line. 
                 
Figure 4.3 : Typical product life curve 
But as Zara is in a high fashion industry and its product offering are the latest trends 
and designs with a life of maximum 5-6 weeks so its Product Life Cycle Curve becomes 
like the one given in next diagram. 
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Figure 4.4 : Zara’s production life cycle curve 
 
4.2.3: ZARA’S KEY FACTORS OF SUCCESS  
Zara concentrates on three winning formulae to bake its fresh fashions: 
 Short Lead Time = More fashionable clothes 
 Lower quantities = Scarce supply 
 More styles = More choice, and more chances of hitting it 
 
Firstly, by focusing on shorter response times, the company ensures that its stores are 
able to carry clothes that the consumers want at that time. Zara can move from 
identifying a trend to having clothes in its stores within 30 days, this means that Zara 
can quickly identify and catch a winning fashion trend, while its competitors are 
struggling to catch up. Catching fashion while it is hot is a clear recipe for better 
margins with more sales happening at full prices and fewer discounts. In comparison, 
most retailers of comparable size or even smaller, work on timelines that stretch into 
4-12 months. Thus, most retailers try to forecast what and how much its customers 
might buy many months in the future, while Zara moves in step with its customers. 
Trend identification comes through constant research not just traditional consumer 
market research, but a daily stream of emails and phone calls from the stores to head 
office. Unlike other retailers, Zara's machinery can react to the report immediately and 
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produce a response in terms of a new style or a modification within 2-4 weeks. Many 
other retailers have such long supply chain lead times that for them it would seem a 
lost cause for them to even try and respond to a sales report. Secondly, by reducing 
the quantity manufactured in each style, Zara not only reduces its exposure to any 
single product but also creates an artificial scarcity. As with all things fashionable, the 
less its availability, the more desirable the object becomes. The added benefit of lower 
quantities is that if a style does not work well, there is not much to be disposed during 
the season-end sale. The result of this is that Zara discounts only about 18 percent of 
its production, roughly half the levels of competitors. Thirdly, instead of more 
quantities per style, Zara produces more styles, roughly 12,000 a year. Thus, even if a 
style sells out very quickly, there are new styles already waiting to take up the space. 
Zara can offer more choices in more current fashions than many of its competitors. It 
delivers merchandise to its stores twice a week, and since re-orders are rare the stores 
look fresh every 3-4 days. Fresh produce, moving in step with the fashion trend and 
updated frequently the ingredients are just right to create the sweet smell of success.  
 
Number of 
product variants 
and change rate 
Distribution 
channel 
Demand and 
supply 
characteristics 
Planning 
approach 
Main benefits 
12000 new 
models a year, 
short product 
life, for example 
2 to 4 weeks. 
Own store 
network, 600 
stores. 
Continuous 
change 
generates sales, 
part of 
production 
capacity 
responsive. 
Accurate 
gathering of 
demand data 
and fast 
reactions to 
changes 
Catching 
demand trends, 
stability through 
seasonal 
collection 
Figure 4.5: Zara’s business model 
 
4.2.4: STRATEGIC DRAWBACKS 
Although Zara has a successful business model that differs from that of traditional 
retailers, it also has disadvantages that can affect its sustainable growth. Due its 
model, Zara’s weaknesses also differ from the traditional retailer. Zara holds around 
86% of Inditex’s total international sales-a significantly high number for an 
organization that has 7 other chains. With that, Inditex is putting all of their eggs into 
one basket by sinking a great deal of capital into Zara. Inditex has contributed their 
extensive international sales to Zara and said “Zara was the principal reason Inditex’s 
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sales were increasingly international”. If Zara fails in the future, Inditex will have to 
totally re-formulate their firm’s strategies and may possibly face an internal meltdown. 
Zara also has an inability to penetrate the American apparel market. This may be due 
to American tastes that differ from European preferences. More importantly, however, 
Zara has not been able to develop a strong supply chain strategy in the U.S. like they 
have in Europe. Their European strategy includes, having a strong production and 
distribution facility in their home country in order to have short production and lead 
times. Zara has not invested in distribution facilities in the Americas, which is a threat 
to their U.S. selling abilities since the U.S. makes up 29% of the total apparel market. 
This may make them “subject to diseconomies of scale”, which means that though are  
aware of how to quickly supply 1,000 stores, they may not be able to supply more 
retail locations due to their “centralized logistics model”. Zara’s strategy also creates 
some weaknesses. Their vertical integration has more advantages than drawbacks but 
it is important to recognize its limitations. Vertical integration often leads to the 
inability to acquire economies of scale, which means they cannot gain the advantages 
of producing large quantities of goods for a discounted rate. Higher costs are then 
incurred for the Inditex Corporation. Inditex also has to support their own high capital 
investments for their chains and be able to financially back their “technology and skills 
beyond those currently available within the organization”. Zara’s speedy and recurrent 
introduction of new products incurs increased costs as well. They have higher research 
and development costs. They also have elevated costs due to the constant changeover 
of production techniques to create their different apparel lines. That also means that 
employees must be trained in order to use the new manufacturing techniques, which 
again leads to increased costs. Traditional retailers do not experience higher costs in all 
of these areas. 
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a. Limitations of Vertical Integration 
Vertical integration, a distinctive feature of Zara’s business model, has allowed the 
company to successfully develop a strong merchandising strategy. This strategy has led 
Zara to create a climate of scarcity and opportunity as well as a fast-fashion system. 
However, Zara’s strategy creates some weaknesses. Their vertical integration has more 
advantages than drawbacks but it is important to recognize its limitations. Vertical 
integration often leads to the inability to acquire economies of scale, which means 
Zara cannot gain the advantages of producing large quantities of goods for a 
discounted rate. Higher costs are then incurred for the Inditex Corporation. Inditex 
also has to support their own high capital investments for their chains and be able to 
financially back their “Technology and skills” beyond those currently available within 
the organization. Zara’s speedy and recurrent introductions of new products incur 
increased costs as well. They have higher research and development costs. They also 
have elevated costs due to the constant changeover of production techniques to 
create their different apparel lines. That also means that employees must be trained in 
order to use the new manufacturing techniques, which again leads to increased costs. 
Traditional retailers do not experience higher costs in all of these areas.  
b. Diseconomies of scale: Zara has not invested in distribution facilities to support their 
global expansion. As a result, although it is aware of how to quickly supply 1,000 
stores, they may not be able to supply more retail locations due to their “centralized 
logistic” model. Even though Zara has been successful at scaling up its distribution 
system, the centralized logistics system might eventually be subject to diseconomies of 
scale as Zara continues to open stores all around the world and ships product from its 
single Distribution Center in Europe. This system may work well with the current 
number of stores because majority of the stores are centralized in Europe. However, 
Inditex won’t be benefiting from short lead times and low operational cost with a 
single central Distribution Center model as they are branching out into other countries.  
c. Fast and recurring introduction of new products in different countries increase costs 
R&D: In the manufacturing environment, Zara’s product development teams are 
responsible for attending high-fashion fairs and exhibitions to translate the latest 
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trends of the season into their designs. Also throughout the season, Zara’s product 
development teams are constantly researching the market by traveling to universities 
and clubs around the world to track customer preferences. Additionally, the young, 
fashionable, and international staff helps to interpret the desire of the moment (Zara).  
Changeover of production techniques to create different apparel lines requires highly 
automated equipment specialized by garment type. The more flexible the system is, 
the more costly the production will be. In addition, employees need to be trained to 
use new manufacturing techniques. Developing vertically integrated supply chain 
system in different countries with high labor cost will result in high production cost. 
Zara Management is considering investing in distribution and production in new 
regions they are expanding into. North America and Asia seemed to be the obvious 
regional opportunities. The U.S market was subject to retailing overcapacity, 
demanded larger sizes on average. Zara is already in major cities in the United States. 
Since Zara does not have any distribution or manufacturing facility within United 
States, all the apparel is shipped from Europe to the States which incurs a significant 
transportation cost.  
 
4.2.5: LOGISTICS AND SUPPLY CHAIN 
Zara follows a structure that is more closely controlled than most other retailers, and 
pays further by having the various business elements in close proximity to each other, 
around its headquarters in Spain. 
 
1) Ownership and Control of Production 
Retailers like the American chain ‘Gap’ and the Swedish retailer ‘Hennes & Mauritz’ 
completely outsource their production to factories around the world and mostly to low 
cost Asian countries. In contrast, it is estimated that 80 percent of Zara's production is 
carried out in Europe which is within the small radius of its headquarters in Spain. In 
fact, almost half of its production is in owned or closely-controlled facilities. While this 
gives Zara a tremendous amount of flexibility and control, it does have to contend with 
higher people costs, averaging 17-20 times the costs in Asia. Counter-intuitively Inditex 
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has also gone the route of owning capital-intensive manufacturing facilities in Spain. In 
fact, it is a vertically integrated group, with up-to-date equipment for fabric dyeing and 
processing, cutting and garment finishing. Greige (undyed fabric) is more of a 
commodity and is sourced from Spain, the Far East, India, and Morocco. By retaining 
control over the dyeing and processing areas, Inditex has fabric- processing capacity 
available “on demand” to provide the correct fabrics for new styles. It also does not 
own the labour-intensive process of garment stitching, but controls it through a 
network of subcontracted workshops in Spain and Portugal. 
 
2) Supercharged Product Development 
Design and product development is a highly people-intensive process. The heavy 
creative workload of 1,000 new styles every month is managed by a design and 
development team of over 200 people. This means that every person on an average is 
producing around 60 styles in a year or 1-2 styles every week. With new styles being 
developed and introduced frequently, each style would provide only around 200,000-
300,000 of retail sales, a far lower figure than other retailers or brands, and certainly 
not “cost-efficient” in terms of design and product development costs. But obviously, 
this higher cost of product development is more than adequately compensated by 
higher realized margins. In addition, the entire product development cycle begins from 
the market research. This combines information: 
 from visiting university campuses, discos and other venues to observe what 
young fashion leaders are wearing 
 from daily feedback from the stores 
 from the sales reports 
This has meant a significant investment in information technology and 
communications infrastructure to keep streaming up-to-date trend information to the 
people making the product and business decisions. At the leading edge of research are 
the sales associates and store managers in Zara stores, who zap orders on customized 
hand held computers over the Internet to Zara headquarters based on what they see 
selling. And not just orders, but ideas for cuts, fabrics or even a whole new line. They 
draw upon customer comments, or even a new style that a customer might be wearing 
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that could be copied for Zara's stores. Traditional daily sales reports can hardly provide 
such a dynamically updated picture of the market. 
 
3) React Rather than Predict 
What sets Zara apart from many of its competitors is what it has done to its business 
information and business process. Rather than concentrating on forecasting 
accurately, it has developed its business around reacting swiftly. What a typical retailer 
or brand might do? Designers may start looking at fashion trends, and start designing a 
look for summer 2010. Information and inspiration comes from forecasting agencies, 
trade shows, and various other places. Over a period of 3-5 months they develop the 
ideas into physical samples. Sales budgets and stock plans are developed based on 
what is going on in the business right then (roughly one-year ahead of the targeted 
style). At various times during this seasonal process, there are decision-making 
meetings, where styles are accepted, rejected or changed, pricing and margin 
decisions taken and orders finalized. Based on a host of factors, the orders might then 
be placed with vendors in one or more countries around the world. Typically vendors 
may take a few weeks to two months to procure fabrics, have them approved by the 
retailer, and then produce a number of samples, and only once all approvals are 
finished, put the style into production. From beginning to end, the process of defining 
a concept to receiving goods in the retail store might take anywhere from 9 to 12 
months for a typical retailer. Amazingly, it seems to work 60-65 per cent of the time. 
Zara, on the other hand, largely concentrates its forecasting effort on the kind and 
amount of fabric it will buy. It is a smart hedging by Zara because of two reasons: 
 fabric (raw material) mistakes are cheaper than finished goods errors 
 the same fabric could be turned into different garments 
In fact, for an extra degree of flexibility Zara buys semi-processed or un-coloured fabric 
that it colors up close to the selling season based on the immediate need. With that 
edge, and a super-fast garment design and production process, it takes to the market 
what its customers are looking for. 
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4) Quick-Bake Recipe: Well Mixed Ingredients 
Garment styling for Zara actually starts from the email or phone call received from the 
stores. Thus, from the beginning Zara is responding to an actual need, rather than 
forecasting for a distant future. Based on the store demand, Zara's commercial 
managers and designers sit down and conceptualize 
 what the garment will look-like 
 what fabric it will be made out of 
 what it will cost 
 what price it will sell 
As soon as approvals are received, instructions are issued to cut the appropriate fabric. 
The cutting is done in Zara's own high-tech automated cutting facilities. The cut pieces 
are distributed for assembly to a network of small workshops mostly in Galicia and in 
northern Portugal. None of these workshops are owned by Zara. The workshops are 
provided with a set of easy to follow instructions, which enable them to quickly sew up 
the pieces and provide a constant stream to Zara's garment finishing and packing 
facilities. Thus, what takes months for other companies, takes no more than a few days 
for Zara. Finally, Zara's high-tech distribution system ensures that no style sits around 
very long at head office. The garments are quickly cleared through the distribution 
centre, and shipped to the stores, arriving within 48 hours. Each store receives 
deliveries twice a week, so after being produced the merchandise does not spend 
more than a week at most in transit. 
 
5) Information Technology Keeps It Boiling  
Information and communications technology is at the heart of Zara's business. Four 
critical information-related areas that give Zara its speed include: 
 Collecting information on consumer needs: trend into information flows daily, 
and is fed into a database at head office. Designers check the database for 
these dispatches as well as daily sales numbers, using the information to create 
new lines and modify existing ones thus, designers have access to real-time 
information when deciding with the commercial team on the fabric, cut, and 
price points of a new garment. 
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 Standardization of product information different or incomplete specifications 
and varying product information availability typically add several weeks to a 
typical retailer's product design and approval process, but Zara “warehouses” 
the product information with common definitions, allowing it to quickly and 
accurately prepare designs, with clear cut manufacturing instructions. 
 Product information and inventory management being able to manage 
thousands of fabric and trim specifications, design specifications as well as their 
physical inventory, gives Zara's team the capability to design a garment with 
available stocks, rather than having to order and wait for the material to come 
in. 
 Distribution management: its State-of-the-art distribution facility functions with 
minimal human intervention. Approximately 200 kilometers of underground 
tracks move merchandise from Zara's manufacturing plants to the 400+ chutes 
that ensure each order reaches its right destination. Optical reading devices 
sort out and distribute more than 60,000 items of clothing an hour. Zara's 
merchandise does not waste time waiting for human sorting. 
              
Figure 4.6 : Inventory, Information and Speed 
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6) Keeping Costs Down  
Even while manufacturing in Europe, Zara manages to keep its costs down. None of its 
assembly workshops are owned by the company. Most of the informal economy 
workers the workshops employ are mothers, grandmothers and teenage girls looking 
to add to their household incomes in the small towns and villages where they live. 
Further, in terms of marketing costs, Zara relies more on having prime retail locations 
than on advertising for attracting customers to its stores. It spends a meager 0.3 per 
cent of sales on advertising compared to an average of 3.5 per cent of competitors 
according to the company, choosing highly visible locations for its stores renders 
advertising unnecessary. Apart from designing to the fashion-of-the-day, Zara's 
strategy of producing low volumes per style and changing products quickly in its stores 
enables it to cut down on the discounts as well. Only about 18 percent of Zara clothing 
doesn't work with its customers and must be discounted. That's half the industry 
average of 35 percent. Zara also has two clearly time-limited sales a year rather than 
constant markdowns. Lastly, since it spends effort on producing what are current 
fashion trends, it spends its design effort on interpreting rather than creating afresh. In 
fact, Zara has been constantly alleged to have knocked-off top designers' ranges, thus 
spending less on product development and design. 
 
4.2.6: STRATEGY 
When it just started, Zara’s strategy was the low cost leadership; they apply this 
strategy as follows: Zara has controlled all its manufacture process, from the creation 
to the selling activities, avoiding being under the imagination of the designers, interest 
of the distributors or the ability of retailers to sell. The information is processed in the 
central offices in Coruña, and the commercial decisions are taken by the company’s 
president. The prices for each item are fixed for each market but not towards costs 
analysis, in contrast, they adjust the prices in terms of the final price, and towards the 
profits they expect to earn. Before starting the production process, the company 
brings the raw material from other countries. The 90% of these materials are imported 
from Germany, Korea, China, Italy, India, Marrakech and Turkey. There are also 
delegations to purchase in the United Kingdom, China and Holland. As an addition, a 
big part of their purchases is from China, all of those on Asia are coordinated from 
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Peking. The local factories work all day long with 3 shifts, every 15 days there is a new 
cycle of production, in order to have a quick response to the trends and customer 
changes on preferences. A Just in time system was implemented, in partnership with 
Toyota, so their inventories are almost cero. There is a huge compromise with this 
process, and to move from one side to the other in the big factories, they use bicycles. 
The factories use high technology such as robots that do most of the work but do not 
finish it. Instead, they send it to more than 15.000 independent collaborators working 
for Zara, for the clothes to have higher ending quality. Those independent 
collaborators are grouped into 50 people companies, in which are well seen the 
familiar links, because according to Zara’s managers this can increase productivity and 
lower costs. Under this strategy, Zara also recognized the need to sustain its position, 
meaning for them to reinvest in new technologies to manufacture their products and 
be aware every time of new possible improvements on the company’s systems, 
processes and activities. In 1999, even if the company does not describe its strategy as 
a differentiation position, they mentioned that what they want to sell is not quality but 
the international prestige of the brand, and that as a difference from the traditional 
high priced boutiques, they want its customers to show what they have bought, not 
the brand they bought. Zara is a customer-oriented company; its shops distinguish 
themselves from the competitors for being very clean, and discreet in terms of the 
shops decoration and also in the design of its bags. It is all about strategy also. The 
other trend-bucking aspect of the company's business model is its approach to 
advertising. In comparison with other clothing retailers, who spent 3-4 per cent of 
sales on advertising, Zara spent just 0.3 per cent. The little it did spend went to 
reinforce its identity as a clothing retailer that was low-cost but high fashion. The 
company's founder, Amancio Ortega, believes advertising is a pointless distraction. The 
company believes that its shop windows, the contents of which are also decided in La 
Coruña, are all the advertising it needs. Displays were changed regularly, according to 
designs sent by headquarters, and were critical for Zara to remain visible and entice 
customers. Prime locations in regal buildings are chosen for splendid visibility. The 
store ambient is consistent and appealing from the interior design, artwork, window 
displays, lighting and music. The philosophy seems to have worked. As of late last year, 
Zara had 350 shops in Europe, 18 in the Middle East, 52 in the Americas and five in 
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Asia. With roughly 40% of Inditex shops, Zara brings in about 80% of the group's 
revenue. There are now about 1,100 Inditex stores in the world, and a new one opens 
every other day. The company's success is proof that it is still possible to build a 
massive brand by doing no more than meeting a market need. It has achieved this 
without any advertising or promotion and without outsourcing its manufacturing to 
countries where labour is cheap. Another of the key facts to success is the information 
management. The company disposes a team that works internationally to find new 
trends and customers preferences, by looking at fashion shows, parties, universities 
and competitors shops. 
 
Brand Management At Zara 
Ninety per cent of Zara stores were company-owned; the rest were franchises or joint 
ventures. Customers entering a Zara store on Regent Street in London, Rue Rivoli in 
Paris, Fifth Avenue in New York or Avenidas das Americas in Rio de Janeiro generally 
found themselves in the same environment: a predominantly white, modern and 
spacious store, well-lit and walled with mirror. The latest fashions hung from the store 
racks around them. A long line of people typically waited at the cash registers to pay 
for their purchases: a few select items.  Zara's pricing differed across country markets. 
It set prices according to individual market conditions, rather than using cost plus 
margin as its basis (which has been the industry norm). In Spain, Zara products were 
low-cost, while in the US, Japan and Mexico, they were priced as luxury fashion items.  
The remuneration of store managers was partially based on the accuracy of their sales 
forecasts and sales growth. Each evening, a hand-held PDA displayed the newest 
designs sent by headquarters, which were available for order. Order deadlines were 
twice weekly, and were issued via the hand-helds. Store managers who failed to order 
by the deadline received replenishment items only.  Deliveries arrived at stores twice 
per week from Zara headquarters, a few days after the order was made, and contained 
both replenishment items as well as new products. Failure rates of Zara's new products 
were reported to be just 1 per cent, considerably lower than the industry average of 
10 per cent.  Technology was a key part of enabling communications and information 
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flow. Zara's IT infrastructure was relatively simple, which meant that its IT expenditure 
was as much as five to 10 times lower than its rivals.  
 
Communication 
The company's success lies in it having total control of every part of the business. It 
designs, produces and distributes itself. Everything is co-ordinated from its 
headquarters on an industrial estate in Sabon-Arteixo, outside La Coruna in Spain. By 
controlling the entire process from factory to shop floor, Zara can react quickly to 
changing fashion trends and customers' tastes, providing a "newness" that has taken 
Europe by storm.  It designs, picks and cuts the cloth before sending it to workshops 
and co-operatives in northern Portugal and the surrounding area of Galicia for sewing.  
The clothes are finished off at La Coruna before being shipped out twice a week to all 
its shops. This “fast fashion” system depends on a constant exchange of information 
throughout every part of Zara’s supply chain: from customer to store managers, from 
store managers to market specialists and designers to production staff, from buyers to 
subcontractors, from warehouse managers to distributors, and so on. Most companies 
insert layers of bureaucracy that can bog down communication between departments. 
But Zara’s organization, operational procedures, performance measure, and even its 
office layouts are all designed to make information transfer easy."Investment banks 
used to say that this model did not work, but we have shown that it gives us more 
flexibility in production, sales and stock management," said Inditex chief executive Jose 
Maria Castellano. Shoppers addicted to the Zara brand know exactly when the 
deliveries will be arriving at their local shop and some even turn up before opening 
time on delivery days to be the first to pick up the latest lines.  With its range of 
clothes constantly being updated, one or two unpopular items are unlikely to hurt its 
profits and customers are more likely to visit its shops regularly to see new stock. Zara 
shop managers report back every day to designers in La Coruña on what has and has 
not sold. The information is used to decide which product lines and colours are kept or 
altered and whether new lines are created. All this happens in the space of just a few 
days. The efficiency of the system means the company can keep costs down by 
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keeping stocks low. Its design team produces an incredible 12,000 different designs a 
year. Customers also have direct input into what the shops sell as their feedback is 
sent back to the designers too. Castellano has called this the "democratisation of 
fashion." Zara's single, centralized design and production center is attached to Inditex 
(Zara's parent company) headquarters in La CoruÃ±a. It consists of three spacious 
halls—one for women's clothing lines, one for men's, and one for children's. Unlike 
most companies, which try to excise redundant labor to cut costs, Zara makes a point 
of running three parallel, but operationally distinct, product families. Accordingly, 
separate design, sales, and procurement and production-planning staffs are dedicated 
to each clothing line. A store may receive three different calls from La Coruña in one 
week from a market specialist in each channel; a factory making shirts may deal 
simultaneously with two Zara managers, one for men's shirts and another for 
children's shirts. Though it's more expensive to operate three channels, the 
information flow for each channel is fast, direct, and unencumbered by problems in 
other channels—making the overall supply chain more responsive. In each hall, floor to 
ceiling windows overlooking the Spanish countryside reinforce a sense of cheery 
informality and openness. Unlike companies that sequester their design staffs, Zara's 
cadre of 200 designers sits right in the midst of the production process. Split among 
the three lines, these mostly twenty something designers—hired because of their 
enthusiasm and talent, no prima donnas allowed—work next to the market specialists 
and procurement and production planners. Large circular tables play host to 
impromptu meetings. Racks of the latest fashion magazines and catalogs fill the walls. 
A small prototype shop has been set up in the corner of each hall, which encourages 
everyone to comment on new garments as they evolve. The physical and 
organizational proximity of the three groups increases both the speed and the quality 
of the design process. Designers can quickly and informally check initial sketches with 
colleagues. Market specialists, who are in constant touch with store managers (and 
many of whom have been store managers themselves), provide quick feedback about 
the look of the new designs (style, color, fabric, and so on) and suggest possible market 
price points. Procurement and production planners make preliminary, but crucial, 
estimates of manufacturing costs and available capacity. The cross-functional teams 
can examine prototypes in the hall, choose a design, and commit resources for its 
64 
 
production and introduction in a few hours, if necessary. Zara is careful about the way 
it deploys the latest information technology tools to facilitate these informal 
exchanges. Customized handheld computers support the connection between the 
retail stores and La Coruña. These PDAs augment regular (often weekly) phone 
conversations between the store managers and the market specialists assigned to 
them. Through the PDAs and telephone conversations, stores transmit all kinds of 
information to La Coruña—such hard data as orders and sales trends and such soft 
data as customer reactions and the "buzz" around a new style. While any company can 
use PDAs to communicate, Zara's flat organization ensures that important 
conversations don't fall through the bureaucratic cracks. Once the team selects a 
prototype for production, the designers refine colors and textures on a computer-
aided design system. If the item is to be made in one of Zara's factories, they transmit 
the specs directly to the relevant cutting machines and other systems in that factory. 
Bar codes track the cut pieces as they are converted into garments through the various 
steps involved in production (including sewing operations usually done by 
subcontractors), distribution, and delivery to the stores, where the communication 
cycle began. The constant flow of updated data mitigates the so-called bullwhip 
effect—the tendency of supply chains (and all open-loop information systems) to 
amplify small disturbances. A small change in retail orders, for example, can result in 
wide fluctuations in factory orders after it's transmitted through wholesalers and 
distributors. In an industry that traditionally allows retailers to change a maximum of 
20 percent of their orders once the season has started, Zara lets them adjust 40 
percent to 50 percent. In this way, Zara avoids costly overproduction and the 
subsequent sales and discounting prevalent in the industry. The relentless introduction 
of new products in small quantities, ironically, reduces the usual costs associated with 
running out of any particular item. Indeed, Zara makes a virtue of stock-outs. Empty 
racks don't drive customers to other stores because shoppers always have new things 
to choose from. Being out of stock in one item helps sell another, since people are 
often happy to snatch what they can. In fact, Zara has an informal policy of moving 
unsold items after two or three weeks. This can be an expensive practice for a typical 
store, but since Zara stores receive small shipments and carry little inventory, the risks 
are small; unsold items account for less than 10 percent of stock, compared with the 
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industry average of 17 percent to 20 percent. Furthermore, new merchandise 
displayed in limited quantities and the short window of opportunity for purchasing 
items motivate people to visit Zara's shops more frequently than they might other 
stores. Consumers in central London, for example, visit the average store four times 
annually, but Zara's customers visit its shops an average of 17 times a year.  
 
4.2.7: OPPORTUNITIES  
Short term 
 Renegotiate overseas shipping costs and terms.  Building new plants and equipment is 
very expensive and takes a lot of time so it may not be feasible to open up new 
manufacturing plants or distribution centers in America in the short term. Zara will 
need to continue to ship product from its European distribution center. Leveraging the 
fact that Zara’s shipments will grow as they continue to expand can help them 
renegotiate overseas shipping costs and terms to reduce overall costs.  
Internet Retailing (America): with an existing website in place, Zara can easily add the 
e-commerce feature to its website. Although 80% of trends and styles are common 
across all countries, there is still some variation in preference and taste from country 
to country. Zara can reach consumers faster and easier in the countries they are trying 
to expand into. This method can also help gauge consumer preferences from country 
to country.  
Long Term  
Build a central regional distribution center in America and smaller/satellite distribution 
centers in other countries. Zara maintains its competitive advantage in Europe through 
its fundamental concept to maintain design, production, and distribution processes 
that enable quick response to customer demand. Global expansion means that Zara 
needs to carry its business model to America in order to maintain short production and 
lead times. Building a central distribution center in America will help Zara decrease 
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logistics and help maintain Zara’s model of fast fashion and economies of scale. Zara 
can strategically locate its central distribution center in or near countries where 
manufacturing can be done with cheap labor cost (i.e. Mexico or Carribeans). Smaller 
distribution centers or satellite centers should be built in countries where expansion 
will proliferate in order to shorten lead times. The close proximity of the distribution 
center to the American market will allow Zara to effectively interpret the particular 
American fashion. The increased cost of product variety will increase cost due to 
possible changeover of production techniques to create different apparel lines but this 
cost is warranted since the monetary gain is much greater than the cost. Central 
distribution centers, however, will help cut some the cost of quick, high fashion since it 
can help streamline some of the processes and techniques used to create different 
apparel as they vary from country to country.  
 
4.3: THE MATHEMATICAL MODEL 
The Spanish distributor and retailer Zara specializes in inexpensive fashions for women 
and men between the ages of 16 and 35. In keeping with the spirit of that 
demographic, Zara moves quickly. Like many apparel retailers, it has two seasons-
fall/winter and spring/summer - but selections change frequently within those periods. 
Items spend no more than two weeks on the shelf before making way for new 
merchandise, and stores are replenished twice a week. With annual growth of around 
20 percent in both sales and number of stores, Zara was finding that strategy 
increasingly difficult to execute. Part of the Inditex group of fashion distributors, it 
currently has more than 1,100 stores in 68 countries. With so much volume flowing 
through the supply chain, the company could no longer rely on guesswork by store 
managers as to how much product it needed to replenish at each location. 
Previously, managers from around the world would submit weekly requests for 
additional product to Zara’s three central warehouses in Spain. The orders would 
reflect each individual’s decidedly unscientific view of what would sell in the store. 
Moreover, there was no limit on quantities. Aggregate orders might easily exceed the 
available supply of a given item, leaving warehouse managers with the task of 
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allocating limited product. The system was both labour intensive and imprecise. 
In the summer of 2005, Zara heard about research being done on mathematical 
models for retailing, by professors Jeremie Gallien of the MIT Sloan School of 
Management and Felipe Caro of the UCLA Anderson School of Management. They 
were invited to Zara’s headquarters in La Coruna, Spain. The visit marked the 
beginning of “an active collaboration” between Zara and the researchers. The focus 
was on making better stock-allocation decisions for Zara’s growing network of stores. 
A prototype of the resulting model was implemented between March and July of the 
following year, as part of a six-month internship at Zara by MIT graduate student Juan 
Correa. Between August and December, researchers ran a live pilot involving 
distribution of a dozen products to Zara’s stores worldwide. An identical selection of 
products was dispatched to stores under the old process, for purposes of comparison. 
The mathematical model drew on historical sales data plus available stock in the 
warehouses to come up with a final number for each store. Gallien says the task was 
exceedingly complex. Each store carries several thousand items in up to eight sizes, 
with exact quantities to be determined for twice-weekly shipments. Through use of 
the model, computers could take over the basic number-crunching, with humans left 
to make adjustments based on exceptions such as bad weather or unexpected 
disruptions in the sales channel. What makes the model unique is that it was 
developed to address the world of “fast fashion.” Zara makes it a point to respond 
quickly to consumer taste. Suppliers are given about two weeks to move from design 
to production of a new item. As a result the reaction to any specific trend can reach 
stores only three weeks after it has been identified. 
 
Feeling of exclusivity 
The emphasis on fast turnaround motivates consumers to purchase items on the spot. 
Unlike in many clothing stores, where seasonal lines remain on the shelves for weeks 
or months, a particular style in a Zara store can disappear within a week. At Zara the 
policy is WIGIG (when it’s gone it’s gone). Nothing is more frustrating to a shopper 
than finding the right style in the wrong size. So the MIT model is careful to dictate the 
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right selection of sizes for a given store. When a store is out of certain popular sizes, 
the entire supply of that item is removed to the back room. Many models replenish 
each size independently: if you’re missing a small, it sends you two more units of small. 
But rather than look at a small size in isolation, (the MIT model) looks at the whole 
range. It only triggers replenishment if the shipment will result in an item making it 
back to the sales floor. Meanwhile, incomplete inventory is shifted between stores to 
create a full set of sizes at the locations where it is most likely to sell. Or it can be 
returned to the warehouse for discounting at the end of the selling season. 
The model captures store execution policies as well as the behavioral perception of 
customers when they are confronted by stakeouts. By insisting on having the right 
sizes for a particular store, Zara makes best use of its available inventory while 
improving the customer’s shopping experience. The idea is to substitute a vision that 
can capture the impact on an entire network.  
 
Proximity production/model 
Zara speeds up its supply chain by strategically selecting and locating suppliers. A 
“proximity model” judges not only their geographic placement, but their ability to 
respond quickly to production orders. About half of the retailer’s production meets the 
proximity threshold, mostly coming from suppliers in Spain, Portugal and Morocco. 
From a geographic standpoint, nearly 65 percent of production is sourced in Europe. 
Zara also buys from suppliers in Asia, but because of the need for speed, their number 
is “considerably less” than the industry’s average. These were basic collection items or 
wardrobe "staples," with minimum fashion content such as T-shirts, lingerie and 
woolens, and where there was a clear cost advantage. Externally manufactured items 
were shipped to Zara's distribution centre. Zara was a fashion imitator. It focused its 
attention on understanding the fashion items that its customers wanted and then 
delivering them, rather than on promoting predicted season's trends via fashion shows 
and similar channels of influence, which the fashion industry traditionally used.  A 
team of 200 young, talented yet unknown designers created designs, based on the 
latest fashions from the catwalk and other fashion hotspots, which were easily 
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adaptable to the mass market. In this way, Zara became adept at picking up up-to-the-
minute trends and churning them out to stores around the world in a matter of weeks. 
For example, after Madonna's first concert date in Spain during a recent tour, her 
outfit was quickly copied by Zara. By the time she performed her last concert in Spain, 
some members of the audience were wearing the same outfit. Working alongside the 
market specialists and production planners, the designers for each of Zara's collections 
kept in touch with market developments to create around 40,000 new designs every 
year, of which around one-quarter were manufactured. The process begins with a 
demand forecast, which is carried out just once for the entire lifecycle of a given 
product, at the time of the production order. For replenishment purposes, demand is 
forecasted on a daily basis. It’s on the replenishment side that the MIT model comes 
into play. The model looks at inventory in the warehouse, what’s remaining in all sizes 
at all stores, and the recent history of sales data. The initial conclusions seemed 
intuitively right to the humans who had previously made those decisions. What was 
different was the model’s ability to process a massive amount of relevant data in a 
matter of seconds. By contrast, the previous method was limited by the cognitive 
limitations of human decision-makers, who could each only examine a small fraction of 
the relevant data at a time, and had to do so under intense time pressure. With several 
million individual shipments to calculate each week, differences by only a few units 
here and there quickly added up. Gallien says MIT and Zara didn’t fully appreciate the 
system’s impact on sales, especially its ability to shift items between stores, until the 
pilot was in effect. When the results of that model were compared with the old way of 
replenishing stores, Zara had achieved an increase in sales of 3 to 4 percent. In fact, 
the retailer last September beat analyst forecasts with an overall 7-percent increase in 
same-store sales for the first half of 2007. Other factors in Zara’s success included the 
favorable impact of currency-exchange rates. The labour-intensive sewing of the 
garments was outsourced to local subcontractors, which used seamstresses in 
cooperatives. Zara was usually their sole client, and they worked without any written 
contracts. Subcontractors received a flat fee per type of garment, and operated on 
short lead times and fast turnaround. They picked up the prepared fabric pieces from 
Zara, and returned them to the 500,000 sq. metre distribution centers. At the Zara 
distribution centre, optical reading devices were used to sort and distribute over 
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60,000 items per hour. The garments were then picked up and collected by trucks, 
which transported them to different destinations all over Europe (which made up 
about 75 per cent of deliveries). Products for more distant destinations were 
transported by air (about 25 per cent). Shipments tended to have almost zero flaws, 
with 98.9 per cent accuracy and under 0.5 per cent shrinkage. Since Zara's garments 
were produced in-house, it was able to make a new line from start to finish in 
anywhere between two and five weeks, depending on the type of garment. As a result, 
Zara could be responsive to fashion items that were selling well during the season, and 
to discontinue those that were not. By constantly refreshing the collection, and 
manufacturing items in high-intensity short runs, Zara was able to prevent the 
accumulation of non-saleable inventories. It was estimated that Zara committed just 
15-25 per cent of production before the season began, 50-60 per cent at the start of 
the season, and the remainder was manufactured in-season. Percentage of Zara sales 
consisting of markdowns was 15-20 per cent. In some cases, stores ran out of stock. 
However, this was not viewed as a negative since it contributed to customers' 
perception of the uniqueness of their purchase. Thanks to the frequent refreshing of 
stock, customers constantly returned to stores to browse new items. Zara's global 
average of 17 visits per customer per year was considerably higher than the three visits 
to its competitors. 
 
Additional benefits 
The model has yielded additional benefits. Product now spends more time on the sales 
floor, and less in a back room or warehouse. With a reduction in misallocated 
inventory, there are fewer returns to the warehouse and transfers between stores. 
And, as Zara’s distribution network continues to grow, the retailer won’t need to 
expand its warehouse team as fast as the old process required. Results seen first in the 
pilot remained steady when the model was rolled out to all items and stores, in a 
combined effort by Zara’s Logistics Group and IT department. The task was completed 
by June 2007. At some point in the future, Zara wants to expand its use of the model 
to help determine the initial allocation of product to the stores. The only catch is that 
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the company won’t have historical demand data on which to rely, for product hitting 
the sales floor for the first time. However, Zara could obtain some information by 
testing new products in a handful of stores that are representative of larger sales 
patterns. In the process it could generate some knowledge about how the item is going 
to sell, then leverage that information when doing the massive initial shipment. The 
right sampling of stores can afford a bigger picture of demand. Such intelligence can at 
least put a retailer on the right track, at which point it can follow up with a rapid 
replenishment model such as the one developed for Zara by MIT and UCLA. “The 
question is never whether the forecast is right or wrong: the only good question about 
forecasts is how wrong they are. It’s important that the model generates information 
that makes sense, that doesn’t conflict with human instinct. Zara is continuing to 
collaborate with Gallien and Caro in the area of clearance-sale pricing optimization. At 
the same time, the original model will likely be expanded to other units of the Inditex 
group, whose other brands include Massimo Dutti, Bershka, Stradivarius and the 
casual youth line Pull and Bear. 
 
4.4: FINANCIAL DATA 
As we can see in the following table, in the last 5 years Inditex’s net sales are growth 
from 6741 (2005),8196 (2006) to 11048 (2009). Below the growth of net sales, as well 
there is the growth of net income from 811 (2005), 1010 (2006), to 1322 (2009). 
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Figure 4.7: Inditex’s net sale – net income 
In the following graph, instead it is point out the trend of the ROE (Return on Equity), 
that show a decline during the last years : from 30% (2005), 32% (2006), 33% (2007), to 
28%(2008), 26(2009). 
                       
Figure 4.8 : Inditex’s ROE 
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4.5: COMPETITORS 
While Inditex competed with local retailers in most of its markets, analysts considered 
its three closest comparable competitors to be The Gap, H&M, and Benetton. All three 
had narrower vertical scope than Zara, which owned much of its production and most 
od its stores. The Gap and H&M, which were the two largest specialist apparel retailers 
in the world, ahead of Inditex, owned most of their stores but outsourced all 
production. Benetton, in contrast, had invested relatively heavily in production, but 
licensees ran its stores. The three competitors were also positioned differently in 
product space from Inditex’s chains as seen in figure.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.9: Zara’s competitors 
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The Gap 
The Gap, based in San Francisco, had been founded in 1969 and had achieved stellar 
growth and profitability through the 1980s and much of the 1990s with what was 
described as an “unpretentious real clothes stance”, comprising extensive collections 
of T-shirts and jeans as well as “smart casual” work clothes. The Gap’s production was 
internationalized- more than 90% of it was outsourced from outside the United State- 
but its store operations were U.S.- centric. International expansion of the store 
network had begun in 1987, but its pace had been limited by difficulties finding 
locations in markets such as the United Kingdom, Germany, and Japan (which 
accounted for 86% of store locations outside North America) adapting to different 
customer sizes and preferences, and dealing with what were, in many cases, more 
severe pricing pressures than in the United States. And by the end of the 1990s, supply 
chains that were still too long, market saturation, imbalances, and inconsistencies 
across the company’s three store chains- Banana Republic, The Gap, and Old Navy_ 
and the lack of a clear fashion positioning had started to take a toll even in the U.S. 
market. A failed attempt to reposition to a more fashion-driven assortment – a major 
fashion miss- triggered significant writedowns a loss for calendar year 2001 a massive 
decline in the Gap’s stock price, and the departure, in May 2002, of its long-time CEO, 
Millard Drexler. 
 
Hennes and Mauritz 
Hennes and Mauritz (H&M), founded as Hennes (hers) in Sweden in 1947, was another 
high-performing apparel retailer. While it was considered Inditex’s closest competitor, 
there were a number of key differences.H&M outsourced all its production, half of it to 
European suppliers, implying lead times that were good by industry standards but 
significantly longer than Zara’s. H&M had been quicker to internationalize, generating 
more than half its sales outside its home country by 1990, 10 years earlier than Inditex. 
It also had adopted a more focused approach, entering one country at a time –with an 
emphasis on northern Europe – and building a distribution center in each one. Unlike 
Inditex, H&M operated a single format, although it marketed its clothes under 
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numerous labels or concepts to different customer segments. H&M also tendeed to 
have slightly lower prices than Zara (which it displayed prominently in store windows 
and on shelving), engaged in extensive advertising like most other apparel retailers, 
employed fewer designers (40& as many as Zara, although Zara was still 40& smaller), 
and refurbished its stores less frequently. H&M’s price-earnings ratio, while still high, 
had declined to levels comparable to Inditex’s because of a fashion miss that had 
reduced net  income by 17& in 200 and a recent announcement that an aggressive 
effort to expand in the United States was being slowed down. 
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CHAPTER 5: BENETTON 
5.1 BENETTON’S HYSTORY 
The firm Benetton was founded in 1965 in Ponzano Veneto, a small town near Treviso, 
by four brothers’ initiative.  In the beginning, Benetton was only a small company that 
was producing sweaters for local independent retailers. The keys to the success 
consisted in some innovations related to the product and its distribution and to an 
efficient production organization based on the work of a large network of small local 
subcontractors specialized in knitting, cutting and sewing garments. In the 1970s it 
expanded in the Italian market of sweaters and soon of casual apparel in general. In 
fact, shortly after the production of knitwear, followed the production of shirts and 
jeans. In the beginning Benetton sold them under different brands (Tomato, Jeans 
West, etc.) because the quality of these new products was not yet comparable to the 
one obtained for the sweaters and there was a fear that it might damage the 
reputation that the firm had achieved as a knitwear producer. The first Benetton’s 
shop opened in Belluno in 1966 and in just few years Benetton’s stores covered all 
Italian’s provinces. In the beginning of the 70s, there were about 500 stores under 
different Benetton’s brands (as well as Benetton, also Tomato, My Market and 
Merceria). It is estimated that in the second part of the seventies around 60-70% of 
the overall Benetton production was made by a hundred of subcontractors located 
mainly in Treviso and in the surrounding provinces of Veneto. The activities such as 
design, quality control and the manufacturing stages which required greater 
investments (such as knitting, cutting and dyeing), were instead undertaken in the two 
factories of Villorba and Monzambano which employed about 1000 workers. From the 
very beginning, a tight control was imposed on subcontractors, to whom raw materials 
and precise technical details to make the garment were sent. The price paid by 
Benetton to its subcontractors was generally lower than the one paid by other firms, 
and it was updated yearly according to the rate of inflation. Lower prices, however, 
were compensated by the certainty and punctuality of payments, by long production 
runs (which could surpass 10 thousand items per model which was large for the 
market of the time) and by the guarantee of continuous orders that permitted the 
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subcontractors to work at full production capacity. In the 1960s and the 1970s, 
Benetton’s promotional strategy was focused on shops, advertising huge expenditures 
being out of reach at the time. The first ‘My Market’ shop format was designed by 
Tobia Scarpa, son of the famous architect Carlo Scarpa. He suggested eliminating the 
counter, arranging all the sweaters on shelters, and opening the window towards the 
interior of the shop. This way, the same room could be used for stocking, selling and 
displaying merchandise. In the 1970s, the company started producing also jeans and 
velvet trousers, shirts and T-shirts, in order to allow customers to find a coordinate set 
of apparel inside its shops. With its combinable collections, Benetton helped 
developing Italian casual style. Product differentiation brought about target 
differentiation, and a multiplication of shop formats as ‘012’ for kids, ‘Merceria’ for 
young customers’ mothers (Benetton-Lee 1990, 12), ‘Jean’s West’ for jeans, or 
‘Tomato’ for penniless young people, and others. Benetton’s name never appeared on 
the sign of the shop, but only on single items (with the wool-knot logo that became 
famous in the 1980s). Low visibility allowed not to alarm competition, and marked off 
the company from shopkeepers commercial policies. In the 1970s Benetton actually 
aimed to conceal its expansion, in order to escape social and political tensions, prevent 
unions from meddling with its informal production and distribution network, and keep 
on moving as a little family business despite its growth. In the beginning almost all 
Benetton production was sold on the domestic market and exports became significant 
toward the end of the 70s with stores opened in France, Germany, United Kingdom, 
Holland and Belgium. Between 1973 and 1979, the Benetton’s sales increased from 31 
to 287 million Euros.  In the seventies, thanks to Benetton and to other firms that 
followed the trail of its success, Italy became the major producer of knitwear in 
Europe. Another important producer of Treviso, Stefanel, in those years experienced a 
market success following the same Benetton’s business model (coloured sweaters sold 
in franchising) and becoming very soon one of its main competitors. At the end of the 
1970s Benetton met its first difficulties in sales. This crisis made the entrepreneurs 
aware the company had reached a threshold in scale, and that reorganization was 
needed in order to avoid a downsizing. Awareness came along tentatively, buying and 
then selling shops and plants, and trying to expand in Europe in order to make up for 
the saturation of Italian market. This learning phase was useful to define company 
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identity according to its specific resources and the elements which had brought it to 
success. Indeed, it was only in the attempt to expand sales abroad that franchising was 
used on purpose to enter new markets, and became the driving element of a new 
strategy for growth. What strikes more is the radical change in the image policy. In the 
1980s sales extended all over Europe, to USA and Japan. Internationalization stirred up 
a logistic and managerial reorganization, while the company went floating in order to 
support investments. From the low-profile attitude of the 1970s, Benetton moved in 
the 1980s towards an explicit brand promotion and an increasing transparency, in view 
of listing on the stock exchange. Sales promotion abroad needed to use the Italian-
style appeal of Benetton name; in Italy too, Benetton unified different existing shops 
under the Benetton, 012 and Jean’s West signs: too much differentiation threatened to 
frustrate brand-advertising efforts. Visibility was also a result of the choice to take 
family-business clothes off, and to turn Benetton into an international company with 
solid relationship with politics and finance. Thanks to its camouflage ability, in the 
1970s the company had been able to enjoy State facilities without undergoing the 
limitations big businesses suffered. In the different political context of the 1980s, it 
became a respectable interlocutor for national institutions, politicians and bankers. In 
the second half of the 1980s, the success of commercial expansion in Europe urged an 
adjustment of international strategy. Western Europe had become Benetton’s real 
domestic market, and the 1987 annual report praised European unification but also 
stated that product ‘globality’ was a strategic asset, a value ‘for company 
management, and an inspiring idea for all protagonists and collaborators of Benetton 
Group’. To expand sales in Asia or in the Americas (and in other products), Benetton 
adopted a new step-by-step entry strategy, firstly licensing local producers to use its 
trade mark, then entering in joint venture with them, and establishing a local branch of 
the company only when the market had shown its development capacity. In this 
project, brand promotion was a basic point: advertising expenditures increased then 
more, in order to promote a coloured, multi-ethnical and global image of the 
company. The firm was quoted in Milano’s stock’s exchange in 1985 and later in the 
New York stock’s exchange (from whose quotation it was withdrawn in 2007).  
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Advertising 
 Since 1983 advertising design had been entrusted to the Parisian agency Eldorado, 
employing the photographers Bruno Sutter and Oliviero Toscani. In the 1984 campaign 
‘All the Colours of the World’ Toscani put together white and black young models 
wearing coloured clothes. He introduced then the ‘United Colors of Benetton’ slogan, 
explicitly identifying the company’s globalization strategy with the ideal of a peaceful, 
multi-ethnical world, which after the international political changes of the second half 
of the 1980s seemed at hand. In 1989 this slogan became the logo of the company, 
and Toscani was hired by Benetton, breaking the contract with Eldorado. In the 
following campaigns, any reference to the product disappeared, and advertising 
focused on topical social issues. Toscani’s ‘shock’ campaigns disconcerted for the 
subject of images, such as the nun and priest kiss, or for the timing of their publication, 
as for the war cemetery photo circulated on occasion of the Gulf-War outbreak. 
Toscani and Benetton claimed for the photographer and for the company the right to 
deal with the reality issues usually expunged from the fictitious world of advertising. 
Indeed, polemics on the press came to emphasize the visibility of the company and its 
presumed social commitment.  
 
Acquisitions 
In the 1990s, unsuccessful attempts to enlarge product range were followed by family-
led acquisitions in other sectors. The inflation of Benetton’s image in the first 1990s 
was also enhanced by the success of the Formula 1 stable the company acquired in 
1984, which in 1994 and 1995 won the World Championship. The company also owned 
basket, rugby, volley and water-polo teams. In 1992 Luciano Benetton stood as 
candidate for and was elected to Parliament, with a move allowing him insider 
knowledge of economic policy decisions in those troubled years for Italy, and putting 
again his company in the limelight.  
 
Shops 
Indeed, troubles were not only for policy makers: in the 1990s Benetton’s market 
position was challenged by international retailers such as The Gap, Zara, H&M and 
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Mango. Company reacted by adjusting the dimensions of shops to the need of a total-
look offer including licensed apparel and accessories, from spectacles to cosmetics. 
The shops, generally of small size constituted an innovation in the Italian market 
because they offered, at good price, good quality and highly fashionable sweaters 
which were displayed in a way so that customers were able to pick them up from the 
shelves, touch and try them. The growth of Benetton depended more and more on the 
capacity to increase the number of stores under its own brands involving in the 
business some of its agents who became owners of many stores. Average shop area 
increased from 50 to 200 square meters, and new megastores were opened in big 
cities all over the world. The megastore project forced the company to buy valuable 
real estate in order to fill strategic commercial positions; still, in perspective also 
megastores were to be franchised to independent shop owners. Even facing retailers’ 
competition, Benetton went on acting as an exclusive wholesaler for its franchisees. 
This strategy allowed more flexibility and shifted on shopkeepers most of market risks. 
The growing conflict between sales expansion and profits was then solved this way in 
favour of profitability. Still, the relationship between the company and its franchisee 
shopkeepers allowed them some room for autonomy and resistance, as in every 
network organization.  In 1984, Benetton was planning to build up a communication 
system collecting both orders and payments from franchisees’ sales records. This 
project failed because of the (mostly passive) resistance shopkeepers and agents 
offered to what they saw as a threat to their autonomy. Even if they succeeded in 
defending their managing independence, shopkeepers were never allowed to meddle 
in company’s brand policy. When sales slumped in European markets in the first 1990s, 
shopkeepers (who could not return unsold goods) blamed Toscani’s ‘shock’ campaigns 
for alienating customers, going so far as to sue the company for that, but lost the case. 
It is interesting to confront this episode with the completely different outcome of the 
2001 conflict on the ‘death row’ campaign. On this occasion, the department store 
chain Sears, Roebuck & Co. rescinded the distribution agreement with Benetton it had 
entered into in 1998. Toscani resigned in 2002. The case pointed out some implications 
of commercial relationship the company seem not to have perceived. In its 
relationship with big retailers, Benetton did not enjoy the same position of strength 
which allowed it to impose its promotional choices to franchisee shopkeepers. Brand 
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policy could not leave out of consideration the eventual reaction of different 
commercial partners. Not only money, but also power concerns persuaded Benetton 
not to change its approach to distribution, even if its ‘flexible formula’ in last years 
turned out to be very rigid, when compared with international competitors’ quick-
response ability based on the control of their chain shops. 
 
Production organization  
At the beginning of 2000, Benetton speeded up the process of changing the production 
organization, in consequence of the strong competition mainly coming from Zara, 
H&M and Mango, which are the main foreign brands to have their own stores in Italy. 
The process of restructuring was extremely fast: in 2003, 48% of the volume of 
production was still manufactured abroad and 62% in Italy. Production abroad 
increased in just one year, between 2004 and 2005, by 13 million items and the 
employment in Benetton’s Italian subcontracting firms shrank, from 2003 to 2005, by 
3100 workers. This great shift was due to the decision taken in 2004 to move 
production to China. The recourse to Asian suppliers with a large autonomy in 
managing a broader range of manufacturing functions, including the sourcing of inputs 
and sometimes logistics, is described as “full package production”. Benetton provides 
the design, often a simple sketch, and buys the final product that is delivered to its 
warehouse and then distributed to the stores. In 2007, Benetton’s full package 
production represented, in terms of volume, 37.6% of the total11 and the increasing 
importance of this form of sourcing has made Benetton much more similar to the large 
clothing international retailers (e.g. H&M, The Gap, Marks&Spencer) than to a clothing 
manufacturer. In 2005 Benetton’s organization shifted from a system based on 
productive units referring to the different product categories (such as wool, cotton, 
etc.), to a structure based on the different activities (such as design, quality control, 
marketing etc); a move that underlines the change in the governance of the value 
chain. Also the structure and the number of collections changed radically. Until 2003, 
the production was based on two seasonal collections (Spring/Summer and 
Autumn/Winter) that were designed much in advance of the selling season and 80% of 
the production was decided on the basis of orders collected before the season by 
Benetton’s agents. The remaining 20% came from reorders. The products designed 
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during the selling seasons “flashes” were a very small part of the production and were 
made just to “refresh” the shop windows. This organization did not permit taking 
advantage of the market opportunities, and was not encouraging consumers to pay 
more visits to the shops in search of the last fashion trends. Following the success of 
Zara, able to offer constantly updated products in its stores, Benetton changed its 
collections timetable. 
The traditional seasonal collection was split taking the names of Contemporary1 and 
Contemporary2. Each one of these collections has a time-to-market that varies 
between 4 and 8 months and is articulated in 4 launches: Spring, Summer, Autumn and 
Winter.  
 Dec Jan Feb Mar  Apr May  Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
Spring/Summer              
Continuative Items              
Contemporary1 Spring              
Contemporary1 Summer              
Contemporary2 Spring              
Contemporary2 Summer              
Trend              
Just in time              
Autumn/Winter              
Continuative Items              
Contemporary1 Autumn              
Contemporary1 Winter              
Contemporary2 Autumn              
Contemporary2 Winter              
Trend              
Just in time              
Figure 5.1: Benetton’s collection 
 
Additionally, during the selling season, Benetton introduced three collections: “Trend” 
a collection more sensitive to the fashion tendencies with time-to-market between 1 
and 4 months and the collections “Just in time” and “Continuative items” that use 
standardised raw materials (“Continuative items” is manufactured on stock) and are 
brought to the market in a very short time (7 days if the products are made in Italy and 
15 days if imported from abroad). While “Just in time” aims to satisfy fashion sensitive 
consumers, “Continuative items” guarantees that a collection’s core products are 
restored in a very short while. The passage from a production planned well in advance 
to a flexible one, with a reduction of the time-to-market and an increase in the number 
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of collections, required a new selling organization. The independent retailers, in fact, 
have to bear the risk of the end of season markdown and they put the orders only 
after having seen the products. There is in fact the need for the agents to visit the 
retailers more than one time a season to show the collections and this implies high 
transactional costs and difficulties in planning production. A direct control of the 
shops, instead, guarantees a better coordination of the entire value chain reducing the 
time needed for the independent retailers to decide their purchases. For this reason, 
Benetton, in the last few years, has increased the number of its own stores that now 
sell about a quarter of the value of total sales. Furthermore, in the last two years 
Benetton invested a great deal of resources in retailing activities, opening new stores 
in new markets, giving economic incentives to the franchisees and linking the 
production, logistic and retailing units through a new information system, in order to 
receive information about the sell-out and the retailers can have immediate 
confirmation and guaranteed delivery times for their orders. 
This shift of focus from production to retail activities confirms the transformation of 
Benetton from a manufacturing to a buying company. 
1960s The idea of color 
1965 The Benetton group is established 
1970s A business model making the difference: unique, flexible and innovative. 
1980s Benetton communication campaigns: known all over the world. 
1990s A global company present in 120 countries 
200s 
Benetton grows with the market: over 150 million garments produced every 
year and distributed in around 6,000 contemporary stores. 
Figure 5.2: Benetton’s timeline 
 
 
5.2: BUSINESS MODEL 
Benetton strategic intent is “to put fashion on an industrial level”. Its success is based 
on a creation, design and distribution system which enables it to be one of the largest 
international transactional structures. The entire supply chain is concerned with 
externalization. This system is based on the “short circuit” principles, and was 
optimized in the early 1980s. This manufacturing organization enables Benetton to 
maintain essential reactivity in a business dealing with fashion, while reaching the 
same efficiency as a large industry.  
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5.2.1: STRENGTHS 
Right from the beginning, Benetton offered a new product characterized by bright 
colours and targeted to young people. The fully fashion knitwear was made on cotton 
looms and it was strictly in plain colour. In this way it is possible to knit plain wool into 
sweaters and postpone dyeing the entire stock just before going to the market, 
according to the latest fashion trends. Retailers could order plain sweaters in advance 
and specify the colour during the selling season. Together with the advantage of a 
rapid Carpi district, which had the Italian knitwear’s leadership at that time, was 
instead specialized in a production of cut and sew knitwear with a very wide offer of 
models. So Benetton, differently from Carpi, offered a limited number of models, using 
the colours as strategy to differentiate its products. As a response to the fashion 
market, the dyeing postponement process allowed a drastic reduction of costs due to 
less expensive inventories and to a smaller unsold stock. This process was made 
possible thanks to an advanced dyeing process set up by Benetton, able to offer an 
wide number of colours and the guarantee that garments did not lose their colours 
when washed. Benetton internalized the dyeing process to take advantage fully of its 
dyeing know how 
 
5.2.2: WEAKNESSES 
In carrying out its business activities, Benetton is subject to the following risks: 
The Benetton business is subject to competitive pressure. The Group operates in an 
industry, the apparel sector, which is highly competitive as far as production, sales and 
distribution are concerned. The number of competitors has grown considerably in the 
last few years, and companies manufacturing out of countries with a low cost base 
now play an important role. To contain this risk, the Group maintains a strategic focus 
on production and organizational efficiency policies related to the process of 
production decentralization, completion of production cycles in overseas units, and 
organizational cost reduction. Increased competition could lead to price pressure, 
which would have a significantly negative impact on the Group’s financial standing and 
performance. As far as distribution is concerned, competition could increase given that 
there are few barriers to entry. Benetton competes against local, national and global 
department stores, specialized retailers, independent retailers and manufacturing 
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companies, as well as against mail order companies which use catalogues to target 
customers. Benetton focuses mainly on quality, breadth of product range and 
merchandising, customer service, store ambience, and sales and marketing programs. 
The Group also competes to secure prime retail sites and the best lease and purchase 
conditions. The success of Benetton’s strategies is influenced by the sales network’s 
buy-in. The substantial incentive scheme in place for the network of commercial 
partners, in line with the business model, seeks to enable partners to increase their 
investment capacity in order to open new stores, renew existing ones, and increase 
competitiveness in terms of price to the final consumer. The success of this strategy 
depends on the ability to motivate and manage the network by setting specific 
objectives and monitoring progress on a regular basis. It is to be noted that the 
Group’s business model is linked to a risk of late payment from customers and, 
generally speaking, payment collection risk. Benetton’s future performance depends 
on its ability to develop the business in emerging markets. The Group is strengthening 
its new commercial strategies. Special emphasis is being placed on certain emerging 
markets, such as China and India, including through agreements with large-scale 
retailers for the opening of “stores in stores” in large department stores in the largest 
cities. The Group’s initiatives include the creation of new partnerships to manage and 
develop commercial activities. Benetton’s business is sensitive to changes in customer 
spending habits and can be influenced, amongst other things, by business outlook, 
interest rates, taxation, local economic conditions, uncertainty over future economic 
prospects and a shift of spending habits towards other goods or services. Consumer 
preferences and economic conditions may change from time to time in each and every 
market in which the Group operates. Benetton’s success depends on its ability to 
anticipate and respond to changing trends. Sales and profitability levels also depend 
on the ability to anticipate and react immediately to changes in fashion trends and 
consumer tastes. If Benetton’s collections were not to meet with the customers’ 
approval, the result would be lower than expected sales, a higher level of discounts, 
and reduced margins. The Group’s growth and expansion strategy has led to an 
increase in fixed and operating costs. To strengthen Benetton’s image and market 
share, investments have been made in recent years to sell products through directly-
owned retail stores, even if the Group has traditionally distributed its products through 
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a capillary network of franchise stores. To date, the Benetton Group manages 280 
wholly-owned shops, which are strategic as far as the demographic and commercial 
profile of their locations is concerned. These retail stores have, however, led to an 
increase in fixed and operating costs. These investments expose the Group to the 
additional risk that some of the chosen locations may turn out to be inadequate 
because of changes in the area’s demographic profile or the location of shopping 
districts. Benetton is exposed to risks linked with its strategies. The Group strives to 
develop the existing commercial network and to strengthen its brand. However, this 
growth could be compromised were Benetton not able to: 
 
1. identify adequate markets and adequate locations for new stores; 
2. maintain the service levels expected by customers; 
3. avoid sales and profit margin erosion for stores selling Benetton-branded goods       
when directly managed megastores are opened in the same areas or shopping 
districts; 
4. manage inventories on the basis of effective needs; 
5. deliver goods on time. 
 
The Group’s systems, procedures, controls, and resources need to be aligned to 
support its expansion plans. Should this not be the case, the success of the strategies 
proposed would not be ensured. The protection of Benetton’s intellectual property 
rights is subject to risks. To safeguard the rights on those core product values which 
are crucial to the Group’s success and market competitiveness - i.e. design, proprietary 
technologies and manufacturing processes, product and concept research, 
acknowledged trademarks. Benetton relies on the laws on business secrecy, unfair 
competition, trade dress, trademarks, patents, and copyrights. Nonetheless, 
trademark registration requests may not result in effective registrations, and in the 
same way even registrations granted may be ineffective to fend off competitors and 
could be subsequently invalidated. Above all, the actions undertaken to protect 
intellectual property rights may turn out to be ineffective against counterfeiting. The 
Group’s know-how may become known to competitors, and Benetton may not be able 
to fully protect its intellectual property rights. Other companies may also develop 
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products independently which are substantially similar or better to Benetton’s, 
without infringing the Group’s intellectual property rights. In addition, it is to be noted 
that legislation in some countries does not protect proprietary rights. The already 
substantial amount of resources allocated to the protection of proprietary rights could 
be significantly increased should the level of infringement by third parties also 
increase. Furthermore, judgments against us in disputes relating to the Group’s 
proprietary rights may: 
1. impose the granting of licenses to third parties or the requesting for licenses from 
third parties; 
2. prevent the production or sale of the Group’s products; 
3. lead to substantial losses. 
United Colors of Benetton, Undercolors, Sisley, Playlife, Killer Loop, and other 
commercial and service trademarks have been registered or are subject to registration 
requests with the trademarks and patent offices of many foreign countries and are 
protected by ordinary legislation. The real estate market for commercial sites is very 
competitive. The ability of Benetton and its partners to find locations for new stores 
depends on the availabilility of adequate buildings and the ability to negotiate terms 
that are in line with established financial targets. Moreover, the Group must ensure 
that existing rental contracts can be renegotiated effectively. The Group is 
implementing a number of changes to its information technology systems which, by 
their very nature, entail the risk of temporary downtime. In synergy with its strategic 
development plans, Benetton has begun changing and replacing its IT systems. The 
changes primarily involve the upgrading of current business systems, the development 
of system modifications, or the purchase of systems with new features. Benetton is 
aware of the risks linked to substitution, including the accurate transfer of data and 
possible system downtime, but we feel we have taken all the necessary steps to 
contain these risks by means of testing, training and project planning, as well as by 
entering into related commercial agreements with suppliers of the replacement 
technologies. The launch of the new versions will be implemented in phases over a 
three-year timeframe. Benetton’s sales and operating income may be influenced by 
foreign exchange rate and interest rate fluctuations. The Group’s sales and operating 
income will continue to be influenced by foreign exchange rate fluctuations in the sale 
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currencies, which in turn impact on the prices of products sold, the cost of sales, and 
operating income. Foreign currency exchange rate variations against the euro may 
have a negative effect on sales, operating results, and the international 
competitiveness of the production facilities of the various business units. Even an 
appreciation of the euro could have an adverse effect on the Group’s sales and 
operating income. Given that Benetton makes use of hedging in order to manage 
currency exposure, the strategies adopted may not be sufficient to protect income 
from the negative effects of future fluctuations. Benetton also holds assets and 
liabilities which are sensitive to interest rate variations and are necessary in managing 
liquidity and financial needs. These assets and liabilities are exposed to interest rate 
risk, which is, at times, managed through the use of derivative financial instruments. 
Benetton is exposed to risks associated with the internationalization of its business 
activities, including risks relating to late payments in some countries or, in general, to 
credit collection difficulties. The business is also exposed to political and economic 
instability in some of the countries in which we operate, as well as to changes in 
legislation, to linguistic and cultural barriers, tariffs or trade barriers, and price or 
exchange rate controls. 
 
5.2.3: PARTNERSHIPS 
Most of the shops were not company-owned, but informally franchised to 
shopkeepers paying no royalties and granted no exclusive right. Independent agents 
recruited franchisees and collected their orders. Benetton carried out a revolution: it 
was the first Italian firm to apply a quasi-franchising system to retailing. This system 
permitted a fast growth of sales thanks to the fact that there was no need to have 
great financial resources to open new stores. That was good for Benetton that at the 
beginning of its success lacked the necessary capital. The relationships with the 
retailers were similar but not equal to those of the franchising contract. In fact, there 
was not a written contract and royalties were not requested. On the other hand 
Benetton did not guarantee the retailers an exclusivity of territory, did not repurchase 
the unsold products and imposed the retail prices. 
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Benetton operates using a blend of in-house expertise and outsourced resources 
throughout the value chain. Benetton was involved in partnership arrangements 
(nothing more than a version of the Italian extended family) long before the term 
strategic alliance became fashionable. Manufacturing, for example, is carried out with 
the help of 450 subcontractors. The third-party manufacturers receive production 
planning support, technical assistance and quality control support. It is not unusual for 
Benetton to provide financial assistance to encourage contractors to equip with 
specialized machinery for special effects and to have' Benetton help financially when 
the equipment is no longer required. Without this encouragement, the contractors 
would not have the motivation to change their technology. It is also not unusual for 
Benetton to encourage employees to convert internal processes to externally 
contracted ones and so assist employees to become self-employed entrepreneurs. In 
return, Benetton demands exclusivity. This is essential to ensure that Benetton always 
has capacity available to handle peaks and to be able to co-ordinate effectively these 
external production units. These independent labour cells give Benetton high levels of 
flexibility compared with a comparably sized in-house unionized labour force. 
Simultaneously, lower labour costs accrue given the cost structures of family-owned 
businesses. The risks and rewards are evenly shared with such an arrangement. It also 
appears that no need is felt to formalize such relationships with a legal contract. 
Analysts believe this blend of high labour cost third-party and a high-technology in-
house operation gives Benetton a manufacturing cost structure comparable with Asian 
producers. Benetton describes itself as "vertically de-integrated". This is the process of 
centralizing those processes which add the highest value and decentralizing the rest. 
This mix of third party and in-house operations extends to functions other than 
manufacturing--always outsourcing when in-house economies of scale cannot be 
obtained and where quality and customer service will not be jeopardized. The use of 
subcontractors has also allowed Benetton to maintain its rapid expansion rate without 
the need for massive capital and labour force investment. The purchasing function is 
centralized in-house given the economies inherent in large scale buying. Benetton is 
one of the largest wool buyers in the world and at one stage was contemplating 
establishing a wool scouring plant in Australia. It is fairly typical for companies to be 
too small for some activities such as international transport and too large for others 
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such as labour intensive finishing and hence there is a cost advantage if such activities 
are performed by a third party. At each step of the supply chain Benetton has taken a 
conscious decision about whether to process in-house or subcontract bearing in mind 
cost, flexibility, speed and service. 
 
5.2.4: INTEGRATION 
Benetton grew through a strategy of vertical and horizontal integration. At the end of 
the 70s Benetton’s organization could be defined as “quasi-vertical integration” as the 
company controlled the whole value chain, even if various activities were not 
organized through an exclusive hierarchical control. In fact Benetton represented the 
main, if not the only, client of its subcontractors and could decide the price paid and 
the general terms of supply. As in the case of the franchisees, there was no a written 
contract and the orders were tacitly replaced at every season. Benetton established 
with its subcontractors long-term relationships based on cooperation and trust. 
Although there was an evident asymmetry in the negotiation power (subcontractors 
employed an average of 15-20 workers), Benetton, thanks to the constant growth of 
sales, was able to renew and increase the orders at every season, favouring the 
subcontractors who updated. The mark up of Benetton’s stores was 70% against an 
average of 100% applied by the other stores. In 1981, Aldo Palmeri, a Bank of Italy 
officer, became CEO of Benetton. Two years later, Giovanni Cantagalli, another 
manager coming from an American multinational company, was recruited in charge of 
personnel and shortly a team of managers was created to reorganize the Benetton’s 
family-owned company. Benetton used to advise its subcontractors about new 
machines that were most profitable and provided to some of them financial assistance 
through its leasing and factoring company. It was at the end of the 80s that Benetton 
started the process of entering directly into the upstream stages of the clothing value 
chain. It acquired important textile and knitting factories through the affiliated 
company Olimpias that today owns, in several Italian provinces, ten plants supplying 
the majority of the raw materials necessary to the Group’s clothing division. The 
control of the entire value chain was then completed: from retailing to clothing and 
textile manufacturing, to which also the wool production was added later. In 1991 in 
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fact, the Benetton family acquired the company Tierras Del Sur Argentino, becoming 
the owner of 900 thousand hectares of breeding area for sheep, for a total production 
of over 6 million kilos of wool. The process of horizontal integration was also achieved. 
The strategy of total look was completed with the introduction of products such as 
shoes, spectacles, perfumes, watches and, most recently, jewellery. This strategy was 
carried out both through acquisitions, as in the case of “Calzaturificio di Varese” in 
1988, and through production licences as in the case of perfumes, spectacles and 
watches. In 1989 it was decided to enter into the sporting goods sector with the 
acquisition (near Treviso) of Nordica, an important producer of boots, skis, skates, 
skateboard and tennis rackets. The new business was not successful and it was sold in 
2003. 
 
5.2.5: SUPPLY CHAIN HISTORY  
Benetton has changed their supply chain model in number of ways. Originally the 
company outsourced labor intensive production, for example tailoring, finishing, and 
ironing to local manufacturing networks. What they chose to keep internal were heavy 
investment strategies and operations such as weaving, cutting, dyeing, quality control 
at all phases, and finished goods packaging. Here is a diagram showing the historic 
supply chain model for Benetton. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3: first Benetton supply chain model 
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In the mid- 1990’s as growth accelerated, Benetton designed a primary center to 
manage production, logistics and distribution. This facility is located near the 
company’s headquarters in Italy and is referred to as the central pole. With the 
establishment of a consolidated central shipping center, the company is estimated to 
have saved 20% on transportation costs. As this framework developed further, 
Benetton set up other similar regional poles around the world in its manufacturing 
centers. With this model, the head production pole in Italy now concentrates on the 
fashion design and electronically sends the product specifications to the regional poles. 
The regional poles then identify the production needs and source to a specific local 
manufacturing network. Once complete the finished products are sent back to the 
central pole for final shipment preparation and distribution to the retail outlets. In 
total, Benetton maintains 32 total productions centers, 22 in Italy, and 10 abroad. The 
following diagram represents this new supply chain orientation. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4: New Benetton’s supply chain orientation 
Through this model, Benetton has realized significant efficiencies through 
coordination, increased control, improved speed of production, and reduced 
inventories. In general, the company’s direct operations, where quality can be 
assessed, and direct distribution to the retail outlets takes place. A timeline of supply 
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chain developments highlights some of the major events that have taken place at 
Benetton from 1999-2007. 
 
 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007 
Overview Retail store 
changes  
Increased control 
over supply chain 
and logistics 
systems 
RFID used to track 
entire supply chain 
Developed sales 
network 
Increased Asian 
operations 
Manufacturing  
and  
Distribution 
 Operations 
Increased 
manufacturing 
capabilities in 
volume 
production 
Moved to a more 
vertically integrated 
system 
 
Reduced product 
line under two 
brands 
 
Controlled 85% of 
all raw material 
 
Integrated 
technology that 
links local stores to 
the main pole in 
Italy 
Implemented RFID 
to track all 
products 
 
Estimated to 
improve in-store 
sales by 5% due to 
better in-store 
availability 
Improved RFID 
logistics in supply 
chain 
 
Incorporated 
licensing of new 
brand for 
manufacturing 
3 distribution centers in 
China to sort not 
accumulate  
 
Increase in sales of 
15%-20% due to Asian’s 
sourcing 
Retail Operations Move to larger 
store model 
Benetton owns 
and operates 
 RFID tags left on 
products after 
sales to monitor 
returns 
Internet to 
increase Asian 
retail 
 
Figure 5.5: timeline of Benetton’s supply chain development 
The first aspect of the model that contribute to the company success is Networked 
Manufacturing where groups of manufacturers collaborate on specific orders that are 
targeted to their capabilities, batch size, flexibility in operations, and lead time to the 
central pole. The second is Postponement in Dyeing, which was a process 
improvement step Benetton created, which referred common manufacturing 
processes in the industry. 
 
5.2.6: NETWORKED MANUFACTURING 
The Networked Manufacturing system Benetton developed is an interesting 
configuration. Benetton had strict policies that stated manufacturing of products 
would not begin without an actual order in hand from a retail store. Once the order 
was placed, Benetton would purchase the raw materials and ship directly to the 
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Networked Manufacturing groups. As time went on, this system became highly 
centralized and allowed for better quality control of materials and logistics 
management in Networked Manufacturing system. The system itself however is where 
the power lies. As the company actively seeks manufacturers for specific product 
segments, for example higher batch size or stitching type, they look for and require 
highly integrated groups of manufacturers that combine their efforts and work 
together closely. What this means is each part of the manufacturing process, cutting 
each piece of the clothing, stitching, assembly, adding accessories, and packaging is all 
coordinated among the members of the manufacturing network so that each has a 
defined role and responsibility. In the 1990’s, contracted networks conducted 40% of 
wool knitting, 60% of assembly, and 20% of finishing operations. The process of 
defining the capabilities for each group is critical and very specialized. If one group for 
example is strong in wool, undyed sweaters, then this network will handle the 
production of these products, while other highly specialized groups focus on say jeans. 
This allows clear guidelines to manufacturers, lower setup costs without having to 
switch machinery, improves speed and ensures proper resource utilization. 
Another important key to the Networked Manufacturing is the coordination among 
manufacturers whose responsibility is similar. For example, if there are two companies 
that both supply collars for a particular shirt, but one runs into problems, Benetton 
doesn’t have ask the other supplier for an increased order size. This may negatively 
impact quality, and hinders the resources the suppliers may have available. Instead the 
networking increases communication among all suppliers, so that the supplier who 
cannot produce the product will provide the order to another capable manufacturer. 
In the case of wool products, this saved Benetton an estimated 85% in costs when 
compared to its competition. 
 
5.2.7: POSTPONEMENT IN DYEING 
In the apparel industry, the process of dyeing or coloring a product commonly begins 
with a purchaser or manufacturers buying pre-dyed raw materials, cotton or other 
fabrics. With pre-dyed materials the only steps are manufacturing, assembly and 
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finished product distribution. What Benetton realized however, was if this process 
were moved to the end of the manufacturing cycle, once the product was completed 
without color, the company would realize greater flexibility in their demand 
production and could lower their inventory significantly. 
 
 
 
     
 
Figure 5.6: Dye and Knit VS Knit and Dye 
With the addition of postponement to the logistics system, Benetton gained many 
significant competitive advantages in the industry. Instead of preparing an entire 
season product line, and holding a large safety stock, the company could produce 
smaller batch sizes to initially stock stores and adjust to customer preferences as the 
season went on. In the old model low volume colors would be marked down in price to 
clear inventory. In the new model, the same inventory is prepared in lower sizes so 
once the low volume product is gone, there is more retail shelf space for higher 
demand products and Benetton can produce these colors as needed. The company 
generally would use the first 5-10% of seasonal sales to project this into the 
postponement strategy for continued manufacturing during the season. Benetton also 
began to use 10% of its production line for what the company calls the “Flash 
Collection”. These 50 or so products are designed as customer demand is identified 
early in the season, primarily by highly desired colors and styles. Benetton limits the 
production of this line, but with the flexibility of the postponement strategy, these 
products can be produced and designed in less than 5 weeks.  Manufacturing and 
shipping take only 1 week. The next time a customer enters the store, the product is 
there just as they imagined. This process improvement has helped to increase 
customer satisfaction and improve the lead time for new product introductions. 
Postponement has also decreased the risk significantly that a new product will fail and 
Dye Dye 
Knit 
Knit 
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the inventory costs of these failures will hurt profitability across all products. The 
investment in adding dyeing machines was well worth the costs saved in lowering the 
inventory holding cumulatively among all the retail outlets. Now retail outlets maintain 
a greater level of selling floor space, and are able to receive new shipment, which go 
directly to the shelf for purchase. 
 
5.3: INFORMATION SYSTEM 
Benetton operates in a highly competitive, mature industry characterized by a fickle 
consumer base demanding an increasing variety of products. The market is volatile and 
risky. Competitive activity can render one's product fines unfashionable overnight. 
Product life cycles are planned to be short to maintain consumer interest. In fact, 
Benetton plans for eight fashion collections on top of the two basic fashion seasons--
that is, a complete change of product lines ten times a year. The logistics system needs 
to operate at a high level of competency to support this incessant pace. The strategic 
responses in such an environment are complex. The successful marketer needs the 
vision and the skills to manage diversity. On the one hand it needs to meet the 
demands of fashion--the rapidly changing needs of the customer. Hence, it needs to 
develop flexibility and speed. On the other hand, to compete in the "industrial fashion" 
stakes, it needs to maintain high levels of efficiency. Benetton has learned how to 
rapidly and constantly adapt to changing consumer tastes while gaining efficiency 
through economies of scale. It has done this by clearly understanding the role of 
logistics in supporting the core business strategy. The linchpin of this support is 
information systems technology. Information technology links the market place with 
the manufacturing process. Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) allows Benetton's agents 
in each country to regularly transmit orders to Benetton's head office. This knowledge 
of the market updated every 24 hours allows Benetton to carefully track and react to 
demand by manufacturing only those garment styles, colours and sizes required. 
Communications technology has allowed Benetton to "eliminate the filters between 
the customer and production" and to link the customer directly to the factory. But the 
rapid transfer of information by and of itself is not the key factor for success. The key 
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factor is how to use the information technology to integrate the supply chain and 
maximize the value output. Benetton has been forced to innovate in the 
manufacturing process to take advantage of the market knowledge made available 
through EDI. Communications technology has been integrated to CAD/CAM systems to 
give Benetton the speed and flexibility which it needs to compete effectively in the 
fashion market. As Benetton has said, in comparing itself to its competitors, "many can 
get the knowledge but only we have the wisdom to be able to use it to create the 
competitive edge". 
Knit now, dying later 
Computer-aided design (CAD) of garments along with computerized garment cutting 
and assembly is the secret to a fast and flexible manufacturing operation. The process 
starts with in-house garment design using sophisticated CAD technology. Video disc 
storage of all past clothing ranges allows designers to call up previous styles and 
colours. State-of-the-art on-line software allows designers to create designs using 250-
colour palette screens. Data representing these designs can be transferred directly to 
computer-controlled garment cutters and knitting machines. In theory then, garment 
design to manufacture can take as little as a few hours. The garment assembly is 
carried out by subcontractors. Any fabric and garment dyeing is carried out by 
Benetton while subcontractors are again used for finishing operations. Clothing 
manufacture is a mix of high technology and high labour. By retaining ownership of the 
high technology production elements, Benetton can take advantage of the economies 
of scale inherent in volume manufacture. By subcontracting the labour intensive 
operations it sheds the high cost elements to small family owned enterprises having 
lower cost structures. These cost benefits flow on to Benetton. Traditionally, the 
manufacture of clothing starts with the dyeing of the yarn followed by the knitting of 
the garment. The problem inherent in this sequence is that the knitting process is 
slow--so that to meet customer service expectations requires high levels of inventory 
of finished garments. The likely result of the traditional approach, as anyone who has 
been responsible for managing inventory will know, is that invariably the desired 
colours will be out of stock while there are excess inventories of the unpopular 
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colours. In a market characterized by very short product life cycles, this mismatch of 
inventory and customer demand cannot be corrected using a traditional 
manufacturing approach. The typical result is the end of season mark-down. The 
obvious answer technically is not a simple one and involved Benetton in process 
innovation. The solution was to manufacture the garments from the bleached yarn and 
delay dyeing until information on the preferred colours became available through EDI. 
This reversal of traditional logic brings its rewards: 
 cost savings by delaying addition of expensive dyestuffs; 
 better customer service by matching supply and demand; 
 increased sales by having customer desired stock available; 
 fewer write-downs for the same reason. 
This delayed dyeing process is an example of the principle of postponement. 
Postponement suggests that value should be added in the supply chain as late as is 
consistent with meeting customer needs. 
The robotic distribution centre 
The $50 million distribution centre (DC), is more accurately described as a giant robot. 
The storage area alone of the DC measures 170 metres long b 80 metres wide by 20 
metres high; a third of this height is below ground level to minimize the impact on the 
surrounding landscape, in keeping with the Benetton concern for the environment. 
Twenty loading and unloading bays service the building. Inbound garments from the 
production areas arrive below ground level. The garments are already packed in one of 
two standard boxes which are barcoded and pre-addressed to customers. The 
barcoded cartons are delivered by high speed conveyors from the receipt bays to rail-
guided transporters in the storage area. Each transporter can transfer up to 24 cartons 
at a time to and from the racking. Simultaneous put-away and retrieval occurs to 
maximize efficiency. The storage zone has a capacity of 250,000 boxes sorted 
randomly. The DC handles 12,000 boxes a day, equivalent to 6,000 consignments a 
day, representing some 60 million garments a year. The high level of automation 
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allows the DC to operate on three shifts with six operators to a shift. Shipment is 
directly to one of 6,000 retail stores in 83 countries. Distributors, wholesalers and 
regional centres are not used. To achieve high levels of response all exports are 
airfreighted. 
Improve service and logistics savings 
During the transition from founder-managed organization to maturity, functions and 
processes need to be formalized and the ad hoc decisions and structures appropriate 
in the growth stage need to be reviewed. The logistics functions are not immune from 
this process. The breathless pace of establishing a global network of shops left a wake 
of uncoordinated and unintegrated movement activities. A raft of carriers, freight 
forwarders and customs brokers had been used to move the product, often with the 
not unexpected result of having the product arrive without matching paperwork and 
with subsequent delay in product delivery to the stores. The poorly integrated 
activities resulted in low service quality at a high cost of distribution. An analysis 
showed Benetton that economies of scale were possible in the freight-forwarding 
function. In a joint venture it established WIDE (Worldwide Integrated Distribution 
Enterprise) to manage the international forwarding and customs clearance functions. 
WIDE was first established to manage the North American product movements. This 
organization deals directly with air carriers--eliminating a level of freight-forwarded 
intervention. EDI technology allows Benetton to transmit documentation ahead of 
consignment arrivals, to allow speedy clearance through customs and on forwarding to 
the retail outlets. These functions are managed or performed by WIDE. The result of 
this rationalization was a 55 per cent reduction in physical distribution costs and a 
reduction in lead times to the USA from 22 days to seven days. 
 
5.3.1: THE SHOP 
Benetton works through a network of 85 agents around the world. Agents in each 
country are responsible for recruiting the retailers, showing the fashion collections, 
processing retailer orders, selecting retail sites, carrying out training and, importantly, 
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feeding market intelligence to Benetton. For this they receive commission, usually 
around 4 per cent, based on sales in their territory. Although often called franchises, 
the retail outlets are more accurately described as licensees. The licensees, unlike a 
franchised arrangement, pay no fees or royalties. This neatly allows Benetton to 
sidestep the often restrictive franchise legislation in many countries. Licensees must 
agree to stock and sell only Benetton products, merchandise and display the garments 
according to Benetton guidelines and also follow price guidelines. For Benetton the 
stores are not simply outlets for their garments but information probes measuring the 
level of customer acceptance of the Benetton "look". In true partnership mind set, the 
key desirable qualities of the licensees are their commitment to Benetton and their 
ability to expand the market. The global EDI network used to keep Benetton in touch 
with the world is used to provide support to the agents. They have access to 
information about what is in production, in the DC or in transit, Licensee billing and 
credit status is also made available to the agents. 
In sum, then, the strategic outsourcing decisions look as follows: 
 CAD/CAM design, cutting, knitting, dyeing: high tech, high capital, scale 
economies possible: do in-house. 
 Garment assembly, finishing: no scale economies possible, large high cost 
labour force needed which could reduce flexibility: outsource to sub-
contractors. 
 Raw material purchasing: scale economies possible; do in-house. 
 Mass distribution: scale economies possible, fast cycle times needed to meet 
customer expectations with minimal inventories: do in-house. 
 International transportation: scale economies not possible with Benetton 
volumes: outsource to international carriers. 
 Freight forwarding: scale economies became possible with increasing volumes, 
service improvements possible: change from outsourcing to in-house through 
joint venture. 
 Global communications network: scale economies not possible with Benetton 
volumes: outsource to GE Information Systems. 
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 Retail stores: high capital needed, potential labour cost and motivation 
problems, and high customer service levels needed: outsource to licensees. 
The speed and flexibility of the entire system is such that it is capable of filling a retail 
shop replenishment order mid-season within two to four weeks. This includes the time 
to manufacture the garments. Mid-season ordering is beyond the capacity of most 
fashion businesses. This is possible with minimal inventories by manufacturing only 
what is ordered. In addition, this is possible only with the aid of information 
technology, flexible high speed manufacturing, high speed distribution and an 
organizational structure capable of handling this. 
5.4: FINANACIAL DATA 
As we seen for Inditex, there is a comparison of revenues and net income. 
Nevertheless, for Benetton revenues and net income are appreciably declining. 
Revenues from 1765 (2005), 1911(2006),2049(2007), 2128 (2008) and then another 
time 2049 (2009). Net income seen a decrease before the revenues: 122(2005), 145 
(2006), 155 (2007), and then 125 (2008), 112 (2009). 
                  
Figure 5.7: Benetton’s revenues-net Income ( millions of euro) 
The following chart show how the revenues are distributed in the world: most of them 
came from Italy. 
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Figure 5.8 : Benetton’s revenues by regions 
To end the financial analysis there is a comparison among three performance 
indicators : ROE (Return on Equity), ROI (Return on Investment) and ROS ( Return on 
Sales) 
                  
Figure 5.9: Benetton’s performance indicators (ROE, ROI, ROS) 
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5.5: COMPETITORS 
GAP 
 Similar to Benetton, Gap is also a retail company offering similar product lines and 
services; this then makes Gap a direct competitor of the company. In addition to 
similar product lines, Gap also employs similar franchising efforts in order to expand its 
business in the international level. For instance, the company had recently established 
a franchising agreement with Al Tayer Group, a retailer based in Dubai, in order to 
distribute its products within five Middle Eastern markets. Aside from this, Gap has 
also been actively expanding its business in other Asian regions; the company for 
instance, had recently signed an agreement with F.J. Benjamin, a Singaporean-based 
franchisee, in order to put up Gap stores in Malaysia and Singapore. This ability of the 
company to expand in different countries is supported by the fact that Gap is a 
recognized global brand, hence, exhibits a strong appeal even to foreign consumers.  
Although Benetton and Gap apply a similar methodology to gain foreign market entry, 
the objectives of the companies appear to be different. Specifically, Benetton employs 
the franchising method so as to strengthen its commercial strategy as well as expand 
its business operations. Gap on the other hand, applies this strategy mainly to reverse 
its slowly declining sales. Gap stores have long been established in Britain and France; 
however, the stores in these areas have already matured and are no longer showing 
signs of great improvement. Thus, the company adopted the franchising strategy so as 
to revive the business. While the companies differ in objective, the development of 
using the franchising strategy in Benetton and Gap took the same pattern. In 
particular, both companies have initially started on establishing company-owned 
stores in foreign locations. Eventually, this system proved to be more costly as 
compared to dealing with large foreign retailers. Thus, in order to save on operational 
and labor costs, Gap and Benetton now consider entering foreign markets by 
contacting interested external franchisees.  
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STEFANEL 
Benetton is imitated by its mainly Italian competitor: Stefanel. This company is one of 
Italy's largest fashion companies, manufacturing young, sporty, wearable separates 
and knitwear for the young menswear and womenswear market. Sold in shops 
worldwide, Stefanel clothing is synonymous with good design in quality fabrics, as well 
its licensing agreements and a joint venture with Calvin Klein. The company began in 
1959 as a manufacturer of knitwear in Treviso, Italy. The brainchild of Carlo Stefanel, it 
quickly established a reputation for lively color and quality. Carlo's son Giuseppe 
Stefanel entered the business in the mid-1970s, with exciting plans for expansion into 
the broader fashion market of casual clothing, sportswear, jeans, and ready-to-wear. 
Through franchising, Stefanel developed a competitive distribution system that 
resulted in a steady growth in international markets, particularly in the Far East and 
Europe. Stefanel's development strategy has supported distribution growth by 
introducing carefully targeted production policies within the textile and clothing 
sector, constantly widening the breadth of product ranges. Knitwear still plays a 
dominant role in Stefanel collections. For both menswear and womenswear the look is 
unisex, homespun, and traditional. Fair Isles, jacquards, stripes and checks are 
incorporated into cozy, easy shapes and restyled into modern, young looks. For 
evening there are slinky gold, ribbed knits and crochet designs teamed with black 
drainpipes and silky white blouses for a dressed-up look. Pioneer-style denims, 
chambray, tartans, and tiny paisley prints are the major woven fabrics used in oversize 
shirts, casual shirtwaist dresses, simple jackets, and wrap over minis with fringed 
hems. Cuban style jackets in heavy wool coating, teamed with fisherman jerseys, can 
give a nautical feel to the range. Stefanel boutiques mix high-tech with traditional in 
their interiors. Simple wood floors and furniture are mixed with chrome and glass to 
create a spacious, modernistic shopping environment. The clothing is merchandised in 
a logical, easy way with garments arranged in color coordinated sections making it 
simple for the customer to put together an outfit. Such retail outlets were sprinkled 
throughout the UK, including its first shops in Ireland in the 1993. Stefanel also opened 
stores in major cities in China, the first consumer goods manufacturer to do so. In the 
1990s the firm experienced growth and a much higher profile. In 1995 Stefanel and 
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Calvin Klein agreed to a joint venture to manufacture and distribute the popular CK 
bridge lines. The agreement further called for opening CK stores across Europe and in 
the Middle East, for Stefanel to acquire a production facility exclusively for CK apparel, 
and the formation of two new companies—K Service SpA (wholly-owned by Stefanel 
for manufacturing) and SKY Company SpA (73-percent owned by Stefanel, the 
remainder to Klein, for distribution). The glow from the Klein deal dimmed quickly, 
however, when Stefanel experienced its first ever losses in 1995 and 1996, due mostly 
to restructuring its worldwide operations. Then the following year top officials of the 
firm were under investigation by Italian authorities for fiscal fraud and falsifying 
documents, though charges had yet to filed. Stefanel and Klein opened their first CK 
store in Milan in early 1997, and the former finally reaped the benefits of its 
reorganization and debt reduction of the last two years. For 1997 Stefanel was back in 
the black and the Klein venture was beginning to pay off. Stefanel then turned its 
attention to expansion outside Europe, namely in the U.S. where operated just a few 
stores. Guiseppe Stefanel has carried on the tradition his father began almost 50 years 
ago, and their firm is one of the few remaining independent fashion empires in Italy 
and beyond. 
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CHAPTER 6 : QUICK RESPONSE 
6.1: FAST FASHION 
The traditional fashion markets, characterised by two fixed seasons per year, have also 
been affected by the need for more rapid refreshing of ranges, styles and colours. 
Demanding consumers and competitive retailing have generated pressures to respond 
with multiple refreshes per season. The focus is on replenishment of the specific styles, 
designs and colours that are selling well, whilst reducing, changing or abandoning 
those that turn out to be less popular than forecast. This reduces the problem of 
marking down the price of less popular clothing that fails to sell in the forecasted 
volumes. This trend, when taken to the extreme of compressing design times, multiple 
refreshes, coupled with very quick response from the supply base, and all done at low 
cost, describes the so-called ‘Fast Fashion’ market. Irrespective of the category, 
clothing products can take a circuitous route from fabric production, through garment 
production and distribution, to eventually reach an individual retail customer.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 : generic high-level structure of globally dispersed clothing supply chains. 
 
Figure 6.1 illustrates the generic high-level structure of globally dispersed clothing 
supply chains. The textile producers supply the clothing plants, which in turn feed into 
distribution and logistics systems to enable garments produced in dispersed global 
networks to meet anticipated demand in specific retail chains and stores. In Figure 6.1, 
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the solid line crossing the regional Distribution Network (RDC) is highlighting 
conceptually that the balance of what is globally and locally dispersed, as well as 
ownership and control patterns, can vary significantly, depending on the specific 
supply chain considered. Thus a major brand owner that sources globally and supplies 
major retailers will have to manage the interface between its distribution network and 
that of each of the retailers it supplies in their national markets. In reality, any specific 
clothing supply configuration will resemble more a supply network than a ‘linear’ 
supply chain. Much of the material flow complexity occurs around clothing plants and 
in the distribution and logistics parts of the system. However, describing just the 
physical configuration and the material flow is insufficient to understand and analyse 
the operation and performance of any specific system. The high-level view illustrated 
in Figure 6.1 is limited in displaying the diverse sets of entities that can play a part in 
any particular supply network. As well as fabric producers, garment manufacturing 
plants and retailers, a global supply network will include designers, buyers and 
merchandisers, distribution, logistics and warehousing companies and may include 
additional finishers that ensure products are ready for display and sale in any particular 
market. Key issues that need to be understood include the different participants within 
the network; the nature of their relationships; ownership, power and control 
structures; how the network is managed, coordinated and controlled and how 
information flows in the network. Buyer-driven chains are controlled by these 
powerful players through their ability to stimulate and shape demand via strong brand 
names and extensive retailing outlets or presence within retail outlets (e.g. M&S, 
Primark, Zara, Levi’s). Such buyer-driven supply networks are different to the 
producer-driven supply networks common in some sectors such as the autoindustry. 
Producer-driven supply networks are characterised by large and powerful multi-
national manufacturers (e.g. Toyota) controlling tightly coupled networks of supply, 
production and distribution. Profits are derived from the scale and volume of 
operations and technological advances in both products and process. Technology rent 
(e.g. the use of unique technology) and organizational rents in the form of intra-
organizational processes (e.g. employing JIT and TQM) act as barriers to entry in 
producer-driven supply networks and that relational rent (inter-firm relationships), 
trade rent (tariffs and quotas) and brand name rent (established brands) act as barriers 
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to entry in buyer-driven supply networks. In contrast to producer-driven supply 
networks, buyer-driven networks in clothing are often characterised by looser and 
more dynamic couplings linking production principally in developing countries to 
demand for fashion in developed countries. They rely on global sourcing strategies to 
meet demand. Profits and margins in buyer-driven supply networks are generated 
from design, sales, marketing and services that link globally dispersed factories with 
consumer markets. This more complex view of globally dispersed clothing supply 
networks incorporating multiple entities, a powerful control entity and various forms 
of relationships, must be considered when evaluating the capabilities and capacity of 
any system, how it performs and how it could be improved.  
 
6.2: GLOBAL QUICK RESPONSE 
Responsiveness in operations management has been defined in different ways. 
Common elements typically highlighted for responsive operational systems include 
information management, partnerships between supply chain members, 
manufacturing flexibility, effective inventory management and strong logistics systems. 
The importance of Quick Response strategies has been emphasised in the clothing and 
apparel sectors since the late 1980s and a number of QR initiatives have been 
undertaken in the sector. The study of QR was initiated by Kurt Salmon Associates 
(KSA) in the US apparel industry in 1986 and has spread widely in the apparel industry 
since 1990. QR in the clothing sector has been defined in different ways and from 
different perspectives. Lowson et al. (1999) define QR as ‘a state of responsiveness and 
flexibility in which an organisation seeks to provide a highly diverse range of products 
and services to a customer/consumer in the exact quantity, variety and quality, and at 
the right time, place and price as dictated by real-time customer /consumer demand.’ 
Forza and Vinelli (2000) define QR as ‘modifying the current organizational system of 
the chain and speeding up the physical and information flows, in both directions, 
between all the phases of the value operative chain system.’ The potential benefits of 
QR initiatives have been noted by a number of researchers - increased sales volumes, 
reduced markdowns, reduced stock-outs, reduced costs and prices, greater price 
validity in retail stores, and improved financial performance and increased 
competitiveness. Retailers improve the profitability of their business by using rotation 
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of stock as leverage (replenishment of orders), which helps to minimise forced 
markdowns and discounts and ensure more sales take place at the normal retail price. 
However, such responsiveness may result in a reduction in order sizes, higher ordering 
frequency and a requirement for shorter lead times than in conventional supply 
systems. The clothing industry now operates with global supply networks, presenting 
greater challenges for Quick Response. Global Quick Response (GQR) is a strategy that 
seeks to achieve accurate, rapid and cost effective response to specific markets 
dynamically by leveraging the potential of dispersed global supply and production 
resources through lead time compression, effective real time information 
management, flexible pipeline management and optimal logistics and distribution 
systems. GQR strives to combine cost and scale efficiencies by sourcing globally with 
quick and accurate response to specific market requirements derived from information 
management, dynamic planning and strong logistics. GQR requires that the 
complexities, risks and additional coordination inherent in managing international 
supply routes with multiple linkages are absorbed if sales opportunities are to be 
maximised and the risks of supplying the wrong products minimised.  
 
6.2.1 ACHIEVING GLOBAL QUICK RESPONSE 
From sample to volume 
The process is initiated by a new garment design that is produced in sample form in 
very small quantities. If the design (typically a set of related garment styles in various 
combinations of colours and sizes) is successful in the marketplace with buyers, 
merchandisers or retailers then volume orders are placed. The process must be 
capable of ‘ramping up’ to volume production if a substantial volume order is placed. 
The flow of garments may then be sustained for a period of time by repeat orders that 
will typically vary in mix during the period, i.e. the quantities for each repeat order may 
vary in terms of colour, size and style details. Substantial pre-production stages are 
needed in order to move from the production of small scale sample designs for 
showing or merchandising purposes to large scale volume production capable of 
sustaining multiple repeat orders with varying mix over a season. Thus, for each 
unique style variant, garment specifications need to be defined, including sizing and 
pattern making and providing relevant instructions for cutting, assembly, sewing, 
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finishing and packing. A key part of ensuring that volume garment production can be 
initiated for a new style or range of related styles is the sourcing of the required fabrics 
and accessories in the required volumes and with appropriate timings. Multiple 
garment styles may often be produced from a specific fabric type. Fabric supply is a 
substantial part of the overall supply process, with typically substantially longer lead 
times than garment production cycles. Having a ready source of fabric that is delivered 
with the anticipated volume of orders is therefore important to ensure quick response 
to volume orders. However, this can pose significant challenges for fashion garments. 
In practice there may be iterations and overlaps between the design, garment 
engineering and fabric sourcing functions, e.g. sampling may be done by a company in 
one country interpreting the design concept from another. Fabric selection may 
stimulate the design process, with fabric sourcing being initiated concurrently with 
design and garment engineering. Garment production is typically a process of cutting, 
making up (sewing garment components together), pressing and packing. For some 
basic garments cutting may be done in separate production units before being sent to 
one or more production units for making up into finished garments. Making up of 
garments is usually the longest process, typically involving multiple skills and a 
significant garment production costs. However, manufacturing lead times may be less 
significant than the combined lead times in upstream design, specification and textile 
sourcing and the downstream logistics and distribution processes. Some of the 
technical aspects noted here vary for knitwear and hosiery garments. Depending on 
where a garment is produced (which could involve multiple locations), logistics and 
distribution must be considered from production sites into retailing distribution 
networks, possibly through producer or logistics providers’ warehouses. In volume 
retailing systems this may just mean fitting into an existing logistics and distribution 
system. These are typically managed by 3rd party logistics providers to feed into the 
retailer’s distribution centres serving the markets where garments are destined. For 
smaller and more specialized outlets specific systems may have to be designed. Two 
further issues that need to be considered are the colouring process and accessories. 
Garments may be produced from fabric that does not need colouring or from fabric 
which is subject to colouring after fabric production. A third possibility is that finished 
garments may be coloured once produced. In the second case the colouring process 
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may add to lead times or complicate fabric sourcing. Sometimes the garment producer 
may store fabric in a ‘grey’ undyed state and wait until orders are confirmed before 
sending fabric for dyeing. If whole garments are dyed then this additional process must 
be factored into the garment production cycle. Although the sourcing and supply of 
garment accessory items may seem a relatively trivial part of the overall process they 
can be problematic. Often accessory items may be the distinguishing feature of a 
particular style variant or be required to match other aspects of the garment style in 
some way. Coordinated sourcing for highly mixed orders is therefore important. 
Special processes such as embroidery or adding sequins may also be problematic if 
they require specialist skills or involve outsides service suppliers, complicating process 
routes and adding to lead time. 
 
6.2.2: THREE KEY PROCESSES 
Global Quick Response (GQR) must be considered with respect to the generic garment 
industry structure and processes described above and the requirements, opportunities 
and challenges that arise. There are three key processes: 
1. The new garment design and development process 
2. The initial volume order process 
3. The replenishment or repeat order process. 
In traditional systems these processes occur sequentially and are affected by different 
constraints in the supply system. Here is considered these processes in the context of 
the global supply network and the factors affecting lead time and the ability to 
respond. 
 
The new garment design and development process 
Typically design samples require only relatively small lengths of sample fabrics usually 
available from fabric suppliers based on standard fabrics that are always in demand 
and new or special fabrics produced by the fabric producers based on expected fashion 
trends in anticipation of garment designers’ needs. The new garment design process 
requires not only new garment designs to be produced quickly but it must also enable 
quick ‘ramp up’ to volume production. The rapidity of new product introduction is a 
feature of current Fast Fashion retailers. This requires capabilities to extract and utilise 
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relevant market information, leverage design resources, modify existing designs and 
understand what is practicable and realisable with available manufacturing resources. 
The value to designers of having local sampling facilities that can produce samples 
quickly is great. Where sample garments are produced using global resources they may 
use specific plants with which the design group has a special relationship. Fast 
turnaround times are important at this stage and may require sample garments to be 
expedited using expensive transport options in small volumes. The time taken for cost 
estimation for a new design may also have to be factored into the new garment 
development process. When pricing needs be done before a garment is offered to 
retail buyers or merchandisers then decisions on where volume production is to be 
carried out, as well as detailed garment engineering and specification details need to 
be completed. Estimation done by a contracting garment manufacturer may add to 
new garment development time and may incur risks if approximations and 
assumptions are made with respect to supply and production costs. An important 
trend in a number of industrial sectors has been the move towards concurrent 
engineering for new product design and development. Concurrent engineering is 
particularly important and challenging when design, development and production are 
not co-located but dispersed internationally. Concurrent engineering principles are 
well developed for engineered products in sectors such as aerospace and automotive 
and there is significant potential for the clothing sector to exploit concurrent product 
development concepts in a GQR context. 
 
The initial volume order 
Decisions on the most appropriate plants in which to produce a new garment are 
typically based on technical, cost, contractual and logistical factors relating to the 
supply of inbound fabric and accessories and outbound distribution. Not all plants in a 
network will have the capability to produce all garment designs. Key issues are: 
technical competence to manufacture; capacity to supply and pre-existing contracts 
for agreed volumes. In buyer-driven supply networks, the brand owner, branded 
manufacturer or major retailer may control fabric supply. Garment producers in the 
network may be mandated to use specific fabric suppliers with which the buyer or 
prime supply network controller has established contracts. This may guarantee 
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adequate fabric supply but also, and importantly from the controller’s perspective, 
may help to assure quality. Initial volume orders may enable significant learning e.g. in 
regard to quality and distribution. Lessons learned from a new supply route may well 
mean changes for subsequent orders – for instance if the anticipated capacity to 
supply has not been realized or if logistical difficulties prove insurmountable. At the 
very least there will be learning opportunities for repeat orders or new styles using the 
supply route. 
 
The repeat and replenishment order process 
A dependable network is needed for replenishment orders. The network needs to be 
capable of working at the required pace for the supply chain and, importantly, be 
capable of accommodating changes in volume and mix requirements. Quality and 
logistics issues need to have been eliminated to ensure that a supply route can 
respond to mix changes and costs with the required speed and responsiveness. Fabric 
sourcing should be agreed and capable of supplying at the rate required. An effective 
order placing and confirmation process must be in place. Supply networks cannot 
maintain high levels of unutilised capacity in anticipation of demand. The potential 
downside of a strongly demand-driven order fulfilment system is that volume sales 
opportunities that arise quickly may not be capable of being fulfilled. The market may 
demand some items in high volumes that could only have been satisfied by prior 
production based on forecasts. Increases and changes in the level of product variety 
add to complexity in international supply chains. Both QR and GQR systems must have 
sufficient supply capacity, accurate market intelligence and effective controls and to 
deal with both the volume and mix issues. Supply networks need to be able to absorb 
the negative effects of volume and mix changes. A key issue in designing effective GQR 
systems is good decision making with respect to when to commit to volume and mix. 
 
Enablers for GQR 
GQR needs to incorporate many of the elements of QR systems but do so in the 
context of globally dispersed production and supply resources. Strive for fast and 
accurate information transmission: the processes and speed of transmission of both 
product and order information need to be analysed. The formats for design and 
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garment specifications need to facilitate both rapid transmission of design 
requirements and the rapid production of new designs. An issue in the sector is that no 
standard universal product data formats exist for garments, unlike engineering design 
information. Speed and accuracy are also important in the transmission of order 
information, particularly for replenishment orders where time is of the essence. 
Develop flexible production resources: traditional garment manufacturing uses batch 
production methods. Many opportunities exist to reconsider layouts and organisation 
of factory processes, particularly cellular manufacturing where whole garments or 
parts of garments are produced or assembled in flow driven cellular processes. If such 
cells are rapidly reconfigurable then advantages can be gained in quickly responding to 
the required mix changes. In addition, flexible human skills are valuable in responding 
to changing garment designs. This is critical, particularly in the time consuming making 
up processes in garment production. When flexible skills are combined with cellular 
team based production, then rapid response to design and mix changes can be 
enacted without incurring significant set up costs. Utilise technology and automation 
where appropriate: in general the garment manufacturing sector is less automated 
than many other industrial sectors, particularly the engineering sector. Human skills 
perform much of the value adding activities in garment production. However, every 
opportunity needs to taken to adopt new technology in areas such as laying up and 
marking of fabric, cutting, sewing, pressing and packing. Also technologies that assist in 
rapid material identification, material handling and material flow and technologies that 
enable flexibility need to be adopted, particularly for quick changeovers and set ups 
processes. Develop fast logistics: rapid material flow needs to be encouraged and 
enabled in any QR system. The corollary to this is that stationary material and large 
inventory buffers should be avoided. The entire distribution channel from production 
to the retail floor needs to be considered. Implementing fast logistics for inbound 
fabric supply, for material flow within plants and outbound into the distribution 
channels is important. The technologies noted above can assist in achieving this. The 
last ‘50 metres’ of the supply chain should not be ignored; hence the importance of 
‘floor ready’ garments that are appropriately tagged and packaged for immediate 
display once delivered. Exploit all opportunities for lead time compression: the 
combination of the above initiatives reduces many of the time delays affecting overall 
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response times. All aspects of processes, systems and procedures for gathering and 
transmitting demand information and for the design, production and distribution of 
garments must be looked at for opportunities to compress lead times. One of the keys 
to compressing overall response times is to ensure fabric availability. As noted earlier, 
this can be challenging for fashion or innovative garments. In addition, QR initiatives 
will try to identify specific opportunities for lead time compression in the systems and 
processes of any specific producer or supply chain prime partner and those aspects of 
the system that need close management and control. QR must be a key part of an 
organisations strategy and have a supportive organisational culture: An organisation 
that seeks to pursue QR must see it as a fundamental part of its business strategy. Not 
all organisations should attempt or will be successful at QR. In pursuing a QR strategy, 
every effort needs to be made to develop a supportive organisational culture. Strong 
QR basics are needed in GQR systems. However, much of the emphasis in QR 
initiatives has focused on internal production systems Achieving GQR in globally 
dispersed clothing supply networks requires much more – a total systems focus. 
 
In the reminder of this section GQR in buyer-driven supply networks is considered with 
respect to (1) market intelligence and rapid new product introduction, (2) network 
structure and composition, (3) network planning and staged postponement, (4) 
network capability, performance and health.  
 
Market intelligence and rapid new product introduction 
Given the increased complexity in a GQR system compared to a locally-based supply 
system, more and better market intelligence is required. Earlier and greater sensitivity 
to changes are needed particularly in new product introduction and in specifying 
repeat orders. The whole of the clothing sector is influenced by trade and fashion 
shows for yarns, fabrics and garments. These strongly influence new styles and the 
fabrics and materials used. Whether for commodity products or for Fast Fashion they 
provide important signals in understanding what future demand may look like. 
However, although such events strongly influence what is designed and produced, 
they cannot dictate consumer behaviour. Receiving accurate consumer-based market 
intelligence is equally important. Effective systems need to be in place to gather and 
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utilise the information emanating from downstream consumer behaviour and 
preferences. Opportunities for lead time compression may be possible in all parts of 
this process – information gathering, information interpretation and in dissemination 
to designers. Design capabilities, skills and expertise are needed that can utilise market 
information and that can manage the sampling process. For rapid new product 
introduction it is important to understand garment architecture and those details of 
garment styles that are important to the customer. Thus, the range of garment styles 
that can be produced from a specific fabric can be maximised. By offering only relevant 
variety that customers value in terms of ranges, styles, colours and sizes, the 
potentially negative impacts of variety in sourcing, production and distribution can be 
minimised. 
 
Network structure and composition 
A strong supply network with multiple capabilities that can respond appropriately to 
diverse and changing demands is essential in achieving GQR. Although some brand 
owners and retailers may be able to use global production resources on an ad-hoc 
contractual basis, more generally a well developed cohesive network is needed to 
guarantee continued response and replenishment in appropriate volumes and mixes 
and also to innovate where appropriate. Hence the nature of the supply chain 
partners, their relationships and locations within the network are important. Desirable 
network structure will depend on factors that include costs, quality, reliability of 
delivery, access to quality inputs and transport and transaction costs. Some supply 
networks may be based on traditional contractual relationships, whilst others may be 
fully integrated with long term relationships based on trust. Purely contractual 
relationships may have benefits in terms of achieving volume and limiting the liabilities 
for the contracting producer. However they are more limited in terms of 
responsiveness to mix changes, in-season refreshing and in changing pre-agreed 
contracts. A fully integrated network structure may positively affect the reputation of a 
brand, facilitating the close monitoring of the entire sourcing process. However, a fully 
integrated network may also be costly to maintain and may result in slow response in 
some circumstances when it is centrally controlled. A combination of contractual and 
integrated partnerships may provide the optimum level of network flexibility. Although 
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various forms of ownership, joint ventures, equity stake holdings, strategic alliances 
and contractual relationships may exist in a network, the development of strong 
mutually beneficial partnerships is central to establishing an effective supply network. 
Partners that agree to adopt a GQR strategy in a supply network are more likely to be 
successful in adopting effective processes and practices over time. Network structures 
operating on a purely contractual basis are likely to take longer to set up, have longer 
lead times and be less flexible and responsive to market changes. However there are 
difficulties in maintaining long term partnerships unless mutual benefits accrue. 
Making partnerships work involves sharing the benefits of improved margins and 
guaranteed volumes rather than benefits accruing only to the prime partner or 
retailer. The importance of partnerships and the careful selection of partners based on 
the specific competencies they offer and the contributions they make to the network. 
Building strong relationships is identified as important, not just at the company level 
but at the functional level as well. They note the importance of specific relationships 
and interfaces in the supply networks they analyse e.g. between designers and 
manufacturers and between sales and development functions. Although GQR is 
premised on utilising global supply networks to gain cost, capability and volume 
advantages, some local production resources may be important for some retail and 
brand strategies to enhance flexibility and speed. Thus, a GQR strategy may combine 
both local and global production resources to cater for some aspects of the dynamics 
of the market quickly and flexibly. An important issue is to decide the right balance 
between local and global production resources to meet specific market requirements. 
Network partnerships involve not just fabric and garment producers but potentially 
many other service providers. Effective logistics is central to a successful GQR strategy. 
This may be facilitated by using experienced Third Party Logistics (3PLs) providers with 
knowledge and expertise of global distribution. Such organisations can provide the 
‘glue’ to enable a GQR network to operate effectively and efficiently. Third Party 
Logistics providers can enhance the operation of supply networks by utilising their 
expertise in deciding appropriate modes of transportation, in facilitating cross border 
trade and in providing contract warehousing facilities with the latest automation in 
materials storage and handling. Logistics partners can organize and facilitate cross-
docking initiatives to minimise stationary time and reduce the need for intermediate 
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storage in supplying retail markets. In addition, GQR networks may require other 
services for the gathering of market data, for product design, merchandising and 
marketing. Ethical issues are increasingly important in supply chain management in 
general and in the clothing sector in particular. The globalisation of the clothing 
industry has increased competition amongst suppliers and indeed between countries 
and this has put pressure on the adoption and maintenance of strong ethical practices. 
However, globalisation also opens up supply networks to greater scrutiny and public 
awareness. Non-ethical practices are more likely to be exposed than in the past. The 
adoption of ethical practices may have positive effects on brand image, perception and 
loyalty both in customers and in suppliers although how these issues affect consumer 
purchasing decisions is open to debate. Many retailers and brand owners have 
developed ethical frameworks, policies and practices. However failure to have ethical 
policies or to apply them in practice exposes the major companies in the supply chain 
to significant risks with respect to both brand perception and legal issues. Ethical 
issues can be expected to play an increasingly significant role in influencing and 
affecting network design and composition in the future. 
 
Network planning and staged postponement 
A supply network must be capable of producing and delivering efficiently at the 
anticipated demand and variety level. Although at the detailed mix level, forecasting is 
likely to be inaccurate, in GQR systems some aspects of future requirements can and 
indeed must be predicted at the volume level, starting with a retailer’s target sales 
volumes. Inaccurate volume estimation will result in either a network that cannot 
supply the required volumes because of capacity limitations or one with costly 
unutilised spare capacity. Effective supply network planning and management is 
important, particularly for ongoing repeat ordering and replenishment where market 
requirements are changing dynamically. There may be a tension here between the 
retailer’s perspective and the producer’s perspective. The former tends to prefer to 
delay committing to precise orders until as late as possible on the basis that later 
information will result in precise requirements being known with greater accuracy and 
thus entailing less risk. However, the producer values long planning lead times to 
ensure that production resources can be marshalled efficiently and that stable plans 
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can be put in place, avoiding frequent changeovers and giving reasonable lead times to 
suppliers. A type of staged postponement described here helps to balance these 
opposing needs. The postponement principle delays commitment to final product 
attributes until close to the point of real demand. It avoids the risks and costs of 
carrying large inventories. Postponement can be applied in different ways and the 
terminology used differs. The more common type of postponement – form 
postponement - delays commitment to the final product form until a late point in the 
production process. This is often associated with ‘late point differentiation’ strategies. 
However, this approach is not of great value in a GQR clothing context. The relative 
time in production is outweighed by time taken for pre-production, fabric sourcing and 
by distribution. In addition a late point differentiation strategy is difficult to apply in 
the sequence of operations in garment production. All the key product attributes – 
fabric/style/colour/ size – are committed to in the cutting process. Once fabric is cut, 
precise style commitments are made. However, the cutting process is the first value 
adding operation in garment production. Place postponement occurs when the final 
destination of finished garments is left undecided until clear demand signals are 
received. This has some value in a GQR system. Finished goods inventory may be 
pooled in central downstream warehouses and ‘called off’ for different locations as 
local demand requires. Place postponement may also be important for fabric sourcing 
when fabrics can be used by various garment producers in the network and allocated 
dynamically to garment manufacturing plants depending on current demands. There 
are some applications in apparel products combining late point differentiation and 
place postponement – so called ‘customising in the channel’ - where centrally stored 
inventory is worked on within logistics facilities for such finishing operations such as 
tagging, labelling, printing or specialised packing appropriate for particular markets, 
particularly for promotional items. A type of postponement that is less commonly 
discussed is postponement in planning. The most valuable and important type of 
postponement in dynamically managing a GQR clothing network is structured and 
staged planning postponement, illustrated in Figure 6.2.  
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Figure 6.2 : Staged planning postponement and flexible open pipelines 
 
 
 Well designed staged planning postponement strategies operating over a rolling 
planning horizon have great potential to enable effective dynamic planning to meet 
changing market requirements. Essentially, aggregate volumes are committed to at an 
early stage of the planning process but commitments to precise mix requirements are 
delayed as late as possible in the planning process, thus maintaining an open flexible 
planning pipeline but allowing the network to prepare for volume production. At each 
stage, commitments to order details become more precise – initially just volume 
contracts but eventually commitment to precise mix ratios in terms of colour and size. 
The precise stages and timings (T1 to T5 in Figure 6.2), as well as the associated 
planning activities, will depend on the nature of demand, the nature of the supply 
network, how responsive it is and also on the retailer’s strategy. The global dispersal of 
production units needs to be factored in – geographical distance may determine the 
latest point at which commitments can be made and how much flexibility there is in 
the planning pipeline. Market knowledge is also important. The details of a staged 
planning postponement strategy will differ depending on whether basic, seasonal, 
fashion or fast fashion garments are being produced. 
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Network capability 
Planning for capacity is one thing. Capability – the range of garment styles that a 
network can produce - is another. Both the capability and performance of the supply 
network must be assessed. Although fashion trends can and do go through sudden, 
perhaps seismic changes from one season to the next, for many seasons range changes 
can be more gradual and planning at the mix level is more important. Ensuring an 
appropriate range of network capabilities, particularly when major changes are 
anticipated is therefore important, i.e. the ‘health’ of the network must be maintained. 
For retailers and brand owners with established networks it is important to track 
performance, understand where critical interfaces occur (e.g. interfaces with the 
greatest influence on responsiveness and lead time) and where additional capabilities 
may be required. Managing across critical interfaces with supply network partners is 
important. The power of rapid information gathering needs to be leveraged with 
appropriate IT systems to highlight underperformance and to assess where additional 
or different capabilities may be desirable. Dynamic networks that attempt to match 
real demand with supply more precisely will inevitably have some problems but 
valuable learning can occur by addressing problems proactively and jointly. The 
powerful player in a supply network can benefit from managing the development of 
capability, capacity and performance of the supply base. Supplier development 
programmes can benefit the long term health of a network by enabling appropriate 
and timely capacity expansion (perhaps through joint investment), by developing 
quality standards and by having proactive and joint approaches to problem solving. 
 
6.3: ZARA 
Different retailers, brand owners and branded manufacturers have evolved, developed 
and deployed different strategies to achieve Global Quick Response (GQR) with 
different levels of network integration. Inditex, the Spanish textile, clothing and 
retailing company and its Zara brand have been noted frequently in the both the 
academic and practitioner literature for the radical changes they have brought to the 
way fashion clothing is sourced, produced and sold. Their supply network has 
traditionally been in Northern Spain and Portugal but increasingly they have used an 
international supply network, sourcing from countries such as Turkey, Morocco, India, 
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Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka and Indonesia. However, their network remains 
strongly integrated - 60% of the production is carried out in-house in Europe and 
neighbouring countries; 40% of its fabric is sourced from Inditex companies; it has its 
own design resources and systems, centralized and automated fabric cutting and 
dyeing and has its own distribution centres. They are therefore more vertically 
integrated than many of the major clothing retailers or brand owners operating 
globally. Zara prioritises responsiveness to its global retail network over production 
efficiency. They are willing to tolerate surplus capacity to enable responsiveness. Their 
operating philosophy emphasises well-designed systems that are focused on 
compressing the time taken from receiving market information to delivering the right 
products to Zara’s retail stores. The dominant ‘rhythm’ that drives design, forecasting, 
planning and replenishment across the entire network. In deploying these principles, 
Zara uses typical good practices, e.g. state-of-the-art IT, warehousing and distribution 
systems. Their distribution centres enable rapid dispatch of garments to stores all over 
the world, e.g. within 24 hours for the EU and within 48 hours for North America and 
Asia. However, they also adopt less common approaches. Co-location of designers, 
production and distribution staff has a major positive effect on achieving rapid 
response. By deploying ‘end-to-end’ control of both physical supply and information 
transmission, Zara achieves rapid time to market for new products in small batches, 
resulting in reduced markdowns and less stock holding overall than competitors.  Their 
inventory-to-sales ratio is better than many of its competitors. Furthermore, Zara 
maintain different mixes of products across their retail outlets and offers large 
assortments of garments to their customers. They are prepared to tolerate stock-outs, 
reasoning that it may encourage customers to make frequent visits to stores. Figure 
6.3 illustrates Zara’s overall approach that enables it to achieve time compression in 
supplying garments to retail stores that will best appeal to customers. It is based on 
strong market intelligence to understand what is selling and customer preferences for 
specific garments, styles, colours and combinations. Retail stores operate on a tight 
schedule for replenishment orders that are fed into the forecasting, planning and 
scheduling system to drive both the production and distribution networks. This 
enables rapid dispatch of garments driven by real demand. Zara is prepared to hold 
significant stocks of fabric to enable the garment production system to be decoupled 
123 
 
from the longer lead time fabric production system. This is helped by having a 
significant level of fabric supply originating within its parent company group. Zara’s 
new garment design cycle may be seen as a form of ‘time postponement’. Market 
intelligence is used for designing and developing new garments quickly. Zara has 
invested significant resources into design and garment engineering to interpret market 
intelligence and to enable new garment variants to be developed, evaluated, costed 
and planned for production rapidly. Thus, Zara can delay or postpone the final design 
until it has a clear view of likely demand for the new variant, knowing that its design 
and development system can respond quickly with garment designs that can be 
successfully engineered and brought into production. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.3 :Zara’s demand driver approach 
 
 
6.4: BENETTON 
Benetton’s traditional approach of direct retailing entrusted to third parties 
represented one of the Group’s most successful strategies for many years. However, 
this strategy no longer seems to be able to sustain Benetton’s presence on the market. 
The retail market has recently been characterized by a general tendency to increase 
the average size of retailing outlets, up to 1500-3000 square metres- the so-called 
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megastores. On the contrary, the average size of Benetton’s retail outlets has 
remained much smaller. Benetton risks seeing its locations suffocated by the 
aggressive market penetration strategies of its international competitors, whose retail 
outlet’s average size is larger. In order to face this challenge Benetton has decided to 
reorganize its commercial policies and change the size of its retail outlets. Alongside 
the strategy of rationalizing retail outlets, which are still organized using the traditional 
licensing formula, Benetton has taken on a far greater challenge: the Retail Project. 
Since November 1999, Benetton has been working on a project which seeks to flank its 
traditional retail network of licensed retailers with a direct sales network, which will be 
made up of medium to large-size shops directly owned and managed by the Treviso-
based company itself. The Retail Project, which entails complete downstream 
integration, represents a marked change in the traditional Benetton model of business 
organization. With the Retail project, Benetton is seeking to challenge competitors, 
focusing on selling garments with a high styling content, on continuous rotation of the 
products displayed in outlets and on very large display areas. By opening and directly 
managing its own retail outlets, Benetton is also able to get closer to the final 
consumer, thus obtaining more information and reinforcing its image, in a business 
where fashion is more and more unpredictable, subject to lightning changes and 
where, as a result, quick response to the market is a key success factor. Moreover, 
through an information system that directly links Benetton’s own retail outlets with 
headquarters, the firm know exactly how many, which size and what colour of article 
has been sold, how much it was paid for these and what remains on the shelves in the 
shops. Thus, Benetton is able to design and produce collections on the basis of 
continuously updated information. 
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CHAPTER 7 : ECR 
Efficient Consumer Response (ECR) came into existence in the US as a direct response 
by the grocery industry to threats from alternative store formats/types – such as 
discount stores, convenience stores, deep discount drug stores (retail pharmacies 
which also sell low-price consumer items), hypermarkets/ supercentres, and the rather 
quaintlynamed “category killers” which offer specialised, limited-line discount goods 
(such as toys or sports goods). These alternatives to the supermarket began to take 
market share away from the major supermarket chains in the late 1980s and early 
1990s. The pressures from competitors in this variety of alternative store formats then 
forced the United States grocery industry to re-examine its supply chain and, as a 
result of the study, a new initiative known as ECR was introduced. The term “Efficient 
Consumer Response” came into general usage at the Food Market Institute 
Conference in January 1993 in the United States. ECR is a grocery industry supply chain 
management strategy aimed at eliminating inefficiencies, and excessive or non-value-
added costs within the supply chain, thus delivering better value to grocery 
consumers. It is designed to re-engineer the grocery supply chain away from a “push 
system” in which manufacturers “push” products into stores, towards a “pull system” 
in which products are “pulled” down the supply chain into the store by consumer-
demand information captured at the point of sale. The ultimate goal of ECR is to 
produce a responsive, consumer-driven system which allows distributors and suppliers 
to work together in order to maximise consumer satisfaction and minimise cost. In 
order to achieve the goal, ECR proposes changes in nearly all the grocery industry 
business practices to make them efficient. The technologies, which are primarily 
electronic commerce (ecommerce) components, are used to automate these efficient 
business processes, as well as to enhance the communication and relationships 
between companies. ECR is thus an application of ecommerce within the grocery 
supply chain. The ECR strategy is used not only in the US but also in some other 
regions, notably Europe. A number of research projects conducted in Europe show that 
there have been increasing levels of interest among manufacturers and retailers in 
implementing ECR. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests that ECR is being 
implemented in Europe for different reasons from those which drove North American 
corporations. The competitive push from alternative store formats does not appear to 
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be a major driver for ECR in Europe. As a preliminary comparative exercise, the more 
limited objective of this paper is to use available survey data to compare aspects of 
ECR implementation in the US and Europe.  
 
7.1 : ECR’S HISTORY 
The supermarket originated during the 1920s in the United States. As retail grocery 
outlets, supermarkets are characterised by self-service from open shelves. 
Supermarkets also provide an assortment of non-grocery products. Due to the 
economic depression which began in 1929 and the mobility of consumers provided by 
the newly-accessible automobile, consumers would rather travel to more distant 
supermarkets offering lower prices, than shop in their closer but more expensive local 
food stores. As a result, supermarkets experienced an explosive growth in popularity 
during the 1930s. As the number of supermarkets in the US began to reach its 
maximum sustainable level during the 1950s, competition drove the development of a 
number of innovations designed to maintain profits. These included, inter alia, the use 
of “private brand” labels, stamps and games. Later, in the 1970s, the use of 
discounting techniques and coupons began to replace the use of stamps and games. 
All these consumer promotion techniques required extensive administration and, 
therefore, introduced overhead costs to the operation of a supermarket  which would 
naturally be reflected in the prices charged to customers. A further disadvantage of 
supermarket operations was the adversarial relationship existing between grocery 
manufacturers and retailers, which operated to the disadvantage of both groups. In 
most transactions, manufacturers would attempt to sell as much as possible at high 
prices, while retailers/distributors would tend to purchase as little as possible at the 
lowest price. Manufacturers normally started with high prices and later discounted 
these to meet their shipping goals. As a consequence, forward/investment buying and 
diverting were added to the array of inefficient grocery industry business practices 
which generated short-term excess profits for the supermarket, but created significant 
administrative overheads, inventory carrying costs, sporadic manufacturing schedules 
for manufacturers and high inventory levels for the entire supply chain. In addition, 
these practices also had the potential to erode the value of manufacturers’ brands, 
causing customers to become more price sensitive and less brand loyal. All these 
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inefficient consumer and trade promotions resulted in a loss of market share for 
supermarkets in favour of the leaner, more focused alternative store formats in the 
late 1980’s/early 1990’s . 
 
7.2: A COLLABORATIVE SOLUTION 
In order to survive, the US grocery industry realised that it must re-examine its supply 
chain and purchasing practices. It needed to study the ways in which alternative 
format retailers were carrying out their business and to develop new ideas for making 
the mainstream grocery industry more competitive. A study undertaken by a group of 
US grocery industry leaders in 1992 resulted in the ECR initiative. ECR is actually not a 
new concept, but a specialised version of the Quick Response (QR) strategy, which is 
employed in the apparel industry. Quick Response, in turn, is a modified version of the 
Just-In-Time (JIT) inventory management strategy for manufacturers, which was first 
used by the Toyota Motor Corporation in Japan. ECR attempts to eliminate 
inefficiencies within the grocery industry supply chain by introducing strategic 
initiatives in four areas: Efficient Store Assortment; Efficient Product Introduction; 
Efficient Promotion; and Efficient Product Replenishment. K 
 
7.3: STRATEGIES 
Efficient store assortment 
This initiative is aimed at optimising the productivity of inventory and shelf 
management at the consumer interface - the store level. 
Efficient product introduction 
The objective of this initiative is to maximise the effectiveness of new product 
development and introduction activities, in order to reduce costs and failure rates in 
introducing new products. 
Efficient promotion 
This initiative aims at maximising the total system efficiency of trade and consumer 
promotions. This can be achieved by introducing better alternative trade and 
consumer promotions, such as pay for performance and every day low price policy. 
Efficient product replenishment 
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The objective of this initiative is to optimise time and cost in the replenishment system 
by the provision of the right product to the right place at the right time in the right 
quantity and in the most efficient manner possible. 
 
7.4: PROCESSES 
Category management 
Category management supports the first three initiative of ECR discussed above. It is 
defined by Information Advantage as “an interactive business process whereby 
retailers and manufacturers work together in mutual cooperation to manage 
categories as strategic business units within each store". A category is a group of 
products which can be substituted for one another by a consumer and examples 
include cereals, bakery, household cleaners, and so on. The types of categories to be 
included in a store have to be determined correctly to meet consumer demand and at 
the same time, to maximise profit for all parties. Category Management employs EDI, 
barcodes and scanners to accurately capture information on customer demand on 
each category and to share the information between trading partners. 
Continuous replenishment program (CRP) 
This program supports the efficient product replenishment initiative. CRP is defined as 
"the practice of partnering among distribution channel members that changes the 
traditional replenishment process from distributor-generated purchase order to one 
based on actual or forecast consumer demand" . 
CRP transfers responsibility for inventory replenishment from retailers/distributors to 
suppliers and thus the approach is also known as “Vendor-Managed Inventory”. With 
CRP, orders are transmitted electronically and are made more frequently and in 
smaller quantities . CRP is also supported by the category management program which 
forms the shelf management strategy to track the inventory and demand for each 
individual category. In addition, CRP involves the use of technologies discussed below. 
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7.5 ENABLING TECHNOLIGIES 
Barcodes / Scanners 
The use of barcodes and scanners is a fundamental element for ECR implementation in 
the grocery industry as it allows accurate and faster information capture to be 
obtained, which in turn can be shared with trading partners (EAN Australia 1997). 
 Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) 
Electronic Data Interchange (EDI) is “an inter-organisational exchange of business 
documentation in a structured, machine-processable form” . Besides purchase orders 
and invoices, another common business document exchanged electronically in the 
grocery industry is the Advance Shipping Notice (ASN) the EDI message which precedes 
the arrival of pallets at their destination.  
Computer-Aided Ordering (CAO) 
Computer Aided Ordering (CAO) is “a retail-based system that automatically generates 
orders for replenishment when the inventory level drops below a pre-determined 
reorder level” (ECR Central 1997, p1). The system keeps track of the inventory levels of 
all items in the store and makes necessary adjustments when sales or replenishments 
occur.  
Cross-Docking/Direct Store Delivery 
Cross-Docking or “Flow-Through Distribution” is a direct flow of merchandise/ product 
from receiving to shipping, thus eliminating additional handling and storage steps in 
the distribution cycle . The idea of cross-docking is analogous to ‘Direct Store Delivery’, 
in which manufacturers deliver products directly to the retailer, bypassing the 
wholesaler to eliminate warehouse handling. 
Activity-based costing 
Activity-Based Costing is a new costing tool which works on the principle that activities 
(as opposed to product volumes or labour in traditional accounting) are what really 
affect costs. ABC offers a better understanding of how profits are generated, as it 
increases the visibility of costs in a particular environment. It can be used to gain top 
management commitment and leadership to support the implementation of ECR and 
its key elements.  
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7.6: MAKING THE CHANGE TO ECR 
The range of management techniques and technological initiatives described above 
have proved highly successful in the United States. The obvious benefits to be gained 
from ECR have led to its adoption by some companies in Europe, though with a 
different motivation. In order to make the ECR initiative work, there is a need for 
major changes in a company’s culture, traditions and business practice. Proponents of 
ECR believe that companies within the supply chain must move from win/lose 
adversarial relationships to win/win relationships between trading partners. Many 
companies find the process of making these changes challenging. However, only when 
all parties within the supply chain work together to increase efficiency and remove 
costs from the chain will they be able to provide greater value to consumers. Then the 
use of technologies to automate these efficient business processes will remove further 
time and costs from the supply chain. 
 
7.7: ADOPTION ISSUE 
 ECR education 
Both US and European respondents viewed “trade association conventions 
/seminars/conferences” and “trade association publications”, as well as “an inside 
champion of ECR” as important sources in obtaining information and learning about 
ECR. Thus, in both regions, industry/trade associations play an important role in 
initiating the adoption of ECR by companies through the communication and 
education process. Both US and European companies view system vendors and 
academics as not particularly useful in understanding the ECR concept. 
Change management 
Both US and European manufacturers and retailers viewed “heavy and visible personal 
commitment” as one of the most effective and widely used ECR change management 
approaches. “Pilot programs with suppliers or customers” and “cross-functional or 
multi-discipline action teams” were reported as widely-used approaches among 
European manufacturers and retailers. The concept of “business process 
reengineering” appears to be quite popular in Europe and was also viewed by some 
American retailers as a satisfactory change management approach. 
Creating Performance Measures 
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There was considerable agreement by both regions on the need to create performance 
measures which:  
· focus more on customer/consumer satisfaction 
· place more emphasis on productivity gains 
· place more emphasis on Activity-Based Costing to understand the real profitability of 
products and customers. 
Level of program and technology implementation 
The US 1995 survey indicates that Category Management and Continuous 
Replenishment Program were progressing significantly among American 
manufacturers and retailers. The 1995/6 European survey showed that these were the 
least widely implemented practices (quite possibly because the much smaller 
European inventory holdings made implementing these processes less urgent). The 
1997 findings, however, indicate an improvement in the implementation level of 
Category Management in Europe. Increased levels of implementation of technologies 
such as EDI, particularly among manufacturer respondents (who generally lagged 
behind retailers in IT implementation), were also identified. The annual tracking 
surveys used in this study suggest that the level of maturity of Cross Docking/Direct 
Store Delivery implementation was higher in Europe than in America. DSD has been 
widely implemented by large European retailers. However the EDI implementation 
levels are still relatively low in both regions. The highest EDI capabilities found in both 
regions were in purchase order transactions and invoice transactions. 
 
7.8: OBSTACLES AND BENEFITS 
 
Obstacles 
The 1994 and 1995 US surveys indicate that “lack of a clear roadmap” was viewed as 
one of the major obstacles to ECR implementation, particularly among retailers. 
“Shortage of skilled personnel”, and “inflexible IS” are also major obstacles. Table 4 
lists, in rank order, the six problems most commonly identified by US manufacturers 
and retailers, based on the 1995 survey. In Europe, most frequent reasons given by 
manufacturers and retailers for not implementing ECR in both surveys, were “shortage 
of adequately skilled people” and “Lack of understanding of ECR. Manufacturers in 
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both regions view “reluctance of customers to share information” as one of the major 
problems encountered. Table 5 lists the six problems most commonly identified by 
European manufacturers and retailers, based on the 1997 survey findings. 
 
Benefits 
The US 1995 survey results indicate that distributors/retailers believed they had gained 
some benefits from ECR, and that the projected benefits had increased over the years. 
These benefits included: increased sales and gross margin, reductions in warehouse 
inventories, reductions in retailer inventories, increased variety of goods offered to 
customers, reductions in the numbers of SKUs (stock keeping units), and reductions in 
expenses for all key operating areas. Similarly, the US manufacturers and brokers both 
expected and experienced such benefits as: increased sales, increased profit 
projections, reductions in costs of goods, reductions in packaging, raw materials, 
manufacturing and other expenses, reduction in out-of-stock problems, reduction in 
finish-product inventory, smoother product flows, and better information. In Europe, 
manufacturers expect to see ECR benefits continue to improve in regards to: 
reductions in finished goods inventories, reductions in invoice deductions and out-of-
stocks, increased in sales, and improved profits. European retailers also expect 
reductions in all their costs, reductions in warehouse inventories, improved sales, gross 
margins and sales per square meter, slight reductions in transaction size, and an 
increase in store traffic. 
  
7.9 : DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
These comparisons suggest that the ECR initiative has gained some acceptance by the 
European grocery supply chain, although the level of ECR investment and the rate of 
growth are still lower in Europe than in the US. The decline from 1995 to 1997 in the 
rate of ECR implementation in Europe may indicate that the European grocery supply 
chain does not take ECR as seriously as does the US supply chain. A further possible 
reason may be that there is less competitive push driving the ECR adoption process in 
Europe. However, the already advanced technology of most European retailers could 
provide a strong foundation for ECR implementation, if these retailers became 
convinced of the advantages of ECR. ECR implementation in Europe is generally 
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initiated by the larger trading partners. In both America and Europe, changes in 
attitude to establish partnerships and facilitate information sharing is still the most 
challenging issue. However, it is argued that more companies in both US and Europe 
are now actively pursuing the ECR partnership in order to improve the overall 
performance of the supply chain. Based on the most commonly cited implementation 
obstacles by survey respondents in both US and Europe, in order to promote ECR 
implementation in both regions, there is still a need for: 
 
 investments in communication both in a technological and behavioural sense 
to address the reluctance in sharing information between trading partners. 
 
 training to address the inadequacy of skilled personnel and to develop clear 
road maps for the implementation process. 
 
 investments in IS to achieve compatibility between organisations. 
 
 reassessment of priorities for resources 
 
 improving the strategic use of ECR to longer term business growth to overcome 
the problem of conflicting priorities. 
 
The surveys used in this study show that manufacturers and retailers in both regions 
have experienced some benefits in terms of increased sales, improved profit and 
reduced costs. However, neither group in the US nor Europe has actually reached what 
could be termed critical mass (30%-35% of industry volume) the point at which the real 
benefits of ECR can be reaped. While the surveys do not provide evidence to show 
whether ECR has produced improvements in turnover or market shares, this is clearly 
an important indicator of the long-term success of ECR. In this regard, further research 
is needed to identify how ECR improves turnover or market shares of companies. 
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7.10: FUTURE RESEARCH 
Despite the potential benefits obtainable from ECR, it must be reiterated that the 
adoption of ECR has been slow in both regions. Clearly, there is a need to explore the 
reasons for the slow uptake of ECR in each of these regions, and to determine whether 
these reasons differ between region. Such understanding could assist in the 
development of techniques for promoting wider ECR implementation. On the other 
hand, further study of low adoption levels may require a revisiting of assumptions 
about information sharing which underlie the ECR concept. It is perhaps significant 
that the ECR strategy least studied thus far in the surveys has been “product 
introduction”, a factor which especially touches on the fine balance between 
collaboration and competition in the grocery industry. 
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CHAPTER 8 : CONCLUSIONS 
Supply chain management has emerged as one of the major areas for companies to 
gain a competitive edge. Managing supply chains effectively is a complex and 
challenging task, due to the current business trends of expanding product variety, 
short product life cycle, increasing outsourcing, globalization of businesses, and 
continuous advances in information technology. Because of shorter and shorter 
product life cycles, the pressure for dynamically adjusting and adapting a company’s 
supply chain strategy is mounting. Zara and Benetton have different approaches that 
enable at the same result : satisfy customer’s demand. ECR is an important suggest to 
supply chain management that had produced substantial results in other industry and 
that can be adopted as well in the clothing industry. 
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CHAPTER 9: PLANNING 
In this chapter is described the time scheduling of the phases of the project, whit a 
chart that show in detail the processes and times needed for its realization.  As we can 
seen later, in this planning there are two different schedules. 
9.1 : INITIAL PROJECT PLANNING 
One of the first things to do while starting a project is the time scheduling; first of all it 
needs to be done a list of the activities to do and secondly to assign a duration to these 
activities. 
This initial planning it was useful to know in each moment where it had to be the 
project and where it really was. 
ACTIVIDADES\SEMANAS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 
PLANNING                               
REPORT                               
INTRODUCTION                               
HISTORY AND ORIGIN                               
BOOK READING*                               
ARTICLES READING                               
ZARA’S BUSINESS MODEL                               
BENETTON’S BUSINESS MODEL                               
ZARA’S STRATEGY                               
BENETTON’S STRATEGY                               
 ZARA’S STRENGTHS                               
 BENETTON’S STRENGTHS                               
COMPARISON OF THE TWO BUSINESS MODEL                               
DESIGN OF INFORMATION SYSTEM                               
CONCLUSIONS                               
BIBLIOGRAPHY     
 
      
 
  
 
            
REVISION                               
Figure 9.1: initial planning 
The initial planning is about 15 weeks  so: 
(15 * 10 * 5 = 750h) + (15* 6 = 90h) =  840h 
Where during the week I’ve worked 10 hours a day and on Saturday only 6 hours. In 
particular, during the week from 9 a.m. to  1 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 8 p.m.. And on 
Saturday from 10 a.m. to 1 p.m. and from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. 
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9.2: REAL TIME  PLANNING 
Once finished the project, it was done the calculation of the real hours spent in the 
project, with the relative distribution. In the following table there is scheduled the final 
order. 
ACTIVIDADES\SEMANAS 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
PLANIFICATION                                
REPORT                                
INTRODUCTION                                
VERTICAL INTEGRATION 
     
 
          HISTORY                                
BOOK READING                                
ARTICLES READING                                
ZARA’S BUSINESS MODEL                                
BENETTON’S BUSINESS MODEL                                
ZARA’S MATHEMATICAL MODEL                                
BENETTON’S INFORMATION SYSTEM                                
 ZARA’S FINANCIAL DATA                                
 BENETTON’S FINANCIAL DATA                                
ZARA’S COMPETITORS                                
BENETTON’S COMPETITORS 
     
 
          COMPARISON                                
ECR 
     
 
          
CONCLUSIONS                                
BIBLIOGRAFY     
 
       
 
  
 
            
REVIEW                                
Figure 9.2: real planning 
This work started the first week of March and ended the 20th of June. 
At the end of the project  work’s total hours  are calculated as follows:  
REAL TIME :  
(15 * 10 * 5 = 750h) + (15* 6 = 90h) =  840h 
 
9.3: JUSTIFICATIONS 
At this point are analysed the reason  why the two tables present such differences. 
Studying in detail the two charts we can elicit different conclusions: 
First of all, during my research and reading the articles, I found correct to change the 
index to underline a specific point of view of the comparison : the vertical integration. 
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Secondly, I finish my work one week later due to my trip to Italy to finish all the 
bureaucracy concerning with the final project. 
All the other differences are due to a obvious inequality with what is theoretical and 
what is real such as: time for learning, researching, writing, amount of information, 
write in a different language. 
 
9.4: ECONOMIC ANALYSIS  
This analysis is concerning with the amount of work’s hours and their relative costs. In 
fact, considering the total hours ( 840) and the cost per hour of an engineer(30€ ): 
840 * 30€ = 25200€ 
Beside this fundamental cost there are also others additional costs such as the cost 
concerning the use of the computers ;  the value of my pc is about 890€, his residual 
value is about  100€ and his useful life is 3 years (156 weeks). My project’s duration is  
15 weeks, so the depreciation charge per week is: 
( 890-100) / 156 = 5,064€ 
And the depreciation charge of the project : 5,064*15 = 75,96€ 
The usage of Internet is a relevant component of the calculation of the project’s costs. 
A cost per month is 29,90€; using it for 4 months : 
29,90 * 4 = 119,6€ 
Another important cost to take into account is the cost of printing all the material that 
I considered important for the project. Considering a cost per sheet of 0,03 € : 
300* 0,03 = 9€ 
At least, we have to add the cost of the book “The delta project” : 26€ 
As a result, the whole cost of the project is: 
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VOICE COST 
ENGINEER 25200€ 
PC 75,96€ 
INTERNET 119,6€ 
PRINT 9€ 
BOOK 26€ 
TOT 25430,56€ 
Figure 9.3: table of cost 
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